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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an examination of the formation, operation and 
dissolution of the Schools Consultative Group in New Zealand. In the 
context of the neo-Liberal restructuring of the state sector that occurred 
throughout the 1980s, the formation of this group was a political 
anomaly. The expulsion of 'vested interests' from the education 
sector, as in other public sectors, was a significant theme of the 
reorganisation of the administration of education. Yet the Schools 
Consultative Group, as a collection of education sector interest groups, 
was invited by the Minister of Education to advise him on matters of 
policy. While appearing to function as a consultative forum, it is 
argued in this thesis that the need for such a group arose out of the 
structural inadequacies of the neo-Liberal state form. More 
particularly, the struggle in education, which had reached critical 
proportions by 1992, was precipitated by the structural exclusion of 
education sector groups as 'vested interests'. The transformation of 
both modes of interest representation and intervention in the 
education state generated a structural crisis which was manifested in 
the form of a political crisis of support for continued educational 
reform. It is suggested here that the Schools Consultative Group 
represented a political strategy to contain the education crisis and to 
remove from the public arena a very public conflict between the 
Minister of Education and the teachers' unions over the direction of 
education policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 1992, a group called the Schools Consultative Group (SCG) 
was formed. The SCG was made up of representatives of the main 
state and private education sector groups (unions, principals' 
associations and employers) and from several key ministries and 
agencies1. Its task was, ostensibly, to find a solution to the continued 
conflict between the teachers' unions and the government over the 
bulk funding of teacher salaries, which had simmered since the 
proposal was made in 1988, in the Labour Government's policy 
statement, Tomorrow's Schools,2 to devolve the administration of 
teachers' salaries to individual school boards. 
The proposal to dismantle teachers' centralised pay system met with 
enormous resistance from the unions, and became a key focus of both 
their industrial and professional campaigns of opposition. Bulk 
funding was, however, only one point of conflict within a much 
broader process of contestation. Union opposition had been occurring 
in response to a whole range of issues arising from the neo-Liberal 
programme of reform implemented by successive Labour and National 
governments across the entire state sector, not just education. When 
the Labour Government specifically set out to restructure the 
education sector, however, the policy of devolution appeared to be a 
direct threat to the unions, because devolved pay was perceived as the 
first step towards site-based bargaining, with the concomitant agenda of 
weakening union power. 
Prior to its restructuring, the education state - made up of the 
Department of Education, the teacher unions, the old school boards 
and other education groups - had, as Gordon (1992) notes, endeavoured 
to operate in a collaborative and consultative manner. The New 
Zealand Education Institute (NZEI), the union of primary teachers 
formed in 1883, had a very close relationship with the old Department, 
1 These were: the Treasury, the State Services Commission (essentially the employer 
of teachers), the Education Review Office, Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet and the Ministry of Education. . 
2 The title of the government policy statement which developed out of the report of the 
Taskforce to Review Education Administration, Administering for Excellence: 
Effective Administration in Education (refer Chapter IV). 
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having forged strong ties with the agencies of state education almost 
from their inception (Jesson 1995). The Post Primary Teachers' 
Association (PPTA) was not formed until 1952, but, although more 
militant that its primary counterpart, it also benefitted from the 
tradition of close relationships in the education sector. Although 
through the 1970s and 1980s the relationship was punctuated by 
infrequent episodes of industrial action, largely from the more militant 
PPTA, the involvement of both the PPTA and the NZEI at the political 
level in policy development and implementation had become 
institutionalised to such an extent that the relationship has been 
described as meso-corporatist in character (Jesson 1995). 
By the mid-1980s, however, this close collaboration between the 
Department and teachers became the target of a campaign of attack 
waged by a number of powerful sources, from government agencies 
such as the Treasury and State Services Commission, to external 
organisations such as the New Zealand Business Roundtable and the 
right-wing Education Forum. The state/teacher relationship was 
viewed as being largely responsible for the poor performance of the 
education system. The thrust of the campaign was to suggest that 
teachers and their unions were self-interested, that the education 
system had been 'captured' by them and organised in such a way that 
teachers and bureaucrats, not students, were the primary beneficiaries. 
Moreover, according to its critics, the system that had developed as a 
result of this provider capture was inefficient, too highly centralised to 
the point of inflexibility and lacked accountability. 
Teachers were deemed responsible, too, for a host of other ills which 
ranged from declining standards and poor student performance to the 
deterioration of the education system as a whole. The proposed 
remedy to this unsatisfactory state of affairs was the discipline of the 
market. According to agencies such as the Treasury and the State 
Services Commission, only a devolved and de centralised education 
environment in which teachers were subject to more effective 
management structures and accountability mechanisms would ensure 
that the education system operated efficiently and economically for the 
benefit its consumers, not its providers. Previously viewed as 
autonomous and skilled professionals with legitimate input at all 
levels of education, from policy to practice, teachers were now being 
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positioned, by advocates of reform, simply as 'production line workers' 
(Gordon 1992b:53). Under Tomorrow's Schools, teachers would be 
repositioned as individualised employees responsible only for carrying 
out the orders of school boards of trustees, comprised of elected parents 
and the school principal, which was to become the new unit of school 
management. 
Although the expulsion of 'vested interests' underpinned the 
restructuring of the state sector as a whole, it was pursued particularly 
vigorously in the education sector. Between 1988 and 1992, a plethora 
of reports were produced by, or with the assistance of, government 
agencies as well as by private sector groups, all reinforcing the view 
that teachers and their unions were responsible for the faults of the 
education system. A bare three months after the new Tomorrow's 
Schools structure came into operation, the Treasury sought, and was 
granted, permission to undertake a review of the entire 
implementation process. The motivation for the review came when 
the expected economies from the restructuring did not eventuate. It 
was not particularly clear that the new government agencies into 
which the old Department of Education had been divided were any 
smaller, in terms of staffing numbers, than the Department had been. 
Furthermore, by the time the new structures came into effect in 1989, a 
number of modifications had been made and in some instances, the 
'more market' view of the Treasury progressively weakened. For 
instance, some of the services intended to be privatised, such as special 
education services, were retained. 
Convinced that the whole process had been subverted by teachers and 
their allies in the education bureaucracy who were on the 
implementation committees overseeing the changes, a Treasury-
dominated committee was established to review the process, producing 
in 1990 a report unimaginatively entitled Today's Schools, but more 
commonly known as the Lough Report. The report identified the 
areas of 'backsliding' in the reform process which required attention, 
and recommended further reductions in the size of central state 
agencies, emphasised the need for hierarchical management and 
control structures, and stressed the importance of bulk funding 
teachers' salaries. Throughout the whole report, as Gordon (1992) 
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notes, teachers were mentioned only four times. Clearly their role in 
the education system was no longer central. 
The State Services Commission, too, were concerned about the role of 
'interest groups', which teachers had now become, in the 
implementation process. In their brief to the new National 
Government elected in 1990, the State Services Commission offered 
the following observations on the influence of 'interest groups' on the 
implementation committees: 
The large number of such groups and the intensive nature 
of their work meant central agency officials had only limited 
influence on the process. Chairpersons appear to have been 
appointed primarily on the basis of the respect they 
commanded in the education field, rather than their 
independence or objectivity. It was obvious from some of 
the policy papers that were rejected, that some working 
group members were opposed to the reforms and very few 
members had direct knowledge of the Government's policy 
formulation process or of its objectives for the state sector as 
a whole. In fact, because individual members were often 
chosen as representatives of particular organisations rather 
than on the basis of personal qualities, they apparently used 
the working groups as a negotiating forum or as a means to 
preserve the status quo (Annex B, 1990:2). 
On the role of teachers, the SSC were the most scathing. Accusing 
teachers of providing a learning environment which was 'sheltered' 
from the harsh realities of a competitive world - and by implication 
suggested that such sheltering made students only fit for ACCESS3 
programmes - the SSC concluded that teachers, not consumers, had 
determined education provision by being able to exert undue influence 
over: their conditions of employment; the criteria for determining 
who can be teachers; teacher numbers; curriculum development; and 
policy development (ibid:5-6). 
3 Post-school vocational training schemes designed to reduce youth unemployment. 
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At the same time as the Treasury and the State Services Commission 
were pressing for their particular managerialist agenda for education, 
the Business Roundtable brought Stuart Sexton to New Zealand to 
evaluate the education reforms. His report, based on a mere two week 
'research' visit in 1990, was withheld by the Business Roundtable until 
1991, after the general election. Sexton concurred with, and went 
further than, both the Treasury and State Services Commission 
evaluations of the subversive influence of teachers and proposed the 
government implement a full market system forthwith. Teachers, he 
declared, 'are the most powerful of all the political constituencies in 
education', thus: 
The promise of a much reduced central bureaucracy has, 
therefore, not materialised. Moreover, most of the new 
boards and agencies have been staffed by people formerly 
employed by the Department of Education, the Education 
Boards, or one of the other former bodies. As a senior 
government official put it to me, the previous Department 
of Education officials are reasserting themselves all over 
again: "enlightened self-interest masquerading as moral 
principles" (1991:33). 
By the time the Sexton Report was released, Lockwood Smith was the 
new National Government's Minister of Education. He proved to be 
strongly supportive of, and ideologically committed to, the view of 
education championed by the Treasury, the State Services Commission 
and Sexton (Gordon 1992), to the view of teachers as merely 'vested 
interests', as well as to the completion of the self-managing agenda by 
the implementation of salaries bulk funding; a commitment he 
quickly demonstrated by directing the Ministry of Education to prepare 
a report on bulk funding shortly after gaining office in October 1990. 
Smith signalled his intention to proceed with bulk funding early in 
1991 with a letter to the two teachers' unions (Jesson 1995), the point 
which marked the beginning of the intensification of the conflict 
between the unions and the government, which would eventually 
culminate in October the following year with the formation of the 
Schools Consultative Group. 
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Given the extent to which education restructuring had, thus far, been 
predicated on the expulsion of teachers from all but the delivery of 
education in the classroom, the formation of the SCG was an 
extraordinary anomaly. Invitations to participate in a consultative 
group were issued by a Minister ideologically committed to the concept 
of greater school self-management, to groups previously dismissed as 
'vested interests', in order to find a solution to a particularly complex 
and enormously sensitive policy deadlock. In the context of the neo-
Liberal state structure, in education as elsewhere, the formation of such 
a group warrants a much closer inspection. Was it a reversion, 
perhaps, to the older-style 'corporatist' relationship that had 
historically prevailed in the education sector, a genuine consultative 
body, or merely an exercise in political risk management, a means by 
which a political crisis in education might be averted? 
In the particular circumstances that existed in 1992, In which the 
Minister was actively courting conflict with the teachers, and the 
unions adopted a strategy specifically aimed at reinforcing the 
impression of Ministerial responsibility for the conflict, the latter 
might be suspected: that the SCG was a broader political strategy to 
contain both the teacher unions, who had demonstrated their capacity 
to engage in protracted episodes of hostility, as well as prevent the 
incitement of further hostility by the Minister himself. Thus, the SCG 
could be viewed as designed simply to provide the 'two years of peace' 
of the title of this thesis, or as representing a more substantial shift in 
terms of state-interest group relations that was seemingly at odds with 
its neo-Liberal form. 
It can be argued that the SCG was, in fact, both of these things. And, as 
will be outlined in Chapters VI to IX, the SCG can be interpreted in 
several different ways and can be seen to have served a variety of 
purposes for the major participants. In the context of this thesis, 
however, I would like to present a more substantial and theoretical 
interpretation of the rise and fall of the SCG. This interpretation will 
be outlined more fully in Chapter III, but can be summarised thus: that 
the conditions that led to the formation of the SCG arose out of 
structural inadequacies inherent in the neo-Liberal state form as it 
existed in the education sector. More specifically, the conditions of 
crisis which occurred in education during 1992, and the ensuing 
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formation of a putative corporatist-type body as an attempt to manage 
that crisis, were, following Jessop (1990), the direct result of the 
transformation of forms of interest representation into, and the modes 
of intervention of, the education state that had taken place with the 
neo-Liberal restructuring of the state sector throughout the 1980s. The 
exclusion of education sector groups from legitimate representation 
into the education state at .the political level, and the structural 
incapacity of the education state to engage with such groups in the 
formation of policy and implementation, was effectively translated 
into a crisis of support for reform for successive governments; a crisis 
that reached its peak in 1992. 
In order to substantiate this position, this thesis falls into two separate, 
but related, parts. The first part deals largely with the theoretical issues 
involved in an examination of state-interest group politics. Clearly 
some theoretical understanding of the state is required, thus Chapter I 
presents a selective overview of the two principal theoretical traditions 
of the post-War state debate, pluralism and Marxism, and discusses 
some of the difficulties involved in the empirical application of such 
perspectives. Chapter II outlines the origin and development of 
corporatism, the body of political theory concerned with the particular 
form of state-interest group relationships it is suggested the SCC may 
be an exemplar of, and with the specific conditions under which such a 
relationship may emerge. Although a quite problematic corpus of 
literature, the model of corporatism to be utilised in the later 
examination of the SCC is presented in Chapter III, together with a 
broader state-theoretical framework derived from Jessop (1990), as a 
solution to the difficulties presented by the forms of Marxist state 
theorising outlined in Chapter I. 
Chapter IV is an historical chapter. In it, a somewhat abridged history 
of the development of state intervention in New Zealand is presented, 
together with an outline of the processes by which the role of the state 
was fundamentally transformed during the 1980s - a transformation 
that appeared to specifically exclude the formation of something like 
the SCC. Chapter V is concerned with issues of method, and outlines 
the difficulties encountered in conducting research on such a 'live' 
political issue as the SCG. Although the group was disbanded in 
September 1994 amidst great political acrimony, the process of 
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interviewing members conducted in 1995 indicated the extent to which 
the political context in which the group was embedded during its 
lifetime was still very much in existence. The political nature of the 
SCC ultimately limited the extent to which research was able to be 
conducted on it. 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII are concerned with documenting the 
formation, operation and dissolution of the SCC. Chapter VI outlines 
the hostile political context out of which the SCC arose, the genesis of 
the group, and also provides a small glimpse into the political 
machinations surrounding the appointment of the group's members. 
Chapter VII charts the operation of the group, its terms of reference 
and operating protocols, as well as the work programme of issues 
referred to it for consideration. The final SCC chapter, Chapter VIII, 
presents the decline and fall of the group, the role played by bulk 
funding in that process and the aftermath of its dissolution. Chapter 
IX, the concluding discussion, utilises the theoretical model outlined 
in Chapter III in order to offer some explanation of the events 
surrounding the establishment of the SCC. It specifically addresses 
four questions: was the SCC a corporatist-type body?; if so, to what 
extent was it an anomaly within a neo-Liberal form?; why was such a 
strategy pursued?; and, finally, to what extent could the SCC be 
considered a 'success'? 
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CHAPTER I - THEORISING THE STATE 
While 'the study of politics involves much more that the study of the 
state' (Held 1989:1), in a study of state politics some theoretical account 
of the assemblage of institutions collectively described and commonly 
known as 'the state' is a necessity. The purpose of this chapter on 
theorising the state, then, is twofold: to outline some of the general 
difficulties associated with defining what states are; and to provide an 
overview of the two principal post-War. theoretical traditions in the 
study of modern states, Marxism and pluralism. The chapter 
concludes with an outline of the problems associated with 
contemporary neo-Marxist theoretical approaches, and also a critique of 
the epistemological inclination within the state debate towards the 
construction of monolithic explanations of state form and function. 
Clearly an element of selection has gone into the perspectives on the 
state to be considered, a selection which is particularly evident in 
relation to the extensive Marxist literature on the subject. A general 
outline of pluralist state theory has been included because it was, and 
remains, an influential approach to understanding the state. However, 
the Marxist accounts included are a sample of only those perspectives 
that stress the relevance and importance of theorising the political 
sphere as something more than merely the instrument of capital. In 
addition to Marx's own fragmentary views on the state, the 
perspectives to be outlined are those of Gramsci, the structuralist 
Marxists Althusser and Poulantzas, and also Offe and Habermas. 
What is the State? 
Although 'the state' has become a central category in political and 
sociological investigation, one of the most fundamental problems in 
any discussion of it is defining exactly what is meant by the term. As 
Salter and Tapper (1985:16-17) have pointed out, due to the frequency 
of its use, the 'state' now means 'all things to all men' (sic) - a 
convenience which has been implicitly expanded and contracted to suit 
different theoretical concerns. Furthermore, a precise specification of 
what is meant by the term would not only prove an inconvenience, 
but would also 'hinder the fluidity of sociological exchange' (ibid). 
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Some theorists argue a precise definition is impossible because of the 
enormous complexity of the state, a position Hoffman (1995:19) has 
described as 'the indefinability thesis' - a position in which the state is 
considered so intrinsically problematic that definition becomes 
impossible. Moreover, the ambiguous nature of the state is so 
disabling that the term is rendered 'conceptually unusable' and, 
indeed, should not be part of political discourse. From this position, 
Hoffman continues, it is a short step to the conclusion that states, like 
gods and unicorns, do not, in fact, have a material existence, but are 
simply 'a divine idea' (pp22-24). Conversely, there are other theorists 
who take an opposing view and seek to define what is meant by 'the 
state' as precisely as possible (for example, Dale 1989; Jessop 1990; Offe 
1984). 
The question of 'what is the state' can be approached in two ways. It 
can be defined in terms of either its constituent institutions or in terms -
of the functions these institutions perform (Ham and Hill 1984). 
Institutional definitions regard the state as a set of governmental 
institutions - government being the process of making rules, 
controlling, guiding or regulating (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). 
Amongst other things, state institutions comprise legislative bodies, 
such as parliamentary assemblies, departments of state and so on, and 
can be located at various levels - national, regional/provincial and 
local. Institutional definitions are often implicit in the many 
sociological analyses which use the terms 'state' and 'government' 
interchangeably. But as Dale (1989:53) has pointed out, while 
government is 'the most visible, and arguably the most important and 
active' part of the state, they are not equivalent concepts. Institutional 
definitions, however, unlike functional accounts of the state, avoid the 
fundamental problem in much political theorising ofconceptualising 
the state as a single, monolithic and purposeful entity by drawing 
attention to it as an assemblage of institutional parts. 
A functional approach, alternatively, seeks to define the state through 
the functions state bodies perform and their contribution overall to 
social stability and continuity (Bilton et al 1981). For example, 
according to Weber's important definition of the state as an institution 
exercising a monopoly right to legitimate force in a given territory, the 
state 'functions' to maintain peace and stability, and possesses a 
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'coercive' capacity to which it can resort in order to enforce compliance 
and, thus, fulfil this function. The classical Marxist view of the state, as 
illustrated by the base-superstructure model, is also a functional 
explanation in that the purpose of state institutions is to uphold, in 
myriad ways, the capitalist economic system. As already noted, 
however, functional definitions display a tendency towards a 
conceptualisation of the state as a unitary 'actor', thereby excluding any 
possibility of understanding it as a network of individuals or agencies 
(Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987:4) 
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987:1-3) distinguish further between types of 
functional definition. The first, or ex ante, approach defines the state 
as that set of institutions which carries out particular goals, purposes. or 
objectives. The second, or ex post, approach defines the state by its 
consequences. While this dichotomy implies a disparity between the 
purposes and consequences of states' action - if this were not so, they 
would both amount to the same thing - the logical corollary to both 
these approaches is that organisations whose goals or purposes, as well 
as outcomes, overlap with those of the state can be considered part of 
the institutions of the state. Both approaches significantly enlarge 
what can be legitimately be considered a component or characteristic of 
states, creating further difficulties in formulating suitable criteria by 
which boundaries can be established. 
For an adequate theoretical understanding of any state, however, it is 
clear that institutional and functional aspects, that is, what the state is 
as well as what it does, must both be taken into account. While there is 
the danger that, in drawing such broad theoretical boundaries around 
the state, accounts of the state become so extensive they become 
accounts of society instead (Duncan 1989), to neglect one or the other 
would necessarily diminish the explanatory strength of the theory. 
Theories which isolate state functions from the particular institutional 
configuration in which they occur, or prioritise institutional 
organisation over function, are both inadequate. 
Two Traditions of State Theory 
Pluralism 
Pluralism, as an analysis of political action, came to prominence in 
America early in the 1950s, although its origins have been identified in 
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the writings of political theorists as early as the eighteenth century 
(McLennan 1989). As with most theoretical perspectives, though, it is 
difficult to identify central and fundamental tenets that can be labelled 
clearly and unambiguously as 'pluralism'. In the context of political 
analysis, however, Held (1989) identifies 'classical' pluralism as a 
school of empirical democratic theory characterised by the application 
of a Weberian conceptualisation of power to the study of interest group 
politics in Western parliamentary democracies. 
Mulgan (1993:129) points out that 'pluralism is not a closely defined, 
self-conscious theory or body of theory'. Vincent (1987:189) notes, too, 
that in contemporary thought the term pluralism has been employed 
in a number of senses and applied to a wide variety of situations -
'philosophical, ethical, cultural and political'. There are, in addition, 
descriptive and normative variations of the theory. From its 
grounding in the behaviourist tradition of analysis (McLennan 
1989:32), American political scientists in particular viewed pluralism as 
a 'descriptive-explanatory' account of the real workings of democracy 
rather than a theoretical framework containing assumptions about the 
ideals of democracy (Held 1987:188). Indeed, according to McLennan 
(1989:32), the work of one of pluralism's early proponents, A. F. 
Bentley, was 'concerned [with ridding] political theory of 'spooks' and 
even 'ideas' unless they were empirically observable'. English 
pluralism, on the other hand, was utilised in a more normative 
fashion, as a doctrine which advocated the desirability of pluralist 
institutional arrangements. As a consequence of the diversity of 
approaches, the term 'pluralism' could more accurately be described as 
an umbrella term within which a number of theoretical strands can be 
found; it is a 'general tendency' rather than a particular school of 
thought (Vincent 1987:215). 
From this brief introduction to the development of pluralist theory, it 
is clearly impossible to discuss the pluralist approach to theorising the 
state, as no singular theoretical framework called pluralism can be 
discerned. Indeed, in many political analyses that could be labelled 
'pluralist', 'the state, as such, is rarely investigated' (Ham and Hill 
1984:28). However, for the purposes of this brief comparative 
overview, the position identified as classical pluralism will be used. 
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As Held (1987) observes, though, very few contemporary political or 
social theorists still adhere to pluralism in its classical form. As a 
framework for understanding the workings of Western democracies 
today, it has been largely rejected as a 'wholly naive and/or narrowly 
ideological celebration of American society' (Held 1989:58). However, 
classical pluralism has cast a very long shadow. While supporters of 
pluralism may reject its classical manifestation as outdated, too 
simplistic or a somewhat stereotyped version of the theory - the 
construction of a theoretical 'straw-man' is a constant danger - it 
remains, nevertheless, extremely influential. Not only has the 
analysis of political behaviour been significantly shaped historically by 
classical pluralism, but modern politics continues to be contextualised 
within this framework. Indeed, assumptions by which political 
behaviour is assessed, in the mass media and by politicians themselves 
(Held 1987), proceeds almost universally from classical pluralism. 
The central focus of the classical pluralist position, and crucial to any 
explanation of the role of the state, is an analysis of the nature and 
distribution of power. By power is meant 'the capacity of one actor to 
achieve his [sic] ends against resistance by others' (Cawson 1986:13), 
where this capacity is contingent upon access to resources. The 
resources on which the exercise of power is based can vary and are 
widely distributed within society. Although this distribution is 
acknowledged as unequal (as with the distribution of most things), any 
relative disadvantage experienced by particular groups in terms of one 
resource, for example wealth, will be outweighed by access to another 
relevant resource (Held 1989), the most widely available being 
universal suffrage. Accordingly, a pluralist conceptualisation of power 
identifies it as disaggregated within civil society, non-cumulative, non-
hierarchical and competitive. Multiple groups, formed around a 
diversity of interests and with access to a wide range of resources, 
compete in order to advance their particular or general interest. 
The key feature of a pluralist understanding of the state is that it is 
essentially neutral, receptive and/or responsive to the demands of 
interest groups. According to Roper (1993:148), the state in capitalist 
society - classical pluralism accepts capitalism as the 'natural setting' 
for democracy (McLennan 1989:21) - is considered to be a collection of 
neutral institutions responsive to the various demands of interest 
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groups formed within the private sphere of civil society. The role of 
the state is to mediate and adjudicate between these competing 
demands. The outcome of this competitive process is the 'conversion' 
of groups' demands into public policies which reflect the balance of 
interests within society (Cawson 1986:47). The state does not have any 
significant effect in either creating or shaping demands, nor does it 
have any independent interests in which it can act. Rather, it is 
viewed as the guardian of something called the 'public interest', with 
political parties and the parliamentary system being the legitimate 
expression of that interest (ibid). The state acts as a neutral 'referee' 
and provides the 'level playing field' upon which the battle between 
interest groups in civil society is conducted (Roper 1993:148). 
Within a pluralist framework, however, it is not the state that is 
theorised. As Vincent (1987:211) notes, 'the state is understood 
minimally and is identified with the political institutions and 
processes of government' (emphasis added). As such, classical 
pluralism does not have a theoretical understanding of the state; 
instead, a theory of government practice is substituted. 
The critique of the pluralist conception of the state stems largely from 
the inadequate conceptualisation of power and power relations in 
Western politics, a view termed by Lukes (1974) as 'one-dimensional' 
(in Bell and Head 1994:28), and the assumptions of state/ government 
neutrality. The assumption that interest groups have access to 
different, but essentially equivalent, power bases in society ignores the 
concentration of power enjoyed by those groups who also have 
economic advantages, for example national and multinational 
corporations. Asymmetries in power between groups such as the 
Business Roundtable and, for example, the 'Kitchen Table' (a 
'feminist' equivalent in Christchurch), are not considered. In addition, 
the existence of multiple power centres, as Held (1987:200) points out: 
... hardly guarantees that government will (a) listen to them 
all equally; (b) do anything other than communicate with 
leaders of such centres; (c) be susceptible to influence by 
anybody other than those in powerful positions; [and] (d) do 
anything about the issues under discussion. 
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Furthermore, by conceptualising power as the capacity of individuals 
to achieve observable aims in the face of opposition, pluralist analyses 
ignore the effects of non-action - 'power is deployed not only when 
things happen ... but also when they do not appear to do so' (Held 
1987:200). As Bell and Head (1994) note, forms of power that are 'less 
observable', such as structural and institutional effects, are neglected. 
Pluralism, therefore, as an empirical account of the exercise of power, 
must be considered deficient. 
The most important criticism, though, is the inadequate theorisation 
of the state that stems from being equated with the 'political system' 
(McLennan 1984), and the assumption of state/government neutrality. 
Classical pluralism provides little insight into the processes by which 
the demands of multiple and competing interest groups are converted 
into public policy - the 'switchboard' approach to the state, into which 
interest groups simply 'plug in' (ibid:83). The processes by which 
policy is constructed are presented as a straightforward and 
unproblematic reflection by government of the dominant interests of 
society - the simple and misleading 'equation of policy with majority 
rule' (Bell and Head 1994:28). Furthermore, there is no capacity within 
a pluralist framework for institutional interests within government to 
exert influence over the formation of interest groups or to modify or 
transform the interests they represent. Thus the state is presented as 
merely instrumental and passive. 
Contemporary variants of pluralism accept many of the objections to 
the classical position outlined above. Indeed, some neo- or critical 
pluralist positions closely parallel some neo-Marxist ideas about the 
state. For instance, Dahl (1985) acknowledges that modern capitalism 
tends 'to produce inequalities in social and economic resources so great 
as to bring about severe violations of political equality and hence the 
democratic process' (in Held 1987:202). He notes, too, that state 
institutions operate within constraints generated by the need to ensure 
the continuation of capital accumulation, and that such constraint 
'systematically limits policy options' (ibid). However, as Bell and Head 
(1994) point out, even the more sophisticated variations of pluralism 
maintain the inadequate state theorisation of the classical position by 
failing to address the issue of why it is states that undertake the roles 
prescribed. 
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Marxism 
As one of the main post-war perspectives in social science, Marxism 
has become increasingly subdivided into a number of quite distinctive 
variants, with an eclectic and nuanced debate between them - especially 
over the last two decades - as vigorous and frequently as impenetrable 
as any to have occurred between Marxism and rival paradigms. 
One of the most crucial and controversial issues within the state debate 
in recent times has been the relative autonomy of the capitalist state. 
Within the Marxist tradition, the classical view - taken from Marx's 
own fragmentary and unsystematic work on the state - has defined the 
state as an essential means of class domination (Carnoy 1984). 
According to this view the state is an instrument of the capitalist class, 
necessary for the maintenance of control over the relations of 
production (Codd, Gordon & Harker 1990) and, thus, has no autonomy. 
Because of the inherent instability of the capitalist production process, 
that is, its periodic crises of over- and under-production, the primary 
role of the state is to avert, resolve or prevent economic crises (ibid). In 
short, the capitalist state, as the political expression of the dominant 
class, is an apparatus for the exercise of power in the interests of the 
ruling class only (Carnoy 1984). 
For some Marxist theorists, however, such an economistic view of the 
state has been unable to explain sufficiently the complex functions of 
state institutions and the diverse effects of state policies in advanced 
capitalist societies (Codd et al 1990). Some of the Marxist approaches 
outlined below have sought to highlight the potential for state 
autonomy and the importance of non-economic factors - political and 
ideological struggles - in both shaping the form and function of the 
state which, in turn, are shaped by the state. Thus, the state has been 
conceptualised as active and as possessing a capacity to act in ways that 
are not always reducible to economic necessity. 
(a) Classical Marxism: 
If the search for what could be viewed as the 'classical' account of the 
state, as articulated by Marx himself, reveals any agreement at all, it 
centres on its fragmented and contradictory nature. The promised 
fourth volume of Capital, in which Marx intended to consider the 
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question of the state, was never written. In its absence, Marx's view of 
the state has been constructed from a wide variety of his other writings. 
Such exegeses, however, have confused rather than clarified his ideas, 
as a number of competing theoretical positions have emerged claiming 
to be the definitive and authoritative interpretation of his work. 
This ambiguous heritage can, in part, be attributed to Marx's historical 
materialism. In essence, the materialist interpretation of history 
asserts that all aspects of human societies can be explained by reference 
to the material economic conditions of life. According to Marx (in 
Selsam and Martel 1963:186): 
In social production which men carryon they enter into 
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of 
their will; these relations of production correspond to a 
definite stage of development of their material powers of 
production. The sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society - the real 
foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures 
and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production in material life 
determines the general character of the social, political, and 
spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their 
social existence determines their consciousness (Critique of 
Political Economy 1859). 
As well as material conditions, however, Marx also claimed, in his 
'Manifesto of the Communist Party', that 'the history of all hitherto 
existing society is the history of class struggles' (in Tucker 1972:335). 
Thus, historical materialism is simultaneously a means by which 
social structure as well as social change can be understood: the 
structure of a given society is created by its economic foundation and 
upon which arises a 'legal and political superstructure'; social change, 
conversely, is the outcome of struggle between the classes 
fundamentally constituted by relations of production within the 
economic system. The two are related, however: 
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Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as 
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, 
given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the 
dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living (Marx 1852, 1978.) 
As a result, there are two distinct but interrelated dynamics intrinsic to 
a Marxist interpretation: the emphasis on economic structures and the 
focus on class struggle. In much subsequent Marxist theorising, 
however, the dialectic between the two has been neglected, replaced by 
a focus on one or the other. This has lead to the development of 
several offshoots of Marxism, each having distinctive characteristics 
(McLennan 1984). The esoteric and nuanced exchanges stimulated by 
such divisions have been vigorous, frequently abstruse and continue 
to plague contemporary Marxist debate. 
A further source of confusion lies in Marx's articulation of several 
different theoretical positions on the state. Held (1989) identifies two 
fundamentally opposing views, Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) identify 
three, and Jessop (1990) six. The most familiar view articulated by 
Marx is of the state as the instrument of class rule. The most concise 
and unmistakable statement of this is contained in the Communist 
Manifesto of 1848: 
[T]he executive of the modern state is but a committee for 
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (in 
Tucker 1972:337). 
Within this framework, the state is merely a superstructural 
epiphenomenon built on the economic foundations of society, 
functioning to serve the interests of the economically dominant 
bourgeoisie. Given this view, not surprisingly, the state does not 
warrant separate consideration - what it is, how it is organised as well 
as what it does can be derived from, and only understood with 
reference to, an analysis of the imperatives of the capitalist economic 
system: 
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[T]he modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a 
capitalist machine, the state of capital, the ideal 
personification of the total national capital (Engels, in Tucker 
1972:633). 
In contrast to this, however, Marx articulated a second, less 
reductionist and more complex, view of the state. In this view, there 
was a clear appreciation of the possibility of disjuncture between 
economic and political power in specific states at particular points in 
history - that there was no necessary direct reflection of the economy at 
the political level (Green 1990). In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, Marx presented a model of the French state as being 
simultaneously a parasitic body on civil society as well as an 
autonomous set of institutions capable of political action independent 
of the economically dominant class (Held 1989). While the autonomy 
of the state could not be overestimated - in The Eighteenth Brumaire, 
Marx continued to emphasise the constraints imposed upon Bonaparte 
by his ultimate dependence upon the bourgeoisie's material power -
this perspective clearly revealed a shift away from the more reductive 
application of the base-superstructure model. More broadly, it allowed 
for the possibility of an independent effectivity of the superstructure 
on the economic base (Green 1990). 
Marx and Engels both came to oppose the more economistic 
interpretations of materialism by some of their followers. Marx, in 
response to those who used historical materialism 'as an excuse for not 
studying history', was sufficiently disturbed by this tendency towards 
monism to claim that 'all I know is that I am not a Marxist' (in Selsam 
and Martel 1963:184). Engels, too, refuted these interpretations: 
According to the materialist conception of history the 
determining element in history is ultimately the production 
and reproduction of real life. More than this Marx nor I 
have ever asserted. If therefore somebody twists this into the 
statement that the economic element is the 0 n 11/ 
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determining one, he transforms it into a meaningless, 
abstract and absurd phrase. The economic situation is the 
basis, but the various elements of the superstructure -
political forms of the class struggle and its consequences, 
19 
constitutions established by the victorious class after a 
successful battle, etc. .. .also exercise their influence upon the 
course of the historical struggles and in many cases 
preponderate in determining their fo rm. (Engels 1890 in 
Selsam and Martel 1963:204; emphasis in original). 
And further: 
Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, 
etc., development is based on economic development. But 
all these react upon one another and also upon the economic 
base. It is not that the economic position is the cause and 
alone active, while everything else only has a passive effect. 
There is, rather, interaction on the basis of the economic 
necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself ... So it is not, 
as people try here and there conveniently to imagine, that 
the economic position produces an automatic effect (ibid:202; 
emphasis in original). 
Engels, however, assumed responsibility, along with Marx, for such 
interpretations: 
Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that 
younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic 
side than is due to it. We had to emphasise this main 
principle in opposition to our adversaries, who denied it, 
and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity 
to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to 
come into their rights (ibid:205). 
In spite of the personal views of Marx and Engels, the legacy of 
Marxism in terms of theorising the capitalist state is one of economism 
and instrumentality. The received view of what is termed 'classical' or 
orthodox Marxism has favoured a much more reductionist view of the 
state than it seems either Marx or Engels intended. The contradictory 
nature of Marx's writing has thus produced several distinct strands of 
state theorising, all claiming Marx as their intellectual predecessor. 
Those positions that pursue Marx's view of the state as potentially 
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autonomous, albeit a constrained autonomy, will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
(b) Gramsci: 
The work of Antonio Gramsci, one of the most original Marxist 
thinkers of the twentieth century (Salamini 1981), is of particular 
significance to contemporary neo-Marxist state theory. As already 
noted, Marx himself did not develop a consistent theory of politics 
comparable to his analysis of political economy, and the prevailing 
deterministic employment of historical materialism considered that 
the state could be understood simply by examining the material 
conditions in which it was situated (Carnoy 1984). From Gramsci's 
disenchantment with this orthodox economistic theorisation of the 
state emerged a more complex grasp of materialism which emphasised 
the role of intellectual ideas and human autonomy (Vincent 1987). 
Gramsci was fundamentally concerned with the question of how 
power was maintained in the modern state (Davidson 1991), 
particularly in the context of Fascist Italy, and in how the state secured 
popular support for its 'rule. Gramsci's distinctive contribution to 
Marxism was his theory of politics in which he stressed the 
independent role of politics and ideology on the economy, and the 
possibility of achieving fundamental social change through political 
struggle rather than solely through the overthrow of the economic 
structure. In asserting the independence of the political from the 
economic, Gramsci elevated the previously superstructural 
epiphenomenon of the state to a critical position in. analysing how 
society functions, although this analysis was still placed within a 
problematic which related the superstructure indirectly to the 
conditions of production. 
Central to Gramsci's theory of the state is the concept of hegemony, 
which can be viewed in two ways. Firstly, as a process within civil 
society whereby a dominant class fraction exercises control through its 
intellectual and moral leadership over other fractions of the dominant 
class. Secondly, as a relationship between dominant and dominated 
classes involving the successful attempts of the dominant class to use 
its political, moral and intellectual leadership to establish its view of 
the world as all-inclusive and universal (Carnoy 1984). It is to the state 
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that Gramsci (1971:244) assigns the function of promoting this 
dominant world view: 
... the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical 
activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and 
maintains its dominance but manages to win the active 
consent of those over whom it rules. 
Although the state consists of both coercive and persuasive elements, 
Gramsci argued that it was only through the latter element that class 
domination could be assured; it was through consent rather than force 
that control in society was maintained. As Vincent (1987:167) points 
out: 
The state I was], therefore, not just a political or institutional 
apparatus which coercively dominate[d] one class. It [was] a 
vessel of intellectual dominance which actually elicit[ed] a 
response from the masses. It wishes to be legitimate in the 
eyes of the broad masses. 
This shift in emphasis, from the significance of the economic to the 
ideological, imported into theories of the state an autonomy of activity 
not present in orthodox Marxist theorising. The state was no longer 
simply an instrument through which the economic power of the 
dominant class was exercised over the dominated. Rather, the state 
was the terrain on which classes struggled to extend and develop their 
own particular hegemony, and to win the right to wield its power - the 
state became simultaneously the location as well as the spoils of class 
conflict. 
While the state is a class state in that it creates the conditions under 
which a certain class can dominate other classes hegemonic ally, it also 
acts in the name of universal interests. As Gramsci (1971:182) 
explained: 
[T]he dominant group is coordinated concretely with the 
general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of 
the state is conceived of as a continuous process of formation 
and superseding of unstable equilibria ... between the interests 
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of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate 
groups - equilibria in which the interests of the dominant 
group prevail, but only up to a certain point. 
As Fiore (1970) points out, the originality of Gramsci's contribution to a 
Marxist theorisation of the state lay: 
in his argument that the system's real strength does not lie 
in the violence of the ruling class or the coercive power of its 
state apparatus, but in the acceptance by the ruled of the 
"conception of the world" which belongs to the rulers. The 
philosophy of the ruling class passes through a whole tissue 
of complex vulgarisations to emerge as "common sense": 
that is, the philosophy of the masses, who accept the 
morality, the customs, the institutionalised behaviour of the 
society they live in. 
If hegemony is not won by the dominant class fraction, then the state is 
subject to constant challenges from other class groups. In a more 
succinct moment, Gramsci (1971:263) defines his conception of the state 
further: 
".the state = political society + civil society, in other words 
hegemony protected by the armour of coercion. 
Although there is considerable difficulty in delineating civil and 
political society in Gramsci's work (Showstack Sassoon 1982), in this 
instance political society may be described as the arena in which the 
'mechanisms for winning the consent of the masses for dominant class 
rule are shaped, marshalled and implemented through the apparatus 
of the state' (Gordon 1989:56). In contrast, civil society represents the 
sphere of ideological and cultural relations and consists of sites in 
which struggles over ideology constantly take place. In Gramsci's own 
:words, it is '".the ensemble of organisms commonly called private' (in 
Showstack Sassoon 1980:113). 
The concept of civil society, and its relationship to the state can be 
taken as the point of departure between Gramscian and Classical 
Marxist analyses. For Marx and Engels, civil society and the state were 
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antitheses, the relationship between the two fundamentally dialectic -
'civil society dominates the state, the structure dominates the 
superstructure' (Carnoy 1984:67). For Gramsci, however, civil society, 
in part incorporated into the state, becomes not a structural institution, 
but a superstructural one. Although a seemingly straightforward 
inversion of traditional Marxist theory, Gramsci complicates his 
analysis further by what he calls a 'dual perspective' on political action 
and state life - a complex theoretical formulation whereby institutions 
like the state or, for example, the Church, can be understood in terms 
of the space occupied simultaneously in both political and civil society 
(Showstack Sassoon 1980). 
Undoubtedly, the account of the state Gramsci presents is extremely 
complex. The conditions under which he wrote the Prison Notebooks 
made their content necessarily enigmatic and fragmentary. However, 
the diversity and complexity of his reflections on the state has resulted 
in an ambiguity in his usage of the term - as Vincent (1987:170) points 
out, his discussion is often 'too diverse and frustratingly elusive'. But 
by concentrating on the ways in which dominant class interests work 
in and through the state, Gramsd altered the conception of the 
relationship between political and economic spheres. Where orthodox 
Marxism viewed this relationship as essentially determined, Gramsci 
focused on the processes by which classes could win - through 
hegemony - control of the state structures. His use of the concept of 
hegemony and the role of the state in the creation of consent 
highlighted the more complex nature of class domination than 
previous instrumental explanations allowed and elevated the state 
from mere economic epiphenomenon to a more active and creative 
role. By drawing attention to the dialectical rather than the exclusive 
and oppositional relationship between structure and superstructure, 
Gramsci's main contribution has been to make politics a legitimate 
part of Marxist analysis. 
(c) Althusser: 
In the structuralist Marxism of French philosopher Althusser, and, in a 
more moderated form, Poulantzas, two of the most dominant themes 
in post-War social theory were brought together (Beilharz 1991). 
Structuralism, in its broadest sense, is a theoretical approach 
characterised by the explanatory priority given to 'systematic laws or 
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patterns' discernible in social phenomena (Dunleavy and O'Leary 
1987:217). According to structuralists, such phenomena are simply the 
observable manifestations of underlying, more fundamental structures 
- the social theory equivalent of the psychoanalytic Freudian slip 
(Beilharz 1991). 
According to Carnoy (1984:89), Althusser claimed 'that the social 
structure [had] no creative subject at its core'. In fact, society was just a 
'system of objective processes without subjects' (ibid). History was the 
history of structures, not of autonomous individual subjects (Vincent 
1987). As Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987:218) point out, in Althusser's 
conceptualisation of the social world: 
Individuals should always be seen not as rounded historical 
figures but merely as bearers of roles ... supporting the 
unfolding of structural laws without reshaping those laws. 
Although he did not address the issue of the state systematically, 
Althusser has presented a somewhat contradictory theorisation of its 
role in capitalist society. Following Gramsci, he rejected the 
economistic view of the state as simply the instrument of a dominant 
class and argued, instead, for the possibility that society was held 
together by ideology or consent - although economic imperatives were 
'ultimately but not practically' the determinants of social life (Beilharz 
1991). The role of the state, according to Althusser, was to provide the 
capitalist economy with the fundamental 'conditions of existence' 
which it could not secure unaided. Through what he described as 
Repressive State Apparatuses - those apparatuses which 'function by 
violence' - and Ideological State Apparatuses - those which 'function 
by ideology' (Althusser 1971:143-145) - the state aided in the production 
of 'docile, disciplined and fragmented individuals whose viewpoints 
and behaviour [were] suitable for capitalist life' (Dunleavy and O'Leary 
1987:218). The state performed this function under a condition of 
'relative autonomy'. 
For Althusser, capitalist society could be divided into three separate 
spheres: political, ideological and economic. In any capitalist social 
formation, it was possible for residual or 'secondary' elements of 
previous modes of production to exist contemporaneously. Therefore, 
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it was impossible for a 'purely capitalist' society to exist. As a result, 
while the mode of production in society was considered by Althusser 
to be determinant of the social formation, the possibility existed for 
either one of the other two spheres, political or ideological, to be 
dominant at any given historical conjuncture - the dominant 
economic class was not necessarily always the leading political or 
ideological class. Hence, the possibility opened up, theoretically at 
least, for the existence of relatively autonomous, yet constrained, 
political and ideological spheres. 
However, even in asserting the possibility of a relative autonomy for 
the political and ideological spheres from the economic, the concept of 
eventual determination by the economy does not appear particularly 
dissimilar from orthodox Marxist economism, except perhaps rather 
more complex. While arguing for the specificity of the political and 
ideological spheres, these are ultimately still explained by reference to 
the capitalist mode of production. Even if the state is able to operate 
'autonomously', this autonomy is still attributed to, and enabled by, 
the economic structure. As Vincent (1987:172) points out, through his 
extreme structuralism, Althusser is g~ilty of introducing an even .more 
rigid determinism into his understanding of the state: 
[AlthusserJ is arguing that the State and ideology appear to be 
autonomous, but this autonomy is in reality an objective 
aspect of the structure of ideology. To treat autonomy as 
really or actually true, namely that it does actually exist in 
the world, is to be fundamentally misled. 
Thus the state cannot be understood as autonomous at all; it is, rather, 
a covertly determined feature of underlying capitalist structures. In the 
end, Althusser simply substitutes structural for economic 
determinism. 
(d) Poulantzas: 
Poulantzas, in contrast to Althusser, addressed the issue of the state 
directly. His intention, as Clarke (1991) notes, was to complement 
Marx's analysis of the economy with a theorisation of the political 
sphere of society. Poulantzas defined the state as the unifying element 
in capitalism (Held 1989), it was the 'factor of cohesion' (Przeworski 
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1990:79). Its function was to secure the reproduction of the capitalist 
system by constituting 'the political unity of the dominant classes, 
thereby establishing them as dominant' (Poulantzas 1978, in Bell and 
Head 1994:45). Because of the vulnerability of the dominant classes to 
fragmentation - due to competition between individual capitalists - an 
institution was required to ensure their political organisation and to 
protect their collective interests (Held 1989). At the same time, the 
state worked to ensure the disorganisation of the working class in 
order to attenuate the threat to capitalism that it posed (Przeworski 
1990). The state could only perform these functions if it was 
autonomous from particular interests among the capitalist class. 
Again, following Althusser, while Poulantzas stressed the specificity of 
the political sphere by theorising an active role for the state in the 
constitution of socio-economic reality, its autonomy was only ever 
relative as the requirements of capitalism would always prevail 'in the 
last instance' (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). 
The difficulties of accurately discerning the general interest of capital 
notwithstanding, Poulantzas does not succeed in providing an 
adequate account of the capitalist state. In his earlier writing, 
Poulantzas' understanding of the state was 'straightforwardly 
structuralist' - the form and function of the state is shaped by class 
(Vincent 1987:173). The inadequacy centres on Poulantzas' later 
definition of the state as the 'factor of cohesion'. According to Jessop 
(1990), Poulantzas uses this concept in two contrasting ways. The first 
implies cohesion is the 'successful organisation of a power bloc under 
the hegemony of monopoly capitalism', which, in turn, implies a view 
of the state that is instrumental although autonomous (ibid:30). The 
second is a reductionist position which sees state power as 'necessarily 
circumscribed by the dominance of capitalism' - implying that, 
regardless of which class has control of the state apparatus, the state can 
only ever operate in the interests of the dominant class (ibid). In short, 
the state is theorised as both independent of the economy, the 
possibility inscribed in the former view, while positing at the same 
time the impossibility of state autonomy, the latter view. As Jessop 
(1990:31) notes, Poulantzas 'oscillates' between the two positions: 
Either he endows the state with complete independence 
from the economic base or he denies it any independence at 
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all. Neither of these positions would be satisfactory on its 
own and together they render his analysis indeterminate. 
In addition to this, the structuralism of both Althusser and Poulantzas 
has been criticised on a number of other grounds, not the least of 
which has been the strong suspicion that, as Vincent (1987:171) notes, 
'underneath the complex terminology of structuralist Marxism is a 
rather paltry creature.' Indeed, it is difficult to appreciate the 
significance of the contribution of a structuralist position that denies 
the possibility of effective individual agency. Structuralist Marxism, as 
Held (1989) points out, ignores social practices through which social 
relations are produced. Clearly it makes a difference, as Miliband (1969) 
observed, whether the individuals who inhabit the state are bourgeois 
constitutionalists or fascists. Individual behaviour and motivations do 
make a difference. 
Structuralist accounts of the state also suffer from the shortcomings of 
functionalist explanations. The state may well be a factor of cohesion 
of capitalist society, providing the necessary conditions under which 
capitalist reproduction can take place. However, to say that this is what 
the state does is not an explanation of how or why it does it, nor an 
explanation of why it is the state that undertakes these functions. As 
Elster (1986, in Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987:257) notes, 'functionalist 
accounts of the state are vacuous because they consist of citing the 
consequences of particular actions as their causes.' Such explanations 
are thus immune from criticism - the state does what is necessary for 
the reproduction of capitalism; what is necessary for the reproduction 
of capitalism is what the state does (Przeworski 1990). On the whole, as 
Vincent (1987:175) observes, structuralism: 
... is unnecessarily abstract and pretentious In its language. Its 
supposed novelty really obscures the same old tedious 
economism and rigid determinism of scientific Marxism 
earlier this century .... In fact it is far more insidious since it 
pretends to value human autonomy and agency, while 
covertly bringing in a new form of super-determinism. Its 
view of the state thus suffers from the same old flaws as the 
cruder traditional Marxism, despite its sophisticated 
appearance. 
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These criticisms are somewhat paradoxical, perhaps, given the claim 
by both Althusser and Poulantzas to be, more or less, the heirs to 
Gramsci's ideas (Vincent 1987). However, the structuralist account of 
the state provided by Althusser and Poulantzas adds little to Gramsci's 
original conceptualisation. Indeed, what could be considered their 
main contribution, the relative autonomy thesis, is itself a main source 
of contention within contemporary Marxist state theorising. 
(e) Offe: 
The recent work of Claus Offe has been extremely influential in 
contemporary Marxist state theory. According to Offe (1984), the state 
does not defend the specific interests of any single class or class fraction. 
Rather, it protects and sanctions a set of institutions and social 
relationships necessary for the domination of the capitalist class - it 
seeks to implement and guarantee the collective interests of all 
members of a class society dominated by capital. 
In doing so, he argues, the state performs two simultaneous and often 
contradictory roles. The first is to support the process of capital 
accumulation. As the power of the state depends indirectly on a 
process of accumulation which is beyond its capacity to organise, that 
is, via the mechanism of taxation, the institutional self-interest of the 
state predisposes it to promote those political conditions most 
conducive to private accumulation (ibid). At the same time the state 
also responds to, and attempts to mediate, a range of other political 
demands from various social groupings and as well as from state 
bureaucrats (Codd, Gordon & Harker 1990). This is the second role of 
the state: to democratically legitimate these conditions by maintaining 
popular support amongst the electorate through social policy measures 
- for example, education and income support - which also serve to 
ameliorate the considerable social costs of the accumulation process 
(Codd, Harker & Nash 1990). In performing these two roles, the 
institutions of the state are independent of any direct or systematic 
control by the capitalist class, but tend to support capitalist interests 
because their continued existence is dependent upon revenue 
generated by private accumulation (ibid). In other words, although the 
institutional form of the state is not determined by the interests of 
capital, state policies will tend to shape capitalist development and 
reproduce the capitalist mode of production. 
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According to Offe, the contradictory roles of the state may be reconciled 
if conditions can be created whereby each citizen becomes a participant 
in commodity relationships - that is, as long as each owner of a unit of 
value can exchange it as a commodity, there will be no lack of material 
resources upon which the state can draw, neither will there be a 
legitimation problem for those maintaining this 'universe of 
commodities' (Offe 1984:121). Difficulties arise, however, when 
economic units of value fail to operate in the commodity form (ibid). 
Values cease to exist in this form as soon as they cease being exchanged 
for money or other values - for example, where there is an 
overproduction of certain goods or when conditions of unemployment 
prevents the free exchange of labour power (Codd, Gordon & Harker 
1990). 
The contradiction inherent in the role of the state is evident, however, 
through state-provided welfare services. This decommodification of 
the exchange relationship fundamentally undermines simultaneous 
state attempts to universalise the commodity form in order to sustain 
capitalist expansion. Not only are these roles contradictory, but, as 
Codd (1990) notes, the concomitant expansion of state budgets also 
threatens state support for capitalism. The borrowing and taxation 
demands of the state, necessary to the fulfilment of its legitimatory 
role, can cause serious contractions in the accumulation of capital, 
resulting in what O'Connor (1973) has called the fiscal crisis of the 
state. In order to preserve conditions for continued capital 
accumulation, the fiscal crisis may be resolved by severe reductions in 
state expenditure. Such policies, however, undermine state electoral 
support, producing what Habermas (1976) has termed a crisis of 
legitimation (ibid). Torn thus between accumulation and legitimation, 
the ultimate contradiction awaits the state in its attempts to meet the 
demands of both: fulfilling the conditions of one results almost 
inevitably in the stimulation of crisis in the other. 
One of the major criticisms of Offe's view of the state lies in the uses to 
which it has been put. The conventional usage of the accumulation-
legitimation view of the state really adds little to any explanation of the 
state in empirical terms because all state activity can be attributed to 
either of these two categories. Causation for all events is 
predetermined. The strength of Offe's approach, however, is that it 
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recognises the different forms that the state can take in performing 
these functions. For example, his distinction between conjunctural 
and structural modes of policy are useful for analysing changing forms 
of the state. 
(f) Habermas: 
As an independent state theorist, Habermas' main contribution to the 
state debate has been his detailed analyses of the varieties of crises to 
which advanced capitalism is susceptible and of the role of the state in 
maintaining and legitimising the capitalist system. In doing so, 
according to Lawrence (1989:135), he 'decisively reject[s] the view that 
the socio-cultural and political realms are a reflex of the capitallwage-
labour relationship', thus dismissing the orthodox Marxist view of the 
state as an epiphenomenon of the· economic base. In his analyses of 
advanced capitalism, Habermas focuses on a reconceptualisation of the 
state! economy! civil society trinity into a framework more indebted to 
systems theory than to Marxism. Indeed, as Vincent (1987) notes, a 
common criticism of his approach is that, as with Offe, the diversity of 
t{leoretical resources drawn on are so eclectic that his analysis has 
moved outside the realm of what could legitimately be considered 
'Marxist'. 
According to Lawrence (1989:137), there are three decisive changes to 
Habermas' conceptualisation of advanced capitalism that place it 
'markedly at odds with orthodox Marxism': firstly, the political nature 
of the class structure as the state, instead of the market, increasingly 
assumes the role of distributor of life chances; second, the dominant 
role of the state in the economy as the 'political counter-control' to the 
forces of production; and third, his contention that the labour theory of 
value is inadequate as a predictor of economic crisis. 
Habermas considers the state in advanced capitalism to be the control 
centre of society (Lawrence 1989). Its role is integrative and concerned 
to ensure the survival of the social system: 'to 'steer the economy so as 
to avoid the more unfortunate contingencies of the market system', at 
the same time as avoiding political crisis. In short, the state's task is to 
stave off economic crises by acting to sustain the accumulation process, 
while avoiding social disintegration - achieved by maintaining a 
certain level of legitimacy for the system as a whole. While Habermas 
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considers the state to be autonomous of the class structure, the goals it 
pursues are the consequence of the inherent instability of the capitalist 
mode of production (ibid). 
Instead of the recognisably Marxist division of social reality into state, 
economy and civil society, Habermas proposes a system of political, 
socio-cultural and economic subsystems, each subjected to a different 
organising principle and consequently endangered by different types of 
crisis. According to Habermas (1976), advanced capitalist society is 
susceptible to four types of crisis: economic, rationality, legitimation 
and motivational (in Held 1989), with the state being susceptible to 
both rationality and legitimation crises. The fourth, motivational, is 
the crucial 'subjective' element of crisis. According to Dunleavy and 
O'Leary (1987), it is only when other crises (particularly those of 
legitimation) are underpinned by a long-term motivational crisis does 
the destabilisation constitute a terminal threat to the capitalist system. 
Contrary to the common usage of 'crisis' as indicating an objective and 
somehow measurable malfunction, Habermas maintains that a crucial 
component of social breakdown is the subjectivity of individual actors 
(Lawrence 1989), the meaning that individuals themselves attribute to 
objective conditions of crisis. Indeed, we can only speak of crisis in the 
Habermasian sense when: 
members of a society experzence structural alterations as 
critical for continued existence and feel their social identity 
threatened (Habermas 1973:3). 
Thus, as Lawrence (1989:134) observes: 
objective disturbances ... will only spark off crises if they 
become coupled with patterns of social consciousness which 
spark off an identity crisis .... [W]hat it signifies is that the 
members of a society must begin to experience their 
dominant institutions as unviable. In other words, the 
manner in which institutions function contradicts social 
expectations which are based on dominant norms and 
values. 
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In short, a crucial factor in Habermas' concept of crisis is the inclusion 
of individual subjective responses to crisis as well as more objective 
'indicators of breakdown' (ibid). 
The most important feature of Habermas' framework is his analysis of 
the consequence of state intervention into anyone of the subsystems 
in order to control crises. Attempts at controlling crises in one 
subsystem simply result in its displacement into another subsystem -
the crisis is never actually expelled (Held 1989). For example, increased 
state activity in the economy has been a key feature of advanced 
capitalism. In order to avoid the inevitable trend of capitalism towards 
economic crisis, states have gradually increased their share of the 
burden of the cost of production. However, following Offe, state 
intervention has only served to undermine the ideology of 'fair 
exchange' which governs what were previously private market 
transactions (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987) - for instance, wage levels -
and politicises increasingly larger sections of the private sphere. As a 
result of this politicisation, the 'hand of the state' in sustaining 
capitalism is exposed. Using wage levels again as an example, where 
inequalities in reward were previously perceived as a 'natural' feature 
of the impartial market system, they are rendered, visibly and 
unmistakably, as the outcome of political decisions - what were 
economic relations become transformed into political relations. The 
role of the state in sustaining inequality in income becomes 
transparent, and thus threatens the concept of the liberal democratic 
state and the expectations of justice and equity it embodies (Lawrence 
1989). The outcome of what was originally a crisis within the 
economic sphere, is thus transported into the political sphere to 
become a crisis of legitimation in which the generalised support for the 
'democratic' political system itself becomes threatened. An economic 
crisis may also translate into a rationality crisis if administrative 
decisions made by the state in the allocation of resources are perceived 
as unfair (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). 
Overall, Habermas rejects the view of the state and state power as being 
determined solely by underlying economic structures or the logic of 
capital. For him, the continuation of capitalism relies on political and 
socio-cultural factors. And while the state is still a capitalist state, it 
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derives its power from its capacity to legitimise its own mode of 
operation. 
Problems with Marxist Theorising 
The main issue that confronts Marxist theorising is whether or not a 
non-reductive theory of politics is· possible. Can the relationship 
between the political and the economic be theorised in such a way that 
what is distinct and useful about Marxism is retained, while the pitfalls 
of reductionism and determinism are avoided? 
One direction in the resolution of this impasse has been the notion of 
relative autonomy and the concept of multiple determinations in 
order to explain events in the political sphere (McLennan 1989). While 
class and economic imperatives may ultimately shape the nature of 
political struggle, they do not determine it in any direct sense. Rather, 
they simply establish the parameters within which a variety of political 
activity is carried out relatively autonomously. In addition, 
supplementary non-class explanatory factors have also been 
introduced. Both of these options, however, have themselves been 
subject to extensive critique on a number of grounds. Relative 
autonomy explanations of politics are open to the criticism of simply 
being a more sophisticated variation of determinism; whether 
determination occurs in the first or last instance, it occurs nonetheless. 
On the other hand, the introduction of non-class factors in the analysis 
of the political sphere is open to the criticism that the analysis is not 
Marxist. The inclusion of non-class factors into Marxism raises the 
problem of causal equivalence and, as such, poses a fundamental threat 
to what is considered an indispensable feature of Marxism - namely, 
class relations. 
Overall, Marxist state theorising appears caught in a theoretical cleft 
stick. In their reductionist manifestation, Marxist analyses become 
fixed, unalterable and predictable in terms of the explanatory factors 
employed. In explaining specific phenomena, there is only one 
explanation for everything - the punch line to the joke is known 
beforehand, as it were. Political phenomena are attributed either to the 
imperatives of the economy and/or as being in the interests of the 
capitalist class. All that has to be demonstrated in such analyses is how 
this is achieved. The outcome of these types of explanations is an 
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instrumental understanding of the state, and a state that has no 
independent effectivity. On the other hand, the relative autonomy 
thesis has been criticised for being both determination in a 
sophisticated disguise and, in asserting a capacity for independent 
action to the political, of removing what is distinct about Marxism 
from any understanding of politics. It has also been criticised by Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985, in Mouzelis 1988) for introducing an unsatisfactory 
theoretical eclecticism into Marxism. The idea of non-class explanatory 
factors is easily dismissed as not Marxist at all. In short, Marxist 
political theory is assailed from all sides as either too Marxist, not 
Marxist enough, or simply not Marxist at all. Such criticisms suggest 
that attempts to overcome the deficiencies of reductionism have 
created more problems for Marxist political and state theorising than 
they have solved. 
Beyond the Debate? 
The revival of interest in state theory in recent years has resulted in a 
partitioning of both Marxism and pluralism into multiple competing 
offshoots, creating a debate described by McLennan (1984:80) as being 'as 
consuming as the clash of the broad traditions themselves'. Some 
theoretical newcomers, however, have registered a challenge to the 
traditional. boundaries of the state debate. Both feminism and 
postmodernism have been described as 'the most important political-
cultural currents of the last decade' (Hoffman 1995:162). Yet as serious 
challengers to the Marxist-pluralist debate, they remain unconvincing. 
Feminist challenges to the State 
Mainstream state theory has contributed little to an understanding of 
the ways in which gender relations intersect with a patriarchal state. In 
fact, political theory in general largely dismisses the impact of the state 
on women as not worthy of serious or separate analysis. Such neglect 
can be attributed to a number of factors. For instance, when gender is 
considered theoretically, it is frequently subsumed under what are 
considered more important and fundamental analytical categories, 
such as class and the economy (ten Tusscher 1986). There is also a 
reluctance, unfortunately common to many disciplines populated by 
male practitioners, to question the gendered nature of the assumptions 
inherent in many of the theoretical concepts utilised or to consider the 
adequacy of the resulting analyses in relation to women. So much so 
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that, according to Bonder (1983:570), 'political science has been the least 
affected by the impact of the new feminist ideas'. While written over a 
decade ago, similar sentiments of a more recent origin are echoed by 
Bryson (1992). 
As Franzway, Court and Connell (1989) point out, however, the 
dichotomy between public and private spheres makes gender an 
intrinsic part of state theories. Cross-cultural research indicates that the 
distinction between public and private is pervasive and fundamentally 
connected with gender - women's work is associated with the private 
sphere and men's work with the public (ibid). Quite simply, the state, 
as an institutional configuration, is predicated on fundamental 
assumptions regarding the nature of gender relations. As such, an 
essential component of any adequate state theory must be the 
recognition of the connection between the state and the patterning of 
gender relations in society. Traditional political theory generally and 
state theory in particular have both been somewhat tardy in this 
regard. 
However, while the state is central to feminist analyses in a number of 
ways, it has been a common criticism that, for the most part, feminist 
analyses of the state are underdeveloped. Indeed, in 1983 MacKinnon 
stated forthrightly that 'feminism has no theory of the state' (in 
MacKinnon 1989:157). While there has been an abundance of case-
study analyses of specific state policies as they impact on women, for 
example housing, health and so on, few of these have been explicit 
about the theoretical assumptions being made about the state. Such 
studies have been characterised as feminist critiques of political theory 
rather than attempts at formulating a feminist theory of the state, per 
se (Jessop 1990). Consequently, a great deal of feminist political 
analysis, while drawing on particular traditional theoretical 
conceptualisations, theorises the state in an implicit rather than 
explicit way (Franzway, Court and Connell 1989:ix). 
Postmodernism 
A postmodern critique of the capitalist state is a theoretical oxymoron, 
for, as Hoffman (1995:11) observes, postmodernism 'appears to reject 
the very idea of critique'. Postmodernism rejects what it terms 
monological or totalising discourses - that is, authoritative voices or 
36 
stories which are 'timelessly and universally true' - because they 
impose an illusory and deceptive organisation on what are, .in fact, 
'unruly historical events' (ibid:164). For instance, a Marxist theory of 
the state is a totalising discourse because it is an authoritative 
explanation of the operation of the capitalist state. However, to 
critique events, or the state, from a postmodern position would 
necessarily raise postmodernism itself to the status of a totalising 
discourse - a rather fundamental and paralysing contradiction. The 
solution to this difficulty, however, lies in 'deconstruction', a process 
by which postmodernist judgement or critique is inoculated against 
becoming totalising. When a discourse is deconstructed, according to 
Connolly (1989), it yields to what he describes as a 'code of paradox' (in 
Hoffman 1995:166). This code of paradox 'compels a discourse to 
'undo' itself by facing up to a number of unpalatable and painful 
realities' (ibid). Quite what constitutes the compulsion, or what form 
the 'undoing' takes remains unspecified. 
Given the difficulties of applying such an approach to the state, it is no 
surprise to find that it is little regarded by postmodernists. According 
to Foucault (1979:20), the state is a 'mythical abstraction whose 
importance is a lot more limited than many of us think'. Even an 
analysis of power, Foucault (1981:96) argues: 
.. . should not concern itself with the regulated and legitimate 
forms of power in their central locations, with the general 
mechanisms through which they operate, and the continual 
effects of these. On the contrary, it should be concerned with 
power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with 
those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more 
regional and local forms and institutions. 
And further: 
I would say that we should direct our researches on the 
nature of power not towards the juridical edifice of 
sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which 
accompany them, but towards domination and the material 
operators of power, towards forms of subjection and the 
inflections and utilisations of their localised systems, and 
37 
towards strategic apparatuses. We must eschew the model of 
Leviathan in the study of power. We must escape from the 
limited field of juridical sovereignty and State institutions, 
and instead base our analysis of power on the study of the 
techniques and tactics of domination (ibid:l02). 
Given the contradictory postmodernist approach to critique, the 
relativist approach to competing discourses, and the disdain for the 
state as a subject of analysis, it is difficult to see how a credible 
postmodernist position in relation to state politics can emerge. 
Conclusion 
Political theories, according to Vincent (1987), differ fundamentally 
from what he terms 'scientific' theories: it is impossible to say which 
political theories, if any, may be 'true' or 'false'. Given that political 
theories playa significant role in constituting the realm of politics and 
political behaviour, there is no 'independent' reality against which 
competing paradigms can be judged. The test for a political theory, 
therefore, lies in its explanatory adequacy. Considered this way, the 
'grand', 'monolithic', or what Althusser has termed 'substantive', 
theoretical tradition of both pluralism and Marxism may all be 
considered at various times 'good' political theories - in spite of the 
internal theoretical and practical contradictions outlined above. For 
example, the economic determinism of Marxism may, in some 
circumstances, be an entirely appropriate explanation of events. 
Indeed, in the New Zealand context over the last decade, a very 
persuasive argument can be mounted that accounts for political 
changes in terms of economic imperatives. In education, too, even the 
rather beleaguered Marxist notion of correspondence has had a 
renewed relevance in relation to the restructuring that occurred during 
the 1980s, when education became even more closely tied to the 
requirements of the workplace. 
Thus, the problem with grand/substantive theories of the state is not 
so much the concepts and assumptions on which they are based, but 
rather the pre-determined nature of their concepts and assumptions, 
that is, they are perspectives constructed to explain states in their 
entirety in terms of pre-established causal mechanisms and 
explanatory approaches. In fact, the search for a satisfactory general 
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theory has encouraged, if not required, this particular epistemological 
orientation to the construction of theoretical accounts of the state. For 
example, pluralism relies, amongst other things, on behaviourist 
assumptions that create a fragmented and individualised frame of 
reference; whereas Marxism's raison d'etre is the logic of capitalism 
which is employed to explain society as a whole. Given the complexity 
of modern states, however, both approaches have been demonstrated 
empirically to be insufficiently sensitive to all possible state forms and 
functions. 
A number of solutions have been proposed to solve the intractable 
difficulties inherent in the 'state debate'. One has been to abandon the 
search for a grand theory. Another has been to attempt a synthesis of 
both pluralism and Marxism, to combine the insights of each -
although the 'open-ended' nature of the sort of Marxism this 
convergence creates has numerous critics (McLennan 1984). A third 
possibility is to employ epistemological alternatives to grand theory, 
for example, the Althusserian 'Generalities II' approach simply 'maps 
out', using conceptual tools rather than substantive theory, the area of 
interest (in Mouzelis 1988), or to utilise other theoretical approaches to 
help bridge the gap between grand theory and evidence. 
In the later examination of the Schools Consultative Group, corporatist 
theory is employ~d in this latter capacity. Although initially 
formulated as an alternative to both Marxism and classical pluralism, 
corporatist accounts of the state have, thus far, proved to be less than 
satisfactory. What corporatism does provide, however, when used in 
conjunction with a more robust state theoretical explanation (the 
subject of Chapter III), is a useful 'middle-range' account of the 
conditions under which a specific form of political relationship may 
emerge. The development of corporatist theory is the subject of 
Chapter II. 
39 
CHAPTER II - CORPORATIST THEORY 
This chapter outlines the history and re-emergence of corporatism in 
the early 1970s as the putative 'third way' or alternative to Marxist and 
pluralist political theory. It also provides an overview of the 
development of corporatist theory over the last two decades by 
examining what Williamson (1989) has described as the 'generations' 
of corporatist literature from 1974 to the late 1980s. The chapter 
concludes with an outline of some of the difficulties that confront 
contemporary corporatist theorising - the most significant of which is 
its inadequate theorisation of the state. As McLennan (1989:247) notes, 
as a theory 'which forefronts the role of the state', corporatism has not 
provided an account of the state that is either 'coherent or compelling'. 
The main conclusion of this chapter is, therefore, that if corporatism is 
to be analytically useful, it can be most appropriately utilised only as a 
description rather than as an explanation of a particular form of 
articulation between the state and civil society 
The Revival of Corporatism 
Until the 1970s, the term corporatism was most commonly associated 
with a number of twentieth century authoritarian regimes: Fascist 
Italy, Portugal 1933-74, Austria 1934-8, Vichy France, and post-1945 
Brazil, Peru and Mexico (Williamson 1985), Nazi Germany (Winkler 
1976) and the Soviet Union (Williamson 1989). However, not all the 
corporatist arrangements this century have been confined to 
authoritarian states. In the post-war period, corporatism was being 
used to describe pressure group politics in a number of liberal 
democracies at different historical conjunctures (Panitch 1979): for 
instance in Norway (Rokkan 1965); Sweden (Ruin 1974); the USA 
(Lowi 1969); and Great Britain (Beer 1956; Eckstein 1960; Shonfield 1965) 
(in Williamson 1989). In these analyses, what was meant by the term 
'corporatism' was not clearly defined, although in most instances it 
was used to describe 'the regular and close involvement of organised 
interests with the public bureaucracy and ministers in the formulation 
of policy, most usually economic policies' (ibid). 
The publication of Schmitter's (1974, reprinted 1979) now seminal 
essay, 'Still the Century of Corporatism?', however, marked the point 
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at which corporatist theory began to develop into a more specific 
description/ explanation of the relationship between organised 
interests and the state within liberal democracies (Williamson 1989). 
In order to distinguish between earlier authoritarian corporatism and 
the more recent application of corporatism to liberal capitalist societies, 
the term is commonly prefixed in the literature as either 'neo-', 
'societal', or 'liberal' corporatism. However, as these labels and the 
distinctions they refer to are (as with so much else about corporatist 
theory) the subject of debate, in the following discussion the term 
'corporatism' will be used to denote its usage in modern liberal 
capitalist societies. 
In spite of its comparatively recent development, corporatist literature 
is already extensive and somewhat diverse. The range of applications 
of corporatist analysis is quite impressive, although this diversity has 
contributed greatly to the perceived inaccessibility of this body of theory 
(Williamson 1989:ix-x). There are now several 'generations' of 
theorists currently engaged in an extremely vigorous internecine 
debate concerning the virtues and vices of 'old' versus 'new' 
corporatism - for example, does corporatism theorise a political form of 
the state or does it explain a process of policy-making (Cox 1988a) - and, 
consequently, about what should and should not constitute the central 
tenets of contemporary corporatist theory. 
As the fundamental concepts of corporatism are debated, however, and 
as the application of the theory to an increasingly wider range of issues 
causes those concepts to be questioned, modified or abandoned, the 
overall picture presented of corporatism is, as Williamson (1989:5) 
notes, 'one of a rather elastic concept with a somewhat uncertain core'. 
While conceptual debate provides a necessary platform for theoretical 
development, according to Perry (1987:114): 
The term 'corporatism ' .. . has been used to explain the 
Japanese economic miracle ... and the Polish political failure; 
to account for Romania's successful transition to industrial 
society and Scotland's lack of success in preventing 
deindllstrialisation. It has been identified as an alternative 
to capitalism ... and as a way of preserving it; as 
complementary to pluralism and as a repudiation of it; as a 
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means of defending working-class interests and as a barrier 
to their expression. 
This diversity of application coupled with the lack of unanimity over 
fundamental concepts, has provided fertile ground for a number of 
critics who question the utility of corporatist theory. Pluralist critics in 
particular have been extremely vociferous in their challenge to 
devotees of corporatism to elaborate more precisely what their model 
consists of, as well as to show categorically how corporatism can be 
clearly distinguished from one of several varieties of pluralism, 
particularly corporate pluralism. Their most strident criticism, though, 
has been that, despite the claims for it, corporatism offers no new 
insights into the relationship between organised interests and the state 
and 'is no more than a label for some de vel 0 p ed, that is 
institutionalised, form of pluralism (Williamson 1989:62). In other 
words, corporatism stands accused of merely reinventing the pluralist 
wheel (Cox 1988b). 
The boundary problems between corporatism and pluralism (Grant 
1985) and the lack of a definitive theoretical model have been 
criticisms that corporatist theorists have had difficulties countering. 
As Cawson (1986:77) notes, the 'recent literature on corporatism has 
been conspicuous for its lack of agreement on the nature of the 
concept'. It has suffered from what Bull (1992:257) has described as 
'conceptual stretching', that is, the constant adjustment of its central 
features in order to account for changing reality. And, according to 
Therborn (1986:213), the potential of corporatist theory to illuminate 
the relationship between organised interests and the state is difficult to 
establish because not only do we not know 'what a fully corporatist 
animal looks like', but we do not know either 'what separates it from 
others in the zoo of political sociology'. 
In response, corporatist theorists have pointed out, somewhat 
inadequately, that it would be unfair to expect a high degree of 
theoretical unity in such a new body of literature. The development 
and refinement of concepts is a normal part of the process of 
theoretical development and should not be taken to indicate that the 
theory is meaningless. Moreover, disagreement over concepts is 
hardly unique to corporatism. As Cawson (1988:313) points out: 
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.. . democratic theorists are divided over whether democracy 
is an institutional arrangement or a set of values; students of 
power have never been able to agree on a usable concept. 
However, surely few would use such disagreements as a 
reason for dismissing the significance of power and 
democracy. 
However, a number of corporatist writers acknowledge as legitimate 
the criticism that the diverse range of applications of the theory has 
resulted in as many different versions of corporatism as there are 
writers on the subject. This is, in part, a function of the fact that 
corporatism has been used to refer to a complete economic system, a 
form of state, a form of interest intermediation, and a mode of policy-
making. The diversity of application, though, has been attributed to 
the sheer novelty value of having a different theoretical approach and 
is, consequently, somewhat inevitable. As both McLennan (1989) and 
Williamson (1989:189) have pointed out, there has been a recent 
'scaling down' in the number of corporatist analyses attributable 
simply to a declining interest in the theory: 
... m more recent times ... the upsurge of interest in 
corporatism has significantly abated. While differences 
continue to exist, there is today a concentration on fewer, 
more enduring representations as many have fallen off the 
corporatist band-wagon. We should not, therefore, become 
over-concerned with what llsed to be a body of theory that 
was rather difficult to pin down. Today there is a more solid. 
central core. 
Criticism concerning the distinction between corporatism and 
pluralism, however, is more substantial and complex. This particular 
argument will be dealt with in a later section. 
Phases of Corporatist Theorising 
Interest in corporatist theory first developed in mainstream political 
science with the publication of Schmitter's (1974) essay, 'Still the 
Century of Corporatism?', and, as Jessop (1990:111) points out, this 
work remains the 'standard point of reference' for any discussion of 
corporatist theory. The following discussion focuses on the 
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chronological development from 1974 of what Williamson (1989:9) has 
termed 'the corporatist dynasty'. This 'dynasty' can be divided into 
several 'generations' which serves not only to outline the changing 
concerns and approaches of corporatist theorists from 1974 up to the 
mid-1980s, but also to contextualise the origin and growth of a number 
of key issues that remain unresolved within corporatist theorising. 
'1974' and All That ... 
Pick up any publication on corporatist theory and included in it will be 
the most quoted definition of corporatism: that of Philippe Schmitter. 
Writing in 1974, Schmitter's definition of corporatism (in Schmitter 
and Lehmbruch 1979:13) marked a shift away from the previous usage 
of corporatism, as a description of a form of policy making, to focus on 
institutional structure: 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest 
representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within. their respective 
categories in exchange for observi1Jg certain controls on 
their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
supports. 
It is important to note, too, that Schmitter's definition of corporatism 
as a system of interest representation pitched corporatist theory at the 
level of explaining and understanding the relationship between society 
and the state in capitalist democracies. Corporatism was not, as some 
later theorists claimed, the theorisation of a completely novel form of 
political economic system that could be distinguished from capitalism. 
In this sense, corporatism was not intended to be an explanation of a 
'total system', simply the theorisation of a particular aspect of the 
existing one. The extension of corporatism as a theorisation of a novel 
form of political economy was to be developed by later corporatist 
writers. 
44 
Aware of the previously negative association with fascism, one of the 
key themes of Schmitter's corporatist theorising (along with other 
earlier writers), was not only the articulation of a coherent definition 
of the corporatist model, but also the attempt to distinguish this new 
variety of corporatism evident in liberal democracies from that of 
more authoritarian regimes. Although Schmitter viewed the 
development of corporatism as not exclusively the domain of either 
authoritarian or liberal systems - in fact, corporatist structures could 
exist in markedly different types of system - a distinction did need to be 
made between corporatist forms in democracies and non-democracies 
(Williamson 1989:11). He labelled these two sub-types societal 
corporatism and state corporatism, based on a distinction made by an 
earlier corporatist theorist, Rumanian Mihail Manoilesco (1936, in 
Schmitter 1979). 
However, while corporatist structures could exist in any political 
system, the processes that gave rise to such structures were quite 
different. In general terms, Schmitter (1974, in Schmitter and 
Lehmbruch 1979:24) argued that the development of corporatist 
structures in any given regime: 
.. . [are] related to certain basic imperatives or needs of 
capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and 
continually to accumulate further resources. 
However, it was the differences in these imperatives that accounted for 
the differences in origins between societal and state forms of 
corporatism. The origins of the societal variant of corporatism: 
.. . can be traced primarily to the imperative necessity for a 
stable, bourgeois-dominant regime, due to processes of 
concentration of ownership, competition between national 
economies, expansion of the role of public policy and 
rationalisation of decision-making within the state to 
associate or incorporate subordinate classes and status groups 
more closely within the political process (ibid:24-25). 
The emergence of state corporatism, however: 
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· .. seems closely associated with the necessity to enforce 
"social peace ", not by co-opting and incorporating, but by 
repressing and excluding the autonomous articulation of 
subordinate class demands in a situation where the 
bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally 
dependent and/or short of resources to respond effectively 
and legitimately to these demands within the framework of 
the liberal democratic state (ibid:25). 
To summarise in more general terms, corporatist structures emerge 
within a liberal-democratic framework in conditions where civil 
society co-operates and agrees with the need for the state to establish 
order (the societal variant), or when order and stability are imposed in 
an authoritarian manner from above by the state - the state variant. 
While Schmitter's explanation of societal corporatism represented the 
first significant attempt to understand the origin and nature of 
corporatist structures in liberal democracies, it still contained a number 
of unresolved issues (Jessop 1990). As Williamson (1989:12) points out, 
Schmitter's arguments for the emergence of corporatist structures were 
extremely general, if not 'speculative', offering very little detail on the 
'specific operation of and power structures associated with societal 
corporatism' . 
More importantly for later theorising, perhaps, was Schmitter's 
ambiguous and contradictory treatment of the state. According to 
Jessop (1990:112), Schmitter's system of interest representation: 
... simply took the state as given and endowed it with the 
power to licence, control or, indeed, create corporatism. 
Schmitter's conception of an autonomous state with powers to licence, 
control or create corporatist groups was inconsistent with his 
explanation of the origin of corporatist structures being located in 
'certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the 
conditions for its existence'. This exp lana tion, according to Jessop 
(1990:112), treated 'the state as a simple instrument', and endowed 'the 
bourgeoisie with the power to restructure the system of political 
representation at will'. In addition, Schmitter's treatment of the state 
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implicitly perpetuated the distinction between the public sphere of the 
state and private sphere of civil society - the distinction for which 
pluralist theory was criticised - by appearing to view the state as 
'outside, if not above, conflicts rooted in the economy and civil society' 
(ibid). However, if, as Schmitter asserts, the emergence of corporatist 
structures is contingent upon the imperatives of the reproduction of 
capitalism, this would suggest, according to Jessop (1990), 'that the 
capitalist state is deeply implicated in (rather than standing above) class 
conflict (ibid). 
At the centre of Schmitter's definition of state and societal variants of 
corporatism, however, lies a fundamental contradiction. As Cox 
(1988b) notes, although the distinction between the two types appeared 
to correspond with empirical reality, that is the emergence of 
corporatism in both fascist and liberal-democratic regimes, in both 
societal and state variations, according to Schmitter's definition, the 
state necessarily played a dominant and decisive role as the licenser 
and controller of monopoly functional groups. If the state necessarily 
dominates both versions, then, the distinction between the two is a 
non sequitur: 'state corporatism is about imposition by the state - a 
tautology on reflection. Societal corporatism is about societal interests 
agreeing to the state imposing decisions - which is hardly distinct from 
pluralism' (ibid:42). 
Using Schmitter's definition of corporatist arrangements to explain 
state-interest group relations in liberal democracies, subsequent 
corporatist writers have struggled, not too successfully, to construct an 
adequate theoretical account of the state. This 'spectre of the state', as 
Cawson (1989:233) puts it, continues to haunt corporatist writing. 
At the same time as Schmitter was developing his model of 
corporatism, another, although subsequently less influential, model 
was being proposed. In 1974 Pahl and Winkler published a paper 
boldly predicting, with what Williamson (1989:13) has described as 'an 
unwise degree of certainty for the academic world', that a corporatist 
system would be established in Britain by 1980. Unlike Schmitter's 
model of corporatism as a system of interest representation, Pahl and 
Winkler presented an alternative model of corporatism as a novel 
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form of political economy that could be distinguished from both 
capitalism and socialism: 
Corporatism is an economic system in which the state directs 
and controls predominantly privately-owned business 
according to four principles: unity, order, nationalism and 
success .... Stripped to its essentials, corporatism is principally 
defined by one particularly important qualitative change, the 
shift from a supportive to a directive role for the state in the 
economy (in Winkler 1976:103; emphasis in original). 
According to this version, corporatism is viewed as 'a response to 
changes in the structure of the ... economy', changes generated due to 
' .. .industrial concentration, declining profitability, technological 
development, and international competition' (Winkler 1976:117). 
Driven by economic crisis, the state is encouraged to intervene to 
secure the stability of capitalism. However, in doing so, the role of the 
state changes qualitatively. Increasing intervention alters the role of 
the state from being merely supportive, that is, from the provision of 
incentives and subsidies, welfare services, technological development, 
etc, to being directive - a situation where the state assumes direct 
control over economic production (Winkler 1976). Corporatism is 
proposed as 'the best means for the achievement of collective success' 
(ibid:110): 
[It] operates from the belief that goals are better achieved 
through the purposive organisation of collective effort than 
through spontaneous individual responses to perceived 
opportunities. Concretely, this means a corporatist regime 
would attempt to establish control over the investment 
process ... and assume some degree of responsibility for 
economic planning .... This is more than conventional state 
intervention, more than Keynesian demand management, 
indicative planning, technocracy or socially responsible 
capitalism. It is a planned, organised and controlled 
economic system, justified by its ability to achieve collective 
ends. 
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Such a fundamental restructuring of the economy and the state would 
result in an enduring situation from which, according to Winkler 
(1976:118), there would be 'no going back'. The system would no 
longer be capitalist because 'rights over private capital [would be] 
abrogated by the state, and the market mechanism ... superseded by 
oligopolistic power' (Cawson 1986:23). 
Pahl and Winkler's model of corporatism was developed within the 
context of a bipartisan approach to the management of the British 
economy during the early 1970s. This trend was generalised, 
prompting the prediction that: 
A corporatist economic system ... is likely to be instituted in 
Britain during the life of the present government and its 
successor (whatever its political complexion), that is, over 
the next five to ten years (Winkler 1976:114). 
Unfortunately for Pahl and Winkler the empirical evidence did not 
support their confident claim, nor did their theorisation of the state 
and capitalism bear close scrutiny (for a detailed critique see Jessop 
1990:113-116). Most damaging to their claim, though, was the fact that 
the economic crisis experienced in Britain patently did not result in 
state direction and control. On the contrary, the election of the 
Thatcher government and subsequent adoption of neo-Liberal 
economic policies made their predictions appear, as Williamson 
(1989:13) notes, 'more eccentric than anything else'. According to 
O'Sullivan (1988), it was only in Japan that anything could be found to 
fit Pahl and Winkler's model. However, comparisons between Japan 
and western democracies, given their different political traditions, 
revealed very little about the western corporatist experience (ibid). Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, this variety of corporatism has little current 
appeal. 
The First Generation 
By the end of the 1970s, the interest in corporatist theory was 
translating into an increasingly substantial body of literature - some of 
which were published in a volume edited by Schmitter and 
Lehmbruch (1979), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation. 
Judging by the work presented in this volume, there had been little 
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progress made in establishing a clear model of corporatism. Quite the 
reverse, in fact; the level of disagreement appeared to be increasing 
(Williamson 1989:14). 
Perhaps the most important issue to emerge from this generation of 
corporatist theorising was the discussion surrounding the need for a 
more adequate theorisation of the state in order to understand its role 
in the establishment and maintenance of corporatist structures. To 
this end, both Jessop (1978) and Panitch (1979) presented 
reinterpretations of corporatist theory within a framework of Marxist 
state theory. According to Panitch (ibid:123), corporatism was best 
understood as: 
... a political structure within advanced capitalism which 
integrates organised socioeconomic producer groups 
through a system of representation and co-operative mutual 
interaction at the leadership level and of mobilisation and 
social control at the mass level. 
In this version, corporatism was a state strategy to 'integrate the 
working class into the capitalist state in the interest of protecting 
business and capital accumulation by restraining wage and other social 
demands at a time of falling profits and increased international 
competition' (Cox 1981:92). Labour was 'duped' into collaboration with 
capital and 'incorporated into a process of economic constraint' 
(McLennan 1984:102). 
In contrast to, and as an improvement on, both Schmitter and Pahl 
and Winkler, Jessop (1978, in Jessop 1990:116) a~gued that corporatism 
had so far been analysed in 'technological, economic or class 
reductionist terms and/or in an arbitrary, eclectic and ad hoc manner'. 
These deficiencies, he maintained, were clearly reflected in the 
inadequacy of the corporatist treatment of the state in both approaches: 
it was viewed as 'an autonomous instance and both theories fluctuated 
between instrumentalist and subjectivist views of state intervention' 
(ibid). According to Jessop (1990:120), corporatism could be defined as a 
specific form of state within capitalist society characterised by a 'specific 
mode of articulation and disarticulation between representation and 
intervention': 
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Corporatism can also be defined as a distinctive combination 
of political representation and state intervention. In this 
case, however, representation is mediated through a system 
of public I corporations I which are constituted on the basis of 
their members functions within the division of labour. And 
state intervention occurs through these same corporations 
and/or administrative agencies formally accountable to 
them. Thus, whereas representation and intervention are 
typically institutionally separated in parliamentary-
bureaucratic systems, in corporatism they tend to be 
institutionally fused. For the formal organs through which 
political representation is mediated are also responsible for 
intervention. 
In other words, corporations, constituted on the basis of economic 
function, serve to both represent the interests of their members to the 
state, as well as to implement state policies (Cawson 1986). Interest 
groups do not persuade governments of the need to implement a 
particular policy; policy is the outcome of negotiation between 
functional groups and the state. It is this notion of the 'fusion of the 
processes of representation and intervention' that distinguishes 
corporatist structures from other state forms. As Cawson (1986:25) 
notes, '[t]here is no separation, except in theory, between making the 
policy and implementing it'. 
By contextualising their analyses of corporatist structures within the 
framework of Marxist state theory, however, both Jessop and Panitch 
imported into their interpretation of corporatism Marxism's associated 
economic reductionism. And, according to Cox (1981) the argument 
that corporatism was simply a state strategy on behalf of capitalism 
could be refuted by empirical evidence: for example in Britain, 
business, as well as state agencies such as the Treasury resisted rather 
than encouraged corporatist developments. And the notion that 
unions were 'duped' into participation dismissed the extent to which, 
as McLennan (1984:102) observes, in corporatism 'it is above all the 
long term struggle of labour which is recognised, negotiated, and 
(possibly) furthered', through concessions such as welfare provision 
which are won from capital. 
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At the same time as Jessop and Panitch were proposing an approach 
that fused corporatism with Marxist state theory, Cawson (1978), partly 
in response to the version of corporatism advocated by Winkler, began 
to examine the uneven development of corporatist structures in 
Britain. According to Cawson (ibid:187), corporatism could be defined 
as: 
... a politico-economic system in which the state directs the 
activities of predominantly privately-owned industry in 
partnership with the representatives of a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically 
ordered and functionally differentiated interest groups. 
While Cawson also linked the development of corporatist structures of 
interest representation with 'long-term changes in economic structure 
and technological development' (ibid:197), his paper represented the 
first corporatist analysis to suggest that corporatism should not be 
viewed as a total system (Williamson 1989). According to Cawson 
(1978:181), the political system in Britain 'embrace[d] both a 'corporate 
sector' and a 'pluralist sector' of interest representation', with the 
tendency for corporatist arrangements to develop only in strategic areas 
of state activity. Given the fundamental role of the state as the 
'guarantor of capitalism' (ibid:191), it would of necessity be economic 
interests that became corporatised as state intervention to regulate 
economic activity increased: 
Since the major determinant of the corporatist trend is 
concentration in the economic structure and in the plurality 
of political interests, it is clear that corporate representation 
will become most fully developed in economic issues 
reflecting the strategic role of the state, and interest groups 
will be incorporated or established where co-ordination and 
planning is recognised as essential to the performance of this 
role (plBS). 
In other words, there was an important distinction to be made 
'between groups according to their significance for the activities of the 
state rather than according to their subjective concerns' (Cawson 
1978:192). A corporatist relationship between the state and producer 
52 
groups would be vital in economic planning to provide not only the 
'specialised knowledge and professional capability' required by the 
state, but also to confer legitimacy by providing a context in which state 
intervention can occur within an environment of 'consultation and 
representation' (ibid). In contrast, the activity of consumer groups, for 
example the civil liberties lobby, would remain 'largely outside the 
purview of the state' and firmly within the realm of pluralist pressure 
group politics (ibid). This distinction between producer and consumer 
spheres of interest representation was an important precursor to the 
later shift in corporatist theory, from a macro-level 'total system' 
explanation, to analyses located at both meso- and micro-level 
(Williamson 1989). 
Before moving to the second generation of corporatist theorising, two 
more developments during this time can be noted briefly. The first 
was the emphasis by Lehmbruch (1979) on corporatism as a means of 
regulating conflict between labour and capital based on his 
observations that corporatist structures most frequently occurred 
between organised labour and business interests, and were most often 
concerned with economic policy, particularly income policy (ibid:152). 
This was similar to the view articulated by Panitch (1979), although 
Lehmbruch's emphasis was on the 'high degree of collaboration' and 
consensus among these groups rather than the more Marxist focus of 
class conflict. In times of economic crisis, the more direct attempts by 
the state to control economic activity created, according to Lehmbruch, 
'acute problems of consensus' (ibid:154). Under such circumstances, 
direct control was replaced in favour of 'political bargaining of 
governments with the large interest associations, that is to say, by 
corporatist consensus-building' (ibid). 
The second point to note was indicated by a shift in terminology by 
Schmitter (1979). Instead of discussing corporatism as a system of 
interest representation, he had shifted to labelling corporatism as a 
system of interest intermediation (ibid:63-94). According to Schmitter 
(1979:93), the concept of interest representation was an inadequate 
attempt to capture what it was that interest organisations actually did: 
... it conveys the impression that formal interest associations 
accurately and faithfully transmit the demands and 
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preferences of their members, or, worse, are "representative" 
in some stat-istical sense of the term ... [and] it implies that 
representation is the exclusive or even predominant task of 
such specialised organisations. 
Rather, what Schmitter wanted to convey through his use of 
intermediation was the notion that: 
.. . associations not only may express interests of their own, 
fail to articulate or even to know the preferences of their 
members, and/or play an important role in teaching their 
members what their interests "should be", but also often 
assume or are forced to acquire private governmental 
functions or resource allocation and social control. 
Representation (or misrepresentation), hence, may be only 
one of the activities of these associations (ibid). 
In short, interest organisations acted as intermediaries between the 
state and their members, not necessarily 'accurately or fully' 
representing their members' interests one the one hand, and on the 
other, acting to 'perform a regulatory function over their members in a 
quasi-public manner' (Williamson 1989:14). 
The Second Generation 
As with the first generation, the second generation of corporatist 
theorising was represented by the publication of two edited volumes, 
Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making (1982) by Lehmbruch and 
Schmitter, and Organising Interests in Western Europe (1981) by 
Suzanne Berger. This second generation of theorising is perhaps best 
characterised by an emphasis on the elaboration of existing issues and 
on the systematic application of corporatism in empirical research, 
rather than on the 'conceptualisation and speculative theorising' of 
corporatists of the previous generation (Lehmbruch 1982:1). 
According to Williamson (1989:16), one of the most important issues to 
emerge at this time was the 'recognition that there were two linked, 
though distinct, usages of corporatism'. As Schmitter (1982:262) noted, 
one of the most productive debates in corporatism had been between 
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those theorists advocating what he labelled as 'corporatisml' and those 
advocating 'corporatism2': 
... those who define it as a distinctive mode for organising the 
conflicting functional interests - whether these are based on 
social class, economic sector or professional status - and 
those who identify it as a distinctive mode for making and 
implementing public policy. 
This debate between the old and the new 'testaments' of corporatism 
(Cox 1988b:294), is one aspect of corporatist theory that, as yet, remains 
unresolved. 
A further conceptual development at this time was that of Cawson 
(1982, 1983). Expanding on his earlier work, that a corporate sector of 
interest representation co-existed with a pluralist sector within the 
British political system, and drawing on the work of Offe (1975), he 
developed the concept of a dual politics thesis (1982:15-30). In his 
analysis of corporatism and welfare state intervention in Britain, 
Caws on argued that corporate groups arose 'directly out of the 
functional division of labour in society' (ibid:37). Consequently, 
corporatist structures were a feature of state intervention in the arena 
of economic production. In this form of policy-making: 
representation (of demands) and implementation (of 
policies) are fused within a mutually dependent bargaining 
relationship in which favourable policy outcomes are traded 
for co-operation and expertise (ibid:39). 
Due to the 'degree of independent power' that accrued to such 
functional groups, the state could not simply 'incorporate', and thereby 
dominate, such groups; nor could it merely 'co-opt' members of 
corporate groups as a token measure of participation - their autonomy 
implied the capacity for resistance to such moves. Rather, the state 
needed to 'accommodate' these groups within a 'genuine bargaining 
process' - hence the emergence of a corporatist relationship (ibid:39-40). 
In contrast, the pluralist or competitive sector of politics was the 
domain of the interests of 'clients' of the Welfare State, for example 
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Child Poverty Action Group, Age Concern, etc (Cawson 1982:42). 
Within this sphere of competitive politics, such groups: . 
.. . may have regular access to parties and government, they 
may receive government financial support and be consulted 
prior to the passage of legislation, but their access is 
controlled by politicians and administrators. They do not 
possess socio-economic leverage - they have no clout -
because the clients they represent are not among the 
economically productive whose co-operation is a 
prerequisite of successful policy (ibid:42-3) 
In summary, what Cawson was attempting to indicate with the dual 
politics thesis was that the state does not enter into the same sorts of 
relationships with all interest groups. As Williamson (1989:124) notes, 
this thesis suggests 'that the mode of representation is dependent upon 
the type (producer, allocator, etc) and hence the target (function and 
individual) of state intervention'. Where interests are formed around 
socio-economic function, the state cannot impose policy decisions 
without some loss of legitimacy. Therefore in such instances, the 
corporatist mode of representation would be more appropriate for 
successful intervention (ibid:125). However, a number of criticisms of 
this thesis were raised - most notably its functional nature and the fact 
that policy does not always neatly divide into production and 
consumption spheres. 
One final feature to emerge in this generation of corporatist theorising 
was the need to consider the development of corporatist structures at 
different analytical levels. In contrast to the dominant and 'outspoken 
macro bias' of most of the corporatist theorising to date, Wassenberg 
(1982:85) argued for a view of corporatism as a 'conflict-displacing, 
rather than ... conflict resolving device' in industrial societies. In place 
of the macro-orientation of corporatist theory, Wassenberg suggested a 
three-level analysis of the political system comprising: 
... the peak institutions ... like parliament, cabinet and the 
establishment of private peak associations (e.g employers', 
industrial-entrepreneurial, financial and labour associations) 
... are referred to when we use the label 'macro' .... 'Micro' 
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refers to individual corporate entities ... local representatives 
of the trade unions and chambers of commerce and so 
forth ... I Meso I then refers to the more or less 
institutionalised entity of complete industries, regional 
public authorities and the industry-wide and regional 
managerial machines of trade associations and labour 
unions I (ibid). 
In what he referred to as this 'vertical "balkanisation'" of the political 
and economic order, Wassenberg argued that corporatist structures 
would prevail at the meso-level, but at the same time, the costs of any 
corporatist accommodation could be displaced to both the macro- and 
micro-level - for example, a conflict between capital and labour may be 
transported downward to the level of individual industries (ibid:85-86). 
The significance of Wassenberg's distinction between separate levels of 
corporatist structures was that it provided the key feature of the third 
generation of corporatist literature. 
The Third Generation 
Where the previous generations of corporatist theorising were 
characterised by the publication of one or two collected editions of 
essays, due to the utilisation of Wassenberg's levels of corporatist 
analysis, the third generation was marked by a distinct broadening of 
the agenda for corporatist research and a concomitant explosion in the 
literature. By the mid-1980s corporatist theory had been applied to a 
wide variety of situations. From meso- and micro-level issues such as: 
land use planning in Britain (Simmie 1985); industrial relations 
(Crouch 1985); problems of governmental accountability (Birkinshaw 
1988); the formation of the European Community (Sargent 1985); 
Thatcherism (Bonnett 1985); and the Quebec construction industry 
(Coleman 1985); to the more usual macro-level application of the 
corporatist model to the experience of individual states: Sweden (Elder 
1988); Austria (Marin 1985); Italy (Bull 1988); and Germany (Berghahn 
1988). The criticism that corporatist studies were often short on 
empirical evidence was undeniably answered - according to 
Williamson (1989:18), perhaps a little too emphatically. This raised 
further criticism, however, that in a number of these meso-level case 
studies, attempts to link empirical evidence with theoretical concepts 
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was somewhat neglected, as was any acknowledgement of the inherent 
difficulties in just such a task (ibid). 
An important development to corporatist theory at this time, though, 
and particularly relevant given the arrival in a number of western 
democracies of neo-Liberal governments, was the concept of private 
interest government (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). This entails, 
according to Williamson (1989:18): 
the devolving of public policy functions to private interest 
associations. Thus parts of the economy, and the wider 
society, are regulated by 'private' associations performing a 
'public' role, as opposed to being regulated through either 
the market or the state bureaucracy. 
Most importantly, perhaps, this notion of private interest government 
removed the necessity for corporatist arrangements to be connected 
directly with state intervention, but could exist through other 'quasi-
public structures'. As Williamson (1989:18) notes further, the 
philosophy of state deregulation characteristic of neo-Liberal 
administrations appeared to fit quite neatly with the idea of private 
interest government - an indication, perhaps, that, with the arrival of 
such governments, 'corporatism was not on its deathbed'. 
Reinventing the Wheel? The Challenge to Pluralism 
While it is evident from this brief account of corporatism's theoretical 
development that considerable disagreement exists concerning what 
constitutes a corporatist framework and to what it can be legitimately 
applied, there is considerable unanimity of opinion throughout the 
literature concerning the reason for the revival of interest in it during 
the 1970s. This was as a critique of, and challenge to, the prevailing 
orthodoxies of both pluralist and Marxist models of society. In its 
challenge to Marxism, corporatist theory questioned the notion that 
class· conflict is the ultimate determinant of social existence 
(O'Sullivan 1988), although there are a number of Marxist 
interpretations which have attempted to reformulate corporatism as a 
strategy of capital, for example Offe, Habermas and Jessop. These have 
suffered, according to corporatist critiques, from the economic 
reductionism inherent in Marxist theorising - whereby political 
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processes are viewed as merely an epiphenomenon of the economic 
structure. In addition, non-class interests (assumed to exist by some 
corporatist theorists) cannot be accommodated or explained adequately 
by Marxist theory without losing the essential focus of Marxism (for 
example, Offe 1983; Jessop 1983; cited in Cawson 1985:2-4). 
The main object of corporatist critique, however, has been pluralism. 
When Schmitter first published his formulation of a corporatist 
framework in 1974, the underlying purpose for doing so was quite 
clear: 
One purpose In developing this elaborate general model ... is 
to offer to the political analyst an explicit alternative to the 
paradigm of interest politics which has heretofore 
completely dominated the discipline of North American 
political science: pluralism (Schmitter 1974, reprinted 
1979:14). 
In the 1960s, pluralist theory overall had been compromised by the 
increasing levels of social conflict which its fundamental assumption 
of consensus could neither accommodate or explain. The 'rediscovery' 
of inequalities, the growing academic critiques of the theoretical bases 
of pluralism as well as the functionalist assumptions with which it was 
associated combined to challenge the primacy of pluralism as the 
dominant social and political science paradigm (Cerny 1990:150). 
Coupled with this was the specific critique by some corporatist writers 
of the relevance of pluralism to the relations between the state and 
interest groups in a European context, given that pluralism was a 
fundamentally American creation (O'Sullivan 1988). Thus, in spite of 
its negative association with Fascism and Nazism in the 1920s and 
1930s corporatism was presented, in the early 1970s, as a viable 
alternative to the dominance of pluralist explanations of state-interest 
association relationships. 
The corporatist critique of pluralist explanations of the relationship 
between the state and interest associations is centred on two key issues: 
the nature and role of interest associations and of the state (Cawson 
1986 Ch2; Cawson 1985:2; Williamson 1989 Ch3; O'Sullivan 1988:5). 
More fundamentally, however, corporatism takes issue with two 
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important elements of the pluralist approach: namely, its 
methodological individualism and behaviourism (Williamson 
1989:51-2). Pluralist analyses of interest association activity are 
underpinned by the assumption that although groups exist in society, 
their behaviour can be understood only through reference to 
individually held preferences. In other words, groups are simply a 
collection of individuals and group interests the aggregate of 
individual preferences. This particular feature of pluralism will be 
considered in more detail below. The behaviourist assumptions of 
pluralist theory are concerned with establishing what the legitimate 
focus of social science research should be: only the objective, 
scientifically observable behaviour of individuals is deemed relevant. 
Subjective needs or motivations, due to their 'unobservable' nature, 
are dismissed. The focus on what is directly observable, however, 
means that the underlying structures and relations of society and 
politics are essentially ignored by pluralism - or, at best, taken as given. 
Outcomes are taken to be the result of individual interactions (ibid). 
Both the individualism and behaviourism inherent in pluralist theory 
will be elaborated on in the following discussion. 
The Nature of Interest Associations 
According to pluralist theory, interests are the preferences expressed by 
individuals (Cawson 1986:7). Interest groups are voluntary 
associations of individuals sharing the same interests who organise 
themselves in order to further those interests and which compete 
equally with each other for members, resources and political influence 
(O'Sullivan 1988:5). They are an important component of the political 
system as a whole, not a part of government. 
An interest association is viewed as successful, that is, as powerful, if it 
can secure from government its preferred policy outcomes (Cawson 
1986:29). Within a pluralist framework, power has been defined as 'the 
capacity of one actor to achieve his (sic) ends against resistance by 
others' (ibid:13). The resources on which this capacity can be based are 
varied and widely, although not equally, dispersed through society -
financial resources, information, skill, etc. This inequality in 
distribution does not result in a permanently unequal social structure, 
however. On the contrary, the diversity of power bases within society 
ensures that groups lacking one resource will have recourse to 
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another, thus compensating for any disadvantage (ibid). In addition, 
the most widely distributed form of power, universal suffrage, 
exercised in the democratic political market-place, ultimately 'ensures 
equality of opportunity for groups to exercise power, even if not a final 
equality of outcome' (Cawson 1985:4). This notion of electoral 
competition is a crucial means by which the accumulation of power 
can be prevented. 
Within a corporatist framework, however, the focus of analysis is the 
interest organisation and how organisational interests differ from 
individual interests (Cawson 1986:11-12). It is concerned with the 
process of collective action and how this process 'is constrained by and 
shapes the nature of the interests involved' (ibid:11). An important 
distinction is also made within corporatist theory between the kinds of 
interest groups that can be formed. Those formed around 'functional', 
that is work-related, interests are considered to be of more significance 
politically than groups that form around other interests, for example, 
ethnic identity (Cawson 1985:4). Functional groups are further divided 
into producers, for instance trade unions and professional associations, 
and consumers, who, given the dispersed and diverse nature of their 
interests, are unlikely to engage in corporatist arrangements. 
In contrast to pluralism, within a corporatist theoretical framework a 
limited number of significant functional interest groups form due to 
what Cawson (1986) has termed 'the degree of concentration in the 
structure of interest groups'. The concept of concentration is derived 
from an analogy between the economic market and the political 
market, and the tendency toward oligopoly (limited competition) and 
monopoly in the economic market (ibid:32-35). As successful 
producers in the economic sphere tend to acquire market power, that 
is, the power to govern the market rather than being governed by it, so 
too does concentration of interest representation occur (Cawson 
1985:5). In opposition to the pluralist notion that power is dispersed in 
society, within a corporatist framework, there exist very distinct 
inequalities and hierarchies of power. According to Cawson (1986:14): 
.. . organisations achieve power by a process of social closure, 
whereby they attain the status of monopoly representative of 
a particular category of functional interest. It is the nature of 
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the interest, and the monopoly position gained through 
closure of the political market place, which accounts for 
inequalities of power. 
In short, some organisations become interest monopolies no longer 
simply representing interests but becoming instrumental to their 
formation. It is just such groups which become· 'corporatised' and 
become part of the process of government policy formulation and 
implementation. In summary, then, corporatism asserts that, contrary 
to pluralist theory, there are only a small number of very large, 
essentially non-competitive interest groups formed around socio-
economic functions, and that membership of these groups cannot be 
considered voluntary because exclusion from these groups would 
mean effective exclusion from participation in the political process 
(O'Sullivan 1988:5). 
The Role of the State 
Within a pluralist framework, the concept of the state is synonymous 
with government (Williamson 1989:55), therefore a theory of the state 
is largely unnecessary. It can be said, though, that pluralism contains 
an implicit theory of the state: that there exists a clear distinction 
between the public sphere - the realm of government and electoral 
competition - and the private sphere - where the putatively 
independent formation of interest groups occurs (Cawson 1986:16, 29). 
What pluralism explicitly theorises, then, is the role of government. 
Government, rather than state, agencies are assumed to be essentially 
neutral but responsive to societal preferences as articulated by multiple 
interest groups. These agencies are operated by officials (civil servants) 
assumed to have no independent interests or power of their own and 
who are accountable to a democratically elected government (Cawson 
1986:28; Williamson 1989:55-56). Interest groups compete for access to 
government in order to secure policy outcomes favourable to their 
particular interest. (It is within this competitive process that the 
origins of any 'crisis of public authority' lie, a crisis caused, according to 
pluralist theory, by an 'excess of democracy' (Cawson 1986:16). Interest 
group demands on the public sphere results in an expansion of 
government activity. As interest groups proliferate, governments 
reach the point where demands and expectations become impossible to 
fulfil, leading to a 'paralysis of government' (ibid). 
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The government is viewed as the referee or the arbiter in the 
conflictual and competitive process of interest group lobbying, acting in 
its capacity as the guardian of the public interest to ensure that the 
'interests' of the public are reflected in policy outcome. As such, the 
government mirrors societal preferences, it does not act against them 
(Williamson 1989:55). Nor, it is important to note, does it play any role 
in shaping those preferences. Policy decisions arrived at through this 
competitive process are then implemented via legislation or 
administered through the government bureaucracy - the crucial point 
being that, because of the clear separation within pluralist theory of the 
public and private spheres, there is no position within a pluralist 
account of government activity for interest groups to play any role in 
the implementation of policy. 
If a pluralist theory of the state is implicitly predicated on the concept 
of distinction between the public and private sphere - a position which 
ignores the role of interest groups within the state (McLennan 1989:25) 
- corporatism, conversely, holds that there has been a growing 
'interpenetration', with the boundaries between these two spheres 
becoming increasingly blurred (O'Sullivan 1988:5). This is due, 
according to Cawson (1986:35), to the corporatist concept of: 
.. . public policy as the outcome of a bargaining process 
between state agencies and those organised interests whose 
power in the political marketplace means that their co-
operation is indispensable if agreed policies are to be 
implemented. 
In the real world, as O'Sullivan (1988:5) notes: 
.. . governments continually step beyond the public into the 
private realm in order to participate in interest politics; 
while on the other hand, interest groups acquire a quasi-
public role, partly by virtue of the privileged position they 
hold in policy formation. 
In contrast to pluralism, then, corporatist theory accords the state more 
than a merely neutral and responsive role. The state makes use of 
interest groups to formulate and implement policy. But, more than 
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that, the state only allows access to this process to those specific groups 
on which it has conferred, what Offe (1981) has referred to as 'public 
status', that is the recognition or licensing by the state of an interest 
group as the legitimate monopoly representative of any particular 
interest. 
It is important to note, too, that corporatist theory focuses on the state 
as opposed to government, thus holding the wider view that the 
activity of state institutions cannot be explained, as within the pluralist 
framework, simply by reference to elected governments (Williamson 
1989:121). 
Conclusion 
Although corporatism outlines a considerably more expansive and 
active role for the state than pluralism, an adequate theorisation of the 
state within corporatist structures has so far proved elusive. In a 
putative explanation for the development of corporatist structures, this 
is a critical omission. As Cawson (1985:6) has noted, corporatist 
structures always involve the state, yet 'the crucial issue of whether 
there is a state interest which is integral to corporatist 
relationships ... and how that interest can be theorised [remains] 
unresolved'. The inadequacy of corporatist accounts of the state, 
however, can be directly attributed to the over-extension of 
corporatism - its application as an explanatory theory in competition 
with both Marxism and pluralism, rather than as a descriptive account 
of a form of political relationship. 
The contribution of corporatism to understanding the relationship 
between the state and civil society lies at the level of description. In 
spite of claims by its advocates, corporatism is not an explanation of 
state forms capable of displacing either pluralism or Marxism, but is 
simply one of several alternative descriptions of political reality. 
Corporatism, as Cox (1988b:44) notes, can best be viewed as 'an empty 
shell into which anything can be poured, depending upon the balance 
of political forces shaping the policies of the state'. It describes an 
ideal-type of relationship between the state and civil society which does 
not say anything about how such a political form is used or by whom: 
the interests corporatist structures serve, whether they are biased 
towards some interests at the expense of others, are empirical questions 
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that can only be answered if corporatism is utilised in conjunction 
with a more adequate theoretical account of the state. In Chapter III a 
model of corporatism as an ideal-type will be outlined, as well as the 
theoretical approach to the state to be utilised in the later examination 
of the Schools Consultative Group. 
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CHAPTER III - THE STATE AND CORPORATISM 
As a solution to the difficulties presented by both the 'grand' 
theoretical and reductionist approaches of much Marxist state 
theorising, the first part of this chapter outlines a state theoretical 
framework that draws substantially on the conceptual and 'empirical' 
approach advocated by Jessop (1990). The adequacy of this approach to 
an examination of the education state in New Zealand will be 
considered, as will the relevance of corporatist analysis to the sphere of 
social policy and to professional associations. The chapter concludes 
with a model of corporatism to be applied, in conjunction with Jessop's 
six-dimensional approach to the state, in the analysis of the Schools 
Consultative Group contained in Chapter IX. 
Theory Construction and Method 
Jessop (1990) has developed a conceptual framework that aims to 
resolve some of the most significant inadequacies of Marxist state 
theory: namely the more or less complex determinism and 
reductionism. Although he describes his approach as Marxist, this 
claim is difficult to reconcile with his utilisation of concepts from other 
theoretical perspectives, the use of regulation theory with its 
assumption of multiple as opposed to single logics of capital, systems 
theory and autopoeticism amongst others. According to Jessop 
(1990:12), his approach to the state theory: 
... rules out any possibility that single set of causal 
mechanisms could explain the concrete, complex 
development of social life. Thus I do not believe that the 
economic system (or the dominant mode of production) has 
the properties necessary to enable it to play a unilateral 
causal role in determining the form, functions or impact of 
other systems of social relations .... Nor do I believe that 
Marxist analyses ... could exhaust all aspects of social 
structures and/or social relations. This implies in turn that, 
for some purposes, Marxist analyses must be articulated with 
concepts, principles of explanation and assumptions drawn 
from non-Marxist theories. 
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While it can easily be asked what remains of Marxist theory in this 
approach to the state, Jessop has been more accurately described by 
McLennan (1984) as a 'pluralistic' Marxist. 
Methodologically, there are two key themes underlying his theoretical 
approach: multiple determination of events and contingency. The 
theoretical task Jessop sets himself is to provide a framework through 
which the accidental, unpredictable and 'non-necessary' interactions of 
causal mechanisms which combine to produce specific outcomes and 
events can be understood. Allied to this is the view that no single set 
of causal mechanisms can explain how or why interactions occur. 
Consequently an adequate theoretical and, perhaps more importantly 
for Jessop, empirical understanding of events in relation to the state is 
necessarily predicated upon the adoption of a diversity of causal 
mechanisms as well as the utilisation of concepts and explanations 
from different theoretical systems. Explanatory adequacy thus rests on 
a method of theory construction that develops analyses of the real 
world that progress from abstract to concrete as well as from simple to 
complex (Jessop 1990:12). 
In relation to the state, the starting point for Jessop's approach is that it 
is not possible to develop a theory of the state in any strong sense of 
theory understood as 'an integrated account of the state in terms of a 
single set of causal mechanisms' (1990:249). It is methodologically 
impossible to establish a single theory which is sensitive to the 
complexity, diversity and historical specificity of particular states. 
Indeed, there is so much disagreement over what the state actually is 
that the development of any adequate theoretical understanding of it 
has simply produced and reproduced 'vapid debates and a conceptual 
morass' (ibid:339). The diversity of existing states is such that features 
given theoretical priority as fundamental and definitive are often a 
question of preference or of empirical confirmation. Even if 
agreement could be reached over the basic principles, assumptions and 
definitions required for an adequate state theory, this is still no 
guarantee that inferential processes will produce similar conclusions. 
As Vincent (1987:40) points out: 
Hobbes and Locke shared many individualistic assumptions, 
as also do John Rawls and Robert Nozick. However, in the 
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case of Hobbes the contractual process leads to an absolute 
monarchy and in Locke to a rudimentary constitutional 
theory. In Rawls, the conclusion is a social democratic 
welfare state; in Nozick, a minimalist state and free market 
economy. 
In addition, the interaction between theoretical development and 
actual states also precludes any definitive statements concerning state 
form and function. Political theories play a significant constitutive 
role in the reality they purport to explain. In short, ideas about the 
state impinge upon the formation and operation of real states. As a 
result, there is no independent reality against which the veracity (or 
otherwise) of competing theories can be assessed. 
A Strategic-Theoretical Approach to the State 
In light of the intractable difficulties of formulating a 'grand' or 
monolithic theory of the state, what is required is a 'weak' theory - that 
is, a set of theoretical guidelines to inform the analysis of states which 
is sensitive to the 'complex synthesis of multiple determinations' that 
is the substance of any particular state (Jessop 1990:249), a framework of 
concepts which does not attempt to explain the state in terms of one set 
of pre-determined causal mechanisms1. According to Jessop, what he 
has labelled a strategic-theoretical approach2 to the state is more useful 
than conventional Marxist theorising based largely around 
perspectives that emphasise either the functionality of state forms to 
capital accumulation or the centrality of class struggle to state form and 
function. He suggests that, while these two approaches would appear 
to exhaust all possible Marxist explanations of events pertaining to the 
state, the dichotomy between capital-logic and class-theoretical 
approaches is fundamentally flawed and has presented state theorists 
with a 'false dilemma': that is, the utilisation of one necessarily 
excludes and neglects the other. To solve this, what is required is an 
approach that mediates between the two perspectives and which 
IThe advocacy of weak as opposed to strong theory does not originate with Jessop. 
Althusser (1969) made a similar distinction between what he termed Generalities II 
and Generalities III - a conceptual framework versus substantive theory. 
2Jessop argues that the state should be understood as 'the site, the generator and the 
product of strategies' (p260), that is, as a political strategy itself. It is a structure 
which, analogous to the use of strategy in reference to war, is able to impose some 
conditions of engagement on those forces pursuing particular strategies towards it. 
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focuses instead on the dialectic relationship between the two - the ways 
in which 'structures shape forces and forces shape structures' (ibid:256). 
Jessop also rejects the assumption of the existence of a single logic of 
capital. Using regulation theory as a starting point, Jessop proposes a 
focus which takes into account the existence of multiple logics of 
capital. By doing so, he draws attention to the variety of ways in which 
'accumulation comes to be socially mediated through diverse 
institutions, social norms, networks, forms of compromise and so 
forth' (1990:254-5). As a result, explanations of any particular 
accumulation regime are necessarily placed within a framework that is 
required to acknowledge the contingent nature of reproduction as well 
as any inscribed laws of motion. 
He also rejects the class-theoretical assumptions of class unity on the 
basis that if there is no single, unified structure of capitalism then it is 
impossible to reify 'one' class struggle. He goes further, rejecting 
assertions that all struggle is necessarily class based and central to the 
reproduction of capitalism. Instead he suggests that the class-relevance 
of struggle needs to be established rather than making a priori 
assumptions that all struggle must necessarily be class relevant or that 
all class struggles are equal. For example, it is not helpful to consider 
racist attacks on immigrants and social democratic electoral 
competition as expressions of the one unified class struggle. 
Jessop's approach is an attempt to go beyond prescriptive theoretical 
agendas which attribute political phenomena to particular sets of 
predetermined causal mechanisms. The most adequate explanations 
of events will only be obtained through the utilisation of concepts 
from a diversity of theoretical approaches in order to best capture the 
complexity that constitutes modern states. This is not to say, however, 
that instrumental or capital-logic (or any other) approaches to the state 
are misguided or incorrect. Quite the contrary, in fact. As Jessop points 
out with reference to instrumental explanations of state form and 
function, the purpose of political struggle is to engage the capacities of 
the state to particular ends. In this regard an instrumental approach 
may explain particular events very well. However, the starting point 
for determining the adequacy of such explanations lies in establishing 
their veracity empirically. 
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The State as Political Strategy 
A definition of abstract characteristics of states appears contradictory to 
the approach advocated by Jessop. In fact he suggests that it is not the 
'proper job' of state theorists to offer definitions, 'once and for all', of 
what a state may look like or how it may act (1990:340-41). Jessop's 
approach to the state is as a 'real-concrete' rather than abstract object; 
that is, he argues for a clear institutional framework from which the 
functions of the state can be adduced empirically. This approach, 
however, attempting to theorise the state without explicitly stating 
what the theoretical subject is, poses a number of problems - not the 
least of which is the lack of theoretical starting point. To overcome 
this difficulty, however, he does offer a definition but with the 
qualification that it is not the end-point of state theorising, but rather it 
is the beginning; an adequate understanding of the state needs to 
proceed beyond an initial definition (ibid:343). Thus explanations of 
the state (and consequently the formulation of a theoretical 
framework) can never be considered complete because it will 'always 
be possible to make an account more concrete and more complex ... [and] 
ever richer in theoretical determinations' (ibid:341). With this 
qualification in mind, the state is defined as an apparatus that: 
.. . compnses a distinct ensemble of institutions and 
organisations whose socially accepted function is to define 
and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members 
of a society in the name of their common interest or general 
will (ibid). 
As an institutional ensemble, however, a state has 'multiple 
boundaries, no institutional fixity and no pre-given formal or 
substantive unity' (1990:267); it is neither monolithic nor intrinsically 
stable or cohesive. Around the state are other institutions and 
organisations which are connected to a state ensemble in historically 
variant and societally specific ways. Consequently, a state does not 
'achieve full closure or complete separation from society' (ibid:342). In 
addition, the apparent unity of states can only be understood in terms 
of the 'specific political projects and struggles to impose unity or 
coherence' pursued by various forces in their 'attempts to impart a 
specific strategic direction to the individual or collective activities' of 
the state (ibid:268). In short, the unity of a state is always constituted 
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politically (ibid:8)3. Cohesiveness (or the lack thereof) is a function of 
the extent to which support can be secured around potentially 
competing state projects both within and outside the core ensemble of 
a state. As this might suggest, because there is no pre-given 
institutional unity, variations in cohesiveness within a state have the 
potential to result in what Jessop has termed 'states within the state' -
clusters of institutions I agencies constituted around particular and 
varied state projects. 'The' state does not exist, nor does 'the' state act. 
Rather, state activity should be understood as: 
the emergent, unintended and complex resultant of what 
rival 'states within the state' have done and are doing on a 
complex strategic terrain (ibid:9). 
As a result, 'the boundaries of the state and its relative unity as an 
ensemble or agency [are always] contingent' (ibid:366). What 
constitutes the apparent unity of a state or of its effects are the outcome 
of a complex interplay of multiple determinations both within the 
state formation itself as well as in the wider social arena. 
Strategic Selectivity 
The concept of strategic selectivity of the state is employed by Jessop to 
highlight what he describes as 'the state's differential impact on the 
balance of political forces and the strategies which they can pursue' 
(1990:10). More specifically, the state can be analysed as 'a system 
whose structure and modus operandi are more open to some types of 
political strategy than others' (ibid:260): 
Particular forms of state privilege some strategies over 
others, privilege the access of some forces over others, some 
interests over others, some time horizons over others, some 
coalition possibilities over others. A given type of state, a 
3Two central features of Jessop's conceptualisation of the state ensemble are the 
concepts of 'state projects' and 'state effects'. State projects are the particular modes of 
operation through which 'the state [secures] a certain organisational unity and 
cohesiveness of purpose' (1990:353), the 'structural and strategic factors which 
contribute to the existence of state effects' (ibid:9). In short, state projects are the 
various ways in which the state continually creates both the substantive unity of state 
institutions as well as the means by which it secures and maintains the 'integration and 
cohesion of the wider society', what Jessop labels state effects (p346). 
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given state form, a glVen form of regime, will be more 
accessible to some forces than others according to the 
strategies they adopt to gain state power. And it will be more 
suited to the pursuit of some types of economic or political 
strategy than others because of the modes of intervention 
and resources which characterise that system (ibid:l0). 
Thus, the form of the state has significant effects on, and is central to 
understanding, the entire political process - from the structure of states 
and the exercise of state power through to the constitution of political 
interests and the strategies they adopt towards the state. 
State bias is not an original concept in Marxist theorising. As Jessop 
notes, it was evident in the work of Marx himself as well as in other 
Marxist theorising of the state as an epiphenomenon of the economic 
organisation of society and as the instrument of class rule. In these 
formulations, the state was seen as inherently biased towards the needs 
and interests of capital. Jessop's use of strategic selectivity, however, is 
not underpinned by the assumption that the inherent bias of the state 
is necessarily beneficial to capitalism and the interests of capitalists, and 
must therefore irresistibly favour forces acting in the interest of capital 
or fractions thereof. Indeed, Jessop's conceptualisation of the state and 
of state projects does not allude to any particular or pre-given bias of 
the state at all. Rather, the state is theorised, following Gramsci, as: 
a strategically selective terrain which can never be neutral 
among all social forces and political projects; but any bias is 
always tendential and can be undermined or reinforced by 
appropriate strategies. For, within the strategically selective 
limits established by state structures and operating 
procedures, the outcome of state power also depends on the 
changing balance of forces engaged in political action both 
within and beyond the state (ibid:353). 
Thus, the question of precisely which forces may prevail in their 
attempts to influence the exercise of state power is not pre-determined, 
but can only be established empirically: it can only be answered by 
reference to a particular state at a particular historical conjuncture and 
through the outcomes of state policies. 
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Strategic selectivity is not a structural characteristic of the state as a set 
or cluster of institutions. Rather, it is a feature of the relation between 
state structures and the strategies adopted by various groups towards it. 
The basis of this concept is to be found in the view of the state as a 
social relation, that is, a 'form-determined condensation of the balance 
of forces' acting in and through it (1990:269). Selectivity is the outcome 
of the dialectic relationship between structure and strategy: past 
strategies adopted by various forces towards the state, to either 
maintain it or transform it, shapes the form of the state which, in turn, 
shapes the form of future strategies adopted towards it. 
Researching the State: a Six-Dimensional Approach 
Any adequate analysis of the state, however, must progress beyond 
definitional statements about what a state is. In order to analyse it 
adequately, we need to examine factors both within and outside states 
which impinge upon their form and operation. To this end, Jessop 
suggests two analytical approaches. The first is a three-level analysis of 
the state focusing on, firstly, its broader societal context and 'basic 
institutional separation from the rest of society'; secondly, its 
institutional structure and modes of operating; and finally, the nature 
of the political struggles conducted in and around it (1990:343-4). In 
conjunction with this framework, Jessop suggests the application of a 
'conceptual hierarchy' of state development proceeding from the 
abstract concept of statehood itself down to more specific types of 
political organisation, both 'normal and exceptional', to generate a 
typology of state forms. In so doing, states can be understood within a 
global political, as well as within their specific nation-state, context. 
As an alternative to this approach, Jessop suggests a six-dimensional 
conceptual framework which allows an analysis of both the formal or 
institutional aspects of a specific state as well as its behavioural or 
strategic aspects. Described as a 'short circuit' of the first approach, the 
latter narrows the context within which states can be understood by 
dispensing with the level of analysis in the first approach relating to 
social formation, but with an attendant loss of comprehensiveness. 
However, as Jessop notes, not all analyses need to be quite so ambitious 
that an appreciation of a state in a global-political sense is required. In 
these instances the latter approach, which focuses on the institutional 
structure, modes of operation and political struggle in and around 
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states within national-specific contexts, although not exhaustive, does 
provide an 'initial framework for analysing different aspects of the 
state' capable of producing 'more or less complex descriptions of 
particular states and their strategic selectivities' (Jessop 1990:346). 
Jessop identifies three institutional or organisational dimensions of 
states that need to be investigated: forms of representation, forms of 
articulation and forms of intervention. He also identifies three 
behavioural or strategic dimensions, that is, those factors that relate to 
the operation of the state, and to the political forces acting within and 
through it: the social bases of state power, state projects and hegemonic 
projects (Table I): 
Table I: Six-Dimensional Conceptual Framework 
(From Jessop 1990, Chapters 5, 7 and 12) 
Institutional/Organisational Strategic/Behavioural 
Mode of Representation: Social Bases of Support: 
means by which interests political forces within and 
are represented at the level around the state 
of the state or state agencies 
Forms of Articulation: S tate Project: 
internal organisation practices that endow 
of state agencies the state with internal 
unity 
Forms of Intervention: Hegemonic Project: 
through which activity broader objectives around 
of the state is enabled which the exercise of 
or constrained state power is centred 
Representation, Articulation and Intervention 
The institutional aspects of the state that require investigation are 
relatively straightforward. According to Jessop (1990:118), the state is 
an: 
institutional complex of forms of representation and 
intervention.... [which] can be distinguished in terms of the 
differential articulation of political representation and 
intervention. 
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Thus to understand a state, we need to examine the ways in which 
interests are represented both within and outside it, how those 
interests are filtered, modified and shaped by the strategic selectivity of 
the state (or different institutional clusters), and the various ways in 
which the state can intervene (or not) in response to those interests. 
When examining modes of interest representation, various types of 
representational regimes - for example, corporatism, parliamentarism 
or what Jessop describes as tripartism, a hybrid of corporatism and 
parliamentarism - are particularly relevant, as are the roles played by 
political parties, social movements and state personnel - both elected 
and employed. The form of representational regime will have an 
effect on the ways in which interests are articulated. Modes of 
representation, as Jessop points out, are often treated as 'neutral 
transmission belts of objective pre-given interests which simply relay 
those interests into a different field of action' (ibid:160), in this case, the 
state. However, as will be discussed later, interests are not pre-given 
nor are modes of representation neutral. The strategic selectivity of the 
state ensemble, that is the crystallisation within the state form of past 
strategies towards it and struggles fought within it, has a differential 
impact on the articulation of interests in terms of which interests and 
strategies are recognised by the state as legitimate. 
In addition to this, the internal organisation of the state 'expressed 
through the distribution of powers among different parts of the state 
system' (1990:345), (which Jessop terms its 'articulation' as an 
institutional ensemble) also plays an important role. Further to the 
existence of 'states within the state', the various 
branches/ constellations of agencies have different institutional 
'capacities and liabilities' (ibid:270) and, thus, will have a differential 
effect on the exercise of state power - state power being the 'power of 
the forces acting in and through the state'. While such forces include 
class interests constituted either partially or wholly outside the state, as 
well as others such as gender or regional interests for example, Jessop 
includes officials and managers within the state as a key group having 
significant effects and interests of their own. 
The final institutional dimension of the state that needs to be 
examined is the variety of forms of intervention available to a state. 
To this could also be added, in light of using this framework in relation 
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to a neo-Liberal education state, the non-intervention or withdrawal of 
the state from particular sectors. In a similar fashion to modes of 
interest representation, different forms of intervention (or non-
intervention) will have a differential impact on the strategies that can 
be pursued towards the state. The institutional structures of a state can 
constrain or enable intervention, by making certain interventions 
possible, others impossible, and others unable to be articulated within 
particular state or hegemonic projects. 
Social Bases of State Power, State Projects and Hegemonic Projects 
. These three dimensions of Jessop's theoretical framework refer to 
behavioural or strategic aspects of the state - its mode(s) of operation 
and the political forces which act in and around the state. Along with 
the examination of particular policies pursued by a state, other factors 
which also impinge upon the action (as opposed to the structure) of the 
state need to be considered. The first dimension concerns the social 
bases upon which support for, or resistance to, the exercise of state 
power rests. As the reflection of a particular configuration of social 
forces acting in and through the state, state power is exercised with the 
support or opposition of particular social forces. As Jessop (1990:346) 
notes: 
particular states comprise the material condensation (or 
institutional embodiment) of particular social compromises. 
Thus each state or regime can be related to a social base (or 
bases) which provide its stable core of support and comprise 
in turn its principal beneficiaries. 
In short, those social forces which endorse or oppose the state system, 
its modus operandi and objectives need to be identified in order to 
understand the bases of strategies within and around the state. 
Support for, or resistance to, the state can only be meaningfully 
understood with reference to particular sets of aims and objectives. 
Thus the second dimension, state projects, is concerned with an 
examination of those 'state practices and projects which define the 
boundaries of the state system and endow it with a degree of internal 
unity' (1990:346). In other words, the ways in which a state system, as 
an institutional ensemble with no inherent unity or stability, 
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constitutes its unity politically through particular modes of operation 
or underlying guiding principles. For example, the neo-Liberal agenda 
pursued by states can be viewed as a state project, and also as a 
hegemonic project. 
The dimension relating to hegemonic projects is concerned with 
examining the nature of the broader objectives around which the 
exercise of state power is centred (1990:161), and the means by which 
support is generated for particular state projects in the name of 'the 
general interest'. As Jessop notes, the 'general interest' is essentially a 
fiction, as is the community whose interests it is supposed to represent. 
What is promoted and advanced by the state as in the 'general 
interest', is, in fact (due to strategic selectivity) the particular interest of 
a hegemonic group / alliance. Hence, the hegemonic project of the state 
is the mobilisation of support for a particular course of action on the 
basis of 'general interest' when, in practice, the outcome is the 
advancement of the particular interests of a hegemonic group (ibid). 
Researching the Education State in New Zealand 
Jessop's strategic-theoretical approach to understanding states, as well 
as the research strategy outlined above, is clearly aimed at a theoretical 
understanding of states in their entirety - as complex, multi-faceted 
entities operating in both national-specific as well as geo-political 
contexts. As such, the question is begged whether or not this 
theoretical approach is equally applicable to a specific set of events 
within a particular state formation; that is, can the analytical categories 
outlined above aid an investigation of the formation of the Schools 
Consultative Group (SCG) in the education sector in New Zealand in 
1992? The answer is 'yes', with some minor modifications. Indeed, it 
could be argued that Jessop's approach is pertinent only when applied 
to identifiable clusters of institutions or agencies within the ensemble 
commonly labelled 'the state'. Given his definition of states as having 
multiple boundaries, no institutional fixity and no pre-given formal or 
substantive unity, they are unable to be apprehended in their entirety 
because what constitutes that entirety is too diffuse. Thus, at the level 
of entire state formations, the theoretical focus for Jessop's approach 
remains indeterminate. 
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To adapt Jessop's approach to an examination of a specific political 
event involves some 'miniaturisation' of focus, particularly in the 
dimensions relating to modes of interest representation and the social 
bases of state support. Central to this miniaturisation is the notion of 
'states within the state'. While Jessop is particularly guilty of not 
clearly elucidating what is intended by some of his most central 
concepts, 'states within the state' is taken to indicate, following Pusey 
(1991), the existence of institutional clusters within a state formation, 
differentiated according to function and· which are organised, both 
internally and in relation to other institutional clusters, in particular 
ways, and shaped by the particular forces/interests that confront them. 
In this way what is commonly referred to as the 'education state' can be 
viewed as that set of state institutions and/or agencies involved in the 
provision of 'state' education and can be taken as the analytical focus of 
Jessop's six-dimensional approach. Thus, both the institutional and 
the strategic aspects of the state, how particular parts of the state are 
organised and how they operate, can all be contextualised within an 
educational framework, albeit with a more specific focus in relation to 
both the representation of interests and intervention in the education 
state, as well the bases of support or opposition to the state within 
education. 
Such an approach can be utilised in an examination of the formation 
of the SCG by showing how a crisis within the institutional form of the 
state, that is in the organisation of the state as neo-Liberal, created a 
political crisis for the strategic operation of the state. The expulsion of 
interests from the education state created a crisis of support for the neo-
Liberal hegemonic project, necessitating a different kind of strategy at 
the levels of interest representation and intervention. The failure of 
government attempts to 'mainstream' the education state, that is 'to 
remove from it any special treatment that may be argued for on the 
basis of special needs' (Dale and Jesson 1992:13), underpinned by the 
specific concerns of the State Services Commission to exorcise provider 
capture, ultimately required the adoption of a political strategy in the 
form of the SCG that appeared specifically precluded by the ideological 
assumptions of the broader neo-Liberal regime. A key question that 
remains to be answered, thus, is whether or not the strategy 
represented a retreat to the more corporatist-style relationship between 
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interest groups and the state that had prevailed in the education sector 
prior to the shift to a neo-Liberal state form during the 1980s. 
Jessop's conceptual framework offers a non-determinist methodology 
for understanding state forms, broadly construed. The second part of 
this chapter outlines the model of corporatism that, in conjunction 
with Jessop's six-dimensional approach to the state, will be used in the 
later analysis of the SCG. As a particular mode of articulation between 
state and non-state groups within civil society, and as a form of 
strategic selectivity, corporatism embodies a distinctive configuration 
of interest representation and state intervention. As such, corporatist 
concepts can be utilised within Jessop's institutional dimensions of the 
state - or, in this particular instance, the collection of agencies that 
constitute the education state. Before outlining a model of 
corporatism, however, two important issues concerning its utility need 
to be addressed. The first is the relevance of corporatism to an analysis 
of the education state as a social policy sector; the second, arising from 
the first, is the capacity of teachers' professional associations to act as 
corporatist bodies. 
Corporatism and Social Policy 
While the entire corpus of corporatist literature (both theoretical and 
empirical) is quite extensive, the area of social policy generally has been 
somewhat neglected. As even a cursory examination of the literature 
indicates, theorists are concerned almost exclusively with the 
manifestation of corporatist relationships between the state and peak 
associations of labour and capital at the level of macro-economic 
policy. The most notable exceptions to this are Cawson's (1982) study, 
Corporatism and Welfare, and Harrison's (1984) edited collection, 
Corporatism and the Welfare State. Such studies, however, represent a 
very small part of the corporatist arena of interest. 
The restriction of corporatism to analyses of macro-economic policy 
can be explained, in part, by the nature of the dependency relationship 
between the state and economy. According to Williamson (1989:169), 
corporatism is of most relevance as a model of state-interest group 
relations in situations 'where the state cannot intervene by means of 
authoritative regulation and allocation'. Because the economy is 
essentially the realm of private producers, the state cannot intervene 
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directly or unilaterally without risking a loss of political legitimacy or 
the support of economic interests. Subsequently, corporatist analysis 
has focused largely on industrial relationships between the state, 
employers and trade unions. In the more overtly political realm of 
social policy, or in relation to the often disaggregated interests of 
consumers, the nature of state relationships are perceived to be 
qualitatively different, and therefore less amenable to corporatist 
analysis. 
The economic focus of corporatism is also maintained through the 
availability of structural variables able to be quantified. In this regard, 
Henley and Tsakalotos' (1993) Corporatism and Economic Performance 
is a good example. Indicators such as economic performance, 
centralisation of wage bargaining systems, rates of inflation and 
unemployment represent the quantifiable face of corporatism. 
Correlations between such indicators and characteristics of the political 
systems of a variety of nation states are used to establish the' degree' of 
corporatism, although there is no agreement on what indicators are 
crucial or what structural features need to be present or absent. When 
applying corporatist theory to the area of social welfare, however, there 
is an attendant problem in identifying prerequisite political factors for 
the emergence of corporatist relations. In short, economic 
relationships are 'quantifiable', and thus amenable to analysis, in ways 
the political realm is not. 
An alternative explanation of the profusion of economic analyses 
centres around one of the major inadequacies of corporatist theorising: 
consideration of the role of the state. As already mentioned, the 
treatment of the state in corporatist theorising is, at the very least, 
underdeveloped. Somewhat less charitably perhaps, the inadequacy of 
the theorising of this most integral component of the corporatist 
model poses the greatest threat to the overall viability of the theory. 
Having placed the state in centre stage, corporatist theorists have yet to 
develop a robust theoretical account of its action. Within economic 
corporatist theorising, particularly those models reflecting more 
Marxist antecedents, it is frequently suggested that the underlying 
motivation for states to enter into corporatist arrangements is because 
it enables the reconciliation of potentially conflicting short-term 
interests of individual producers with the longer term systemic 
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interests of the economy. While there are many shortcomings to this 
particular interpretation of corporatism, it does provide an adequate 
starting point for debate and theoretical development. However, the 
somewhat economistic nature of these attempts at theorising the state 
does not permit a substantive analysis of the state's operation in the 
realm of social policy. Within social policy, the particular interests 
advanced or protected by corporatist relationships have proved more 
difficult to discern. 
As has already been suggested, this particular deficit can be countered 
through the utilisation of a more effective state theory as a 
supplementary framework in which to situate the corporatist model. 
In fact, it can be quite cogently argued that this is the most productive 
way in which corporatism can be used: as an adjunct to a larger 
political theory. While corporatist theorists appear to agree only on the 
underdeveloped nature of the theorisation of the state within the 
model, there is a sense in which this is a rather unfair criticism. 
Corporatist theory is an attempt to understand a particular kind of 
relationship that develops between the state and organised interest 
groups. It is not a macro-theory of a total political system, nor a 
theorisation of all possible types of state-group relations. Rather, it 
most usefully operates as a middle-range theory that attempts to 
explain a particular mode of articulation between parts of a total 
system. Thus, the expectation that corporatism, if the middle-range 
purview is accepted, can be raised to a systemic level of analysis is not 
only unrealistic, but incorporates within the model a theoretical 
inconsistency and tension that militates against the utility of the theory 
as a whole. 
The Professions as Corporatist Bodies 
The difficulties of using corporatism in the study of social policy 
notwithstanding, there are some very clear parallels between economic 
producer groups and producers involved in the delivery of welfare 
services - the key group being professionals. Indeed, Williamson (1989) 
has suggested that professional associations, on a number of 
dimensions, appear to be ideal corporatist bodies. In the earlier outline 
of the corporatist model, it was noted that organised interests typically 
engaged in corporatist arrangements with the state share a number of 
key features such as monopoly representation, closure around a 
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particular area of expertise or skill instead of a particular sector of 
production, hierarchical organisation and are frequently self-
regulating, for example the Medical Council and Law Society. 
Professional associations clearly compare favourably to producer 
groups in this regard, and thus meet some of the prerequisites for the 
establishment of corporatist structures between them and the state. 
Such similarities aside, however, the application of corporatist theory 
to relationships between professional groups and the state raises two 
crucial issues that may compromise the relevance of the model. The 
first issue is the location of professionals within the state as employees; 
the second concerns the role of ideology in legitimating professional 
groups' involvement in policy development and implementation. As 
already mentioned, the nature of the dependency relationship between 
welfare producer groups and the state is considered to be different to 
that between the state and economic producer groups. Frequently (but 
not always) in social policy areas, for example education and health, 
professionals are employed by the state. The existence of a contract of 
employment would appear to allow the state a power over 
professionals as employees that it does not enjoy over private actors in 
the economic sector. Hence there may be little need for the state to 
enter into bargained or negotiated agreements with professional 
groups over whom it has an ultimate veto for non-compliance with its 
goals or interests in the form of sacking, redundancy or some other 
censure of its employees. In addition, employment within the state 
also legitimates the input professionals have into the process of policy 
formulation. Consequently the relevance of the corporatist model of 
state-interest group relationships to professional groups within the 
state may be questioned. However, while teachers are state employees, 
given their importance to the successful achievement of various 
government policies in the education sector, it is highly unlikely that 
such an authoritarian approach would be taken. Indeed, collectively 
speaking, the state needs teachers, and is thus required to allow a 
considerable degree of professional autonomy. 
The issue of the employment of professionals within the state also 
raises the question of whether it is theoretically sustainable to suggest 
that corporatist structures can emerge between different branches of the 
state. Professional groups considered as state employees would imply 
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some convergence of interests between them and the wider interests of 
the state, again making the notion of a corporatist-type negotiated 
agreement a little redundant. 
The second issue is the legitimacy of professional group involvement 
in policy development and implementation. Given the ideology of 
professionalism - the possession of specialised theoretical knowledge 
and expertise and a 'public-regarding' as opposed to self-interested 
modus operandi, - the inclusion of professionals in the policy process 
can hardly be considered extraordinary nor particularly interesting 
from a corporatist perspective. Involvement with the state in the 
development of policy and participation in the delivery of such policy 
can all be legitimated on the grounds of professional expertise. 
However, as is being argued, it was the specific exclusion of 
'professional expertise' as provider capture that contributed centrally to 
the formation of the Schools Consultative Group. Clearly, the 
involvement of professional groups in policy development and 
implementation is politically determined and, thus, can form the basis 
of a corporatist relationship. 
For a corporatist relationship to develop between the state and 
professional associations, a significant divergence of interest needs to 
exist. There are three possible ways this can be done. As Walsh (1987) 
and Williamson (1989) have argued, a case can be made for viewing 
professional employees within the state as internal organised interests 
based largely around the issue of professional autonomy. The key 
feature that separates professionals within the state from other 
employees is the concept of professional autonomy, in which 
individual professionals claim 'the right to determine the type and 
forms, and to some extent scale, of the [welfare] service provided to 
individual clients' (Williamson 1989:172). As Williamson points out, 
while professionals are formally part of the state system, their initial 
allegiance lies with the profession and with the defence of its 
autonomy and its domain of expertise. In relation to corporatist 
theorising, the ethos of professionalism may represent the necessary 
divergence of interest that outweighs any shared interest that may 
proceed from the profession being positioned as employees within the 
state. 
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The second way in which a divergence of interest may be established is 
to distinguish between 'the influence of professionals and the 
influence of the profession' (ibid:179; emphasis in original). In other 
words, a distinction needs to be drawn between representation on 
behalf of colleagues and representation of the profession. This is a 
problematic distinction to make, however, as it is often argued that 
what is good for the professionals is good for the profession. The 
difficulty of this distinction is exemplified by the teacher unions in 
New Zealand. They perform both functions simultaneously, although 
to different degrees. They are at the same time professional 
associations and unions - they represent their own interests and the 
interest of the profession as a whole. However, there is some debate 
over whether teachers are professionals, sharing the characteristics of 
other professional groups for example doctors or lawyers, or are 'semi-
professionals'. An important characteristic of corporatist bodies is the 
capacity for self-regulation, and is a trait that teachers appear to lack. 
They are (or were) publicly regulated by the state, not by their own 
associations. 
Both of these options examine the possibility of conflicting interests 
existing between the state and professionals from the perspective of the 
professions. A third, and perhaps more obvious divergence of interest 
between the state and professional interest groups in New Zealand has 
occurred through the neo-Liberal restructuring of the education 
system. The programme of restructuring changed the political context 
of education almost overnight, and was, without doubt, responsible for 
a severe dislocation of interests between what had previously been a 
social-democratic state with social democratic teachers, who had an 
ideal of professional autonomy recognised by the state. The expulsion 
of teachers as professionals from the political arena on the grounds of 
'provider capture', the drive to make teachers 'more accountable' to 
both the government and the consumer and the reordering of the 
industrial relations environment in education to parallel the private 
sector clearly posed a threat to both professionalism and autonomy. In 
Chapter IV, the process of state and education restructuring will be 
outlined in further detail. 
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The Prerequisites of Corporatism 
As noted in the discussion of the development of corporatism in 
Chapter II, there are a variety of competing views concerning what 
constitutes an appropriate model of corporatism and at which 
theoretical level - macro, meso or micro - corporatist analysis can be 
most usefully employed. The origin of this confusion, according to 
Jordan and Richardson (1987:105), can be found in the 'overdramatic 
claims for novelty' made by the 'mainspring of the corporatist attack', 
Philippe Schmitter. In claiming corporatism as a distinctive 
paradigmatic alternative to the orthodox pluralism of political science, 
Schmitter created 'a divisive debate where none need have existed' 
(ibid:95). In the face of the attack that greeted his now famous 
definition in 1974, particularly but not exclusively from pluralists, 
Schmitter retreated significantly from his initial position; to the point 
where he was moved to concede that corporatism and pluralism 
actually shared a number of basic assumptions (Schmitter 1979). In so 
doing, however, corporatism was exposed even further to the criticism 
that it was simply a variant of pluralism.!. As a consequence, the 
ground on which the theoretical debate has taken place has become 
more uncertain - both externally in terms of adequately delineating the 
boundaries between corporatism and pluralism, as well as internally 
concerning what does or does not constitute corporatism. 
While it is certainly true that the progressive dilution and redefinition 
of corporatist concepts has resulted in a body of literature described 
even by sympathetic observers as 'indigestible' and whose utility is still 
open to serious question, corporatism is scarcely alone in this regard. 
Indeed, it could be argued the amount of debate generated reflects the 
degree to which corporatism has, in fact, found a legitimate target. 
However, the main point to be stressed here is that, despite the noise 
levels reached by critics and advocates alike, corporatist theory does 
4Initially Schmitter was accused of providing a model of state-interest group relations 
that, while theoretically different from pluralism, did not cohere readily with the 
empirical reality it sought to explain. There was confusion over whether the model 
was intended to describe real political systems or prescribe an ideal-type of state-
interest group relations. As well, the characteristics of corporatist relationships 
included in the model were criticised for being both arbitrary and difficult to 
operationalise. Schmitter subsequently compounded the confusion by progressively 
retreating from his claims of novelty for corporatism by using corporatism more as an 
ideal-type categorisation. The identification of corporatism changed from a question 
of presence or absence to a question of degree. 
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have a novel contribution to make to the analysis of state-interest 
group relationships, although perhaps not quite to the extent 
Schmitter had originally envisaged. While the process of theory 
construction is far from complete, at its present level of development 
corporatism contains a number of useful insights regarding both the 
structural and non-structural conditions under which corporatist 
relationships between the state and organised interest groups may 
emerge. 
The structural determinants of corporatism have received a great deal 
of attention in corporatist writing. Yet, as Bull (1992:266) points out, to 
get to the heart of the corporatist process, to go beyond simply 
describing institutional characteristics and to account for what is 
distinctive about corporatist relationships, an effective theoretical 
model 'must not only explain the organisational nature of different 
actors but also their behaviour' (emphasis in original). Thus, the 
model of corporatism outlined below, based upon the work of Cawson 
(1986) and Bull (1992), will focus not only on its structural 
preconditions, that is, the nature of the participants in corporatist 
arrangements, but also on the nature of the relationship between the 
participants. 
Corporatism is an ideal-typical account of one form of articulation 
between the state and/or its agencies and organised interest groups 
within civil society. It is a mechanism through which the particular 
interests of civil society may be mediated with the putative 'universal' 
interests of the state (Jessop 1990) and, as such, represents one form of 
what Jessop has described as the strategic selectivity of the state. It is, as 
Cawson (1986) observes, a middle-range, 'partial theory of politics', 
most usefully supplemented by more robust political and/or social 
theories. Although a middle-range theory, corporatist relationships 
can be located at different levels of the socio-political structure (Table 
II), and may be bipartite or tripartite in form. 
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Table II: Varieties of corporatism 
(from Caws on 1986:79) 
Type of Organisational Levels of State Corporatism Actor(s) Institutions 
Sectoral/Tripartite Peak Associations e.g Cabinet Macro-corporatism Trade Unions 
Sectoral, State/Regional Meso-corporatism Interest Groups 
Agencies 
Micro-corpora tism Individual Firms State/Regional 
Agencies 
The confusion surrounding corporatist theory and its empirical 
application have been described by one author as resembling 'holiday-
makers facing a grey and uninviting sea' - the debate has reached such 
baffling proportions that most are left 'anxiously wondering whether 
or not to take the plunge' ('Neal 1986, in Bull 1992:257). The main 
source of this confusion lies in the debate over whether corporatism 
most usefully describes a novel form of interest representation, the 
most frequently utilised definition of this version being Schmitter 
(1974), or whether it is a distinctive mode of state intervention or 
policy making, for example Scholten's (1987) edited collection. In 
addition to this internal debate, the continued use of Schmitter's two 
variants of corporatism, state and societal, have both been the subject 
of substantial critique from pluralists - that societal corporatism is, in 
fact, no different from pluralism, and state corporatism, (which, for 
Cox (1988a) is the only version of the theory that is useful, given that it 
focuses on the indispensable variable of state power), resembles 
authoritarian forms of corporatism far too closely and is, thus, 
indistinguishable from fascism. 
Cawson's (1986:39) definition, however, attempts to overcome the 
divide within corporatism as either interest representation or 
intervention by combining both positions. He also attempts to respond 
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to the challenges of pluralism by identifying as a determinant of 
corporatism a necessary concentration of interests within civil society 
that appears to preclude any association with authoritarian state forms: 
Corporatism is a specific socia-political process in which 
organisations representing monopolistic functional interests 
engage in political exchange with state agencies over public 
policy outputs which involves those organisations in a role 
which combines interest representation and policy 
implementation through delegated self-enforcement. 
While Cawson's definition of corporatism, as Bull (1992:263) observes, 
'appears to be the most concise so far', in attempting to free 
corporatism from its fascist and authoritarian associations, he neglects 
a crucial determinant in the emergence of corporatist relationships -
that is, the power of the state. While drawing a distinction between a 
state that is strong enough to resist colonisation by the interests it 
engages with, yet is not sufficiently strong to act without the co-
operation of those groups is problematic, the role of the state cannot be 
ignored. In the rest of this chapter, the prerequisites of corporatism as 
suggested by both Cawson and Bull - the concentration of political 
interests, the nature and power of the state and the concept of political 
exchange - will be considered in more detail. 
The Concentration of Political Interests 
Corporatist arrangements emerge in situations where, within civil 
society, there exists a monopoly of interest representation, or, as 
Cawson (1986) describes, a concentration of political interest - a 
situation analogous to the economic tendency to oligopoly between 
market competitors. Contrary to pluralist accounts of interest group 
politics, which posit the existence of multiple, voluntary groups 
competing for political influence within a neutral state framework, 
corporatist relationships emerge between the state and/or its agencies 
and interest groups characterised as compulsory and non-competitive 
monopolies. The form of organised interests that engage in corporatist 
arrangements with a state or state agencies is necessarily monopolistic, 
compulsory and non-competitive in order to bring into the 
relationship all possible producers: to ensure that 'exit' is not an option 
for members, to ensure that other organised groups cannot claim to 
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represent the same interests (thereby ensuring that the state is dealing 
with the only possible representative group), and to ensure compliance 
across a whole sector of production to agreements struck. 
According to Jessop (1990), however, the concentration of interests 
within civil society are, in part, shaped by the selectivity of the 
institutional ensemble of the state and/or state agencies with which 
they may engage. Although not wholly determined by the state or its 
agencies, political interests are not 'fully determined elsewhere in 
society' either (ibid:149). They are a response to the differential effect of 
the state on organised interests. Thus, strategic selectivity shapes not 
only the form of the state as an institutional ensemble, but the interests 
or political forces that contest the exercise of power on the terrain of 
the state, as well as the strategies those forces may adopt towards the 
state and/ or its agencies. 
The Nature of the State and of State Power 
Cawson (1986) identifies a significant structural determinant of 
corporatism with the concentration of political interests. Yet Bull 
(1992) also argues for consideration of the state and state power as 
important structural prerequisites - a position entirely consistent with 
Jessop's location of state selectivity at the centre of any understanding 
of the political process. Cawson's downplaying of the role of the state 
as a determinant of corporatist relations is understandable when 
viewed in light of theoretical attempts to distinguish corporatism in 
Liberal Western democracies from its fascist, authoritarian-state 
variations. However, states or state agencies, as central participants in 
corporatist arrangements, and state power are indispensable structural 
variables for the emergence of corporatist relationships. Cawson's 
argument that corporatism is the result of an autonomous 
development of monopoly interests to which states merely respond is 
difficult to defend from the charge that it is not sufficiently different 
from pluralism. To accede to the state an active role in the formation 
of corporatism, that such arrangements are brought into existence by 
state fiat, opens this position up to the criticism that the putative 
'societal' corporatism of Western democracies is, in fact, 
indistinguishable from its 'state' corporatist variant. With Cawson, it 
would seem, the corporatist dilemma over the role of the state is 
perpetuated. 
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According to Bull (1992), the ambiguity surrounding the role of the 
state can only be resolved by utilising both the variables of state power 
and concentration of interests in a four-fold typology of state-group 
relations from which the conditions under which various forms of 
state-group relations can be adduced, and which, thus, replaces 
Cawson's notion of a pluralist-corporatist continuum (Table III). 
Table III: Typology of State-Group Relations 
(from Bull 1992:265) 
State/ Concentration of Interests 
Agency 
Power High Low 
Strong Corporatism State Rule 
Rule by 
Weak Private Pluralism 
Interests 
In this typology of political relationships, however, Bull does not 
elaborate on what constitutes 'strong' or 'weak' state power. Nor does 
he attempt to define what interests states or state agencies pursue 
through such relationships. Although attempting to 'bring the state 
back in' to corporatist theory, he, too, is guilty of perpetuating the 
somewhat simplistic corporatist conceptualisations of the state as a 
unified and monolithic organisation. According to Jessop (1990), the 
classification of states as either weak or strong, or as monolithic and 
unified, is fundamentally misleading. state strength or weakness, that 
is, the power of the state, is not an inscribed characteristic of states or 
state agencies, but the outcome of the balance of political forces 
operating on the strategically selective terrain of the institutional 
ensemble that constitutes 'the' state. Thus, it is the outcome of 
strategies within and towards the state that may be termed strong or 
weak. State power does not exist, and cannot be considered, abstracted 
or isolated from particular forces adopting specific strategies towards 
the exercise of state power at any given conjuncture. 
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Contrary to Bull's view of states as monolithic and unified, their 
internal organisation, that is the articulation of states as institutional 
ensembles, has a significant effect on the exercise of state power. The 
organisation of 'states within the state', that is, particular constellations 
of state agencies such as the education state, may possess differing 
capacities to effect the exercise of state power. Thus, the distribution of 
'power' throughout the state, or the ability to influence its exercise, 
will be variable. Moreover, the differential distribution of 'power' 
throughout the complex of the state cannot be considered in isolation 
from the 'strength' or 'weakness' of the political interests in and 
around the state that clusters of state agencies may confront. Contrary 
to Bull's conceptualisation of the state, then, strength or weakness 
cannot be simply postulated, it must be demonstrated with reference to 
particular parts of the state ensemble and specific political interests. 
Nor can 'strength' or 'weakness' be characteristic of states in their 
entirety because the capacity to influence the exercise of power may be 
distributed unequally throughout the entire state complex. Thus, both 
'state power' and the potential differential capacities within states to 
influence the exercise of it are factors requiring empirical elucidation. 
Political Exchange 
The structural determinants of corporatism are a necessary, but by 
themselves, insufficient prerequisite for the emergence of corporatist 
arrangements. By confining the determining features of corporatism 
to structural factors alone, all relationships between the state and 
monopoly interest groups could, potentially, be classified as corporatist. 
What helps to distinguish corporatism from other forms of 
articulation, however, is the concept of political exchange, a process or 
strategic factor which attempts to explain why actors engage in 
corporatist relationships (Bull 1992). 
Political exchange, according to Bull (1992:263), can be defined as: 
... a relationship entered into by the state and interest groups 
in which the state gives up part of its decision-making 
authority to interest groups in exchange for those groups 
guaranteeing their members I adherence to the decisions 
reached. 
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The 'activation' of political exchange, and thus corporatist 
relationships, can be explained by reference to rational choice theory. 
Contrary to Cawson's conceptualisation, the state is not 'pushed' into 
such an arrangement in an involuntary manner by the autonomous 
concentration of political interests within civil society, nor does the 
state impose corporatist arrangements upon unwilling interest groups. 
Rather, political exchange is viewed by both interest groups and the 
state as 'the current best means to achieve [their] goals compared with 
the existing alternatives of action' (Heath 1976, in Bull 1992:268). As 
Bull points out, the willingness of actors to engage in political 
exchange may simply be 'the result of a mutual change in the means to 
obtain unchanged goals' (ibid:269). In short, and contrary to much 
corporatist theorising, corporatist relationships are a means to an end 
which does not necessarily imply a convergence of views between the 
participants over the desirability of those ends or, indeed, imply a 
change in the ends to be reached. 
Clearly, under a rational choice explanation, for all participants the 
gains to be secured from such arrangements must outweigh the losses. 
While participants lose in terms of autonomy of operation, the direct 
gains, according to Bull (1992:269), are those: 
'" which relate to the goods embodied in the political 
exchange relationship: for the interest groups, preferential 
access to the decision-making process with an increased 
ability to affect market outcomes and protect their monopoly 
status; for the state, increased effectiveness In the 
implementation of its policies and greater legitimacy 
accorded to its actions. 
Furthermore, for the state, an indirect gain exists through: 
... the creation of 'insider' groups, giving them influence 
over decision-making for political purposes and excluding 
other groups; or it may benefit from co-opting groups into 
decision-making procedures and giving the leaders the 
illusion of having influence as a means of social control 
(ibid). 
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Clearly the question of the goals and interests of the participants 
engaged in political exchange are empirical, with the successful 
achievement thereof determined by specific political, economic and 
cultural conditions as well as by the extent to which structural 
conditions for corporatism exist: that interest groups exhibit a high 
degree of political concentration and that the state possesses sufficient 
. coherence and power (ibid). 
Although political exchange is central to Cawson's (1986) 
conceptualisation of corporatism, it remains underdeveloped. As Bull 
(1992) notes, political exchange implies at least two active partners, a 
condition untenable within Cawson's corporatist framework given 
that he does not acknowledge the state as a determinate structural 
variable. Moreover, Cawson's view of exchange is 'static'; it is an 
event activated by the concentration of political interests within civil 
society which 'pushes' the state and monopoly interest groups into 
engagement in a collusive, collaborative and mutually beneficial 
relationship (Bull 1992:266-67). 
There is nothing about political exchange, however, that dictates the 
process is necessarily a co-operative one. Indeed, as Bull notes, a much 
more dynamic approach to political exchange takes into account the 
possibility that conflict may underlie the process of exchange - a 
significant departure from the characterisation of corporatist 
relationships as co-operative and consensual. Yet, it could also be 
argued that Bull takes a similarly 'static' approach to the state which 
limits the extent to which political exchange can illuminate the 
corporatist process. While postulating a conflictual basis for the 
emergence of corporatist arrangements, his conceptualisation of a 
monolithic state provides a rather 'blunt' instrument with which to 
interrogate the bases of that conflict. 
For Jessop (1990), the process of political exchange is inherently 
conflictual. Because the terrain of states or constellations of state 
agencies are strategically selective, that is, more open to some interests 
over others depending on the strategies adopted by particular forces 
towards the exercise of state power (including interests and strategies 
constituted within the state by particular state officials), political 
exchange is fundamentally and necessarily a struggle over power - a 
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struggle between competing interests and strategies to influence the 
exercise of state power. As such, political exchange can only usefully 
demonstrate what is distinctive about corporatist arrangements when 
used in a state-theoretical context which permits a more complex 
understanding of the nature of state power and which identifies 
empirically the political forces engaged in exchange and the strategies 
to be pursued through it. 
Conclusion 
As an antidote to the 'grand' state theorising characteristic of the 
contemporary Marxist approaches outlined in Chapter I, in which 
causative variables are predetermined and explanations of events 
located at the level of entire state systems, Jessop's strategic-relational 
approach, together with the model of corporatism outlined above, 
provides a meso-level, empirically testable framework of concepts with 
which to investigate the emergence of the SCG. It identifies a broad 
range of institutional and strategic factors to be examined, and 
demonstrated empirically, in relation to the education state, as well as 
structural and behavioural factors in relation to the prerequisites for 
corporatism. This framework will be utilised in the following 
chapters, but principally in Chapter IX, to explain the political context 
created by the specific configuration of institutional factors and political 
forces operating within the education state in New Zealand. Before 
examining the SCG in any depth, however, Chapter IV provides an 
historical outline of the transformation of the role of the state in New 
Zealand, and examines how the political terrain of the state was 
restructured to the extent that the formation of a body like the SCG, as 
a mechanism for the management of crisis in education, became 
necessary. 
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CHAPTER IV - RESTRUCTURING THE STATE 
As Roper (1993) noted in a chapter appropriately entitled 'The End of 
the Golden Weather', 1974 was a significant year in New Zealand's 
economic history. To economic history, with the benefit of two 
decades hindsight, could now be added political and social history. The 
global economic crisis of the early 1970s was significant not only 
because it marked the end of an era of extraordinary growth and 
productivity, but because it also marked the beginning of the end of a 
history of political activism initiated by the nineteenth century 
colonial state in New Zealand. While over the twentieth century 
programmes of state intervention advanced, stagnated and 
occasionally retreated, in response mainly to economic crises and the 
subsequent social unrest, the massive restructuring programme 
embarked upon in the 1980s effectively ensured that the forms of 
intervention able to be undertaken by future governments would be 
fundamentally different from before. It is one of the ironies of history 
that the political party that championed the cause of state intervention 
during the 1930s, through its commitment to social democracy and 
equity while in government, was to preside over some of the most 
profoundly undemocratic and inequitable changes to the economic, 
political and social structures of the country. This chapter maps out, 
albeit in a somewhat abridged manner, the processes by which the role 
of the state was transformed in New Zealand. 
Development of the Keynesian Welfare State 
With the abolition of the provinces in 1876, the political system in 
New Zealand was characterised by a pattern of highly centralised 
governmental interventionism (McKinlay 1990). Running counter to 
the prevailing laissez-faire ideology of the nineteenth century, central 
government intervention in the economy was largely a pragmatic 
necessity for the development of the colony. Driven by growing 
migration, the provision of many of the requirements of the colony 
were regarded as being beyond the capacity of provincial governments 
to provide on one hand, and as simply unattractive propositions to the 
private sector on the other: the former being unable, the latter 
unwilling, to attract and invest the substantial financial resources 
necessary for national development. In order to attract both settlers 
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and investment, central government was given little option but to 
assume the burden of infrastructural development itself. 
The vacuum created by the demise of the provinces in 1876 reinforced 
a pattern of strong central government organisation and encouraged 
an expectation and acceptance of the view that central government had 
a legitimate interventionary role in order to facilitate outcomes 
beneficial to society asa whole (ibid). While state intervention in the 
nineteenth century context was concerned largely with the provision 
of a physical and commercial infrastructure - as Oliver (1988) notes, the 
state at this time was the agency of settlement, not welfare1 - the 
colonial legacy of political interventionism served as the foundation 
for a future state structure in which power and the provision of 
welfare services would become more highly centralised than in most 
other countries. 
While extensive labour legislation had been enacted and provision 
made for a means-tested pension by the end of the nineteenth 
century2, during the early part of the twentieth century up to 1936 there 
was very little welfare innovation (Rudd 1993). Indeed, as Rudd 
(1993:227) notes, 'on the eve of the election of the first Labour 
government in 1935, the New Zealand welfare state was not a 
particularly impressive edifice'. While a one or two of the few benefits 
available were universal, the welfare state as it existed at this time was 
a residual and punitive one. Distinctions were made between 
deserving and undeserving poor for some benefits, and the 
impoverishment of the unemployed frequently considered the result 
of moral turpitude or laziness. For example, in the early 1930s, in 
order to avoid what he saw as the 'demoralising' influence of financial 
aid inherent in the British dole system, Prime Minister Forbes, 
operating on the principle of 'no pay without work', forced thousands 
of unemployed men into pointless relief work for lamentable rates of 
pay (Sinclair 1991). 
1 While some of the later nineteenth century state policies were more clearly 
identifiable as 'welfare' policies, Oliver (1988) warns against the frequent historical 
foreshortening that sees in these measures the nascent beginnings of the welfare state 
that emerged in New Zealand after the first Labour government. 
2 The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 and the Old Age Pensions Act 
1989. 
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Throughout the 1920s, economic conditions had been steadily 
worsening. At the time these were believed to be the 'last gales' of the 
post-World War I depression rather than 'portents' of forthcoming 
economic collapse (ibid:255). Unemployment had been rising from the 
mid-1920s, while export returns for primary produce were falling. By 
the time depression struck in the early 1930s in the wake of the Wall 
Street Crash, New Zealand was singularly ill-equipped to cope with its 
effects. Unemployment climbed from a figure of 13,000 in December 
1930 to reach 81,000, or 12% of the total workforce, by 1933 (Cumming 
and Cumming 1978); national income had declined from $150m to 
$90m; and exports had fallen by 40% (Sinclair 1991). In addition, 
interest payments on the national debt had reached 40% of total 
government expenditure (ibid). It was this latter factor, according to 
Sinclair (1991), that was the critical element in intensifying the effects 
of the depression in New Zealand. The national debt generated by the 
extensive borrowing of the Vogel administration in the late 
nineteenth century, and to which the World War I Coalition 
government 'added magnificently', had culminated, by the 1930s, in 
one of the highest per capita levels of national indebtedness in the 
world. 
The Forbes government at the time attempted little to improve 
economic or social conditions, believing the cause of the depression lay 
overseas and, hence, beyond its sphere of influence. The measures it 
did enact, however, were repressive and focused almost exclusively on 
achieving a balanced budget - mainly savage cuts to government 
expenditure and increasing taxation. In addition to this, a plethora of 
state subsidies were made available to farmers to encourage an increase 
in production and export of primary produce in an attempt to trade out 
of the economic crisis. Unfortunately this endeavour was doomed to 
failure given the saturation of the British market. No public provision 
was made to support the unemployed beyond demeaning relief work, 
such as the infamous 'Number Five Scheme'3 (O'Brien and Wilkes 
1993:110), and ineffectual attempts at promoting subsistence farming 
(Sinclair 1991). To deal with the resulting outbursts of social unrest, 
the government resorted to emergency plans which involved 
3 A method of unemployment assistance through public works schemes. At its peak in 
1933, the Number Five scheme supported 65% of those relying on public works 
assistance (O'Brien and Wilkes 1995). 
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deployment of the armed forces in the event of complete economic 
collapse, the establishment of the 'Special Police' and the New Zealand 
Legion, and to repressive legislation in the form of the Public Safety 
Conservation Act 1932. 
Foreshadowing a similar debate that would occur almost exactly half a 
century later, both the government and the opposition Labour Party 
were obsessed with the efficacy of economic policy, but (unlike the 
debate of the 1980s) for fundamentally different reasons. The Coalition 
was concerned to balance the budget - an achievable if somewhat 
severe goal, the cost of which (as observed by Keynes) would be a 
population that was 'flat on its back' (in Sinclair 1991:256). For Labour, 
however, whose leader at the time was Michael Joseph Savage4, the 
efficacy of economic policy was significant not only for its economic 
outcome, but also for its achievement of social policy objectives as well. 
Indeed, economic policy was, of necessity, secondary to the greater and 
more desirable Labour Party goal of equality and 'Social Justice' 
(ibid:263). 
The First Labour Government 1935-49 
The ineffectual attempts of the Forbes Coalition government to 
manage the economic and social crises strengthened and united 
traditionally opposing forces. The election of Savage as leader of the 
Labour Party on the death of Holland in 1933, combined with their 
intention to 'civilise' capitalism rather than implement socialism 
(Oliver 1977), made the Labour party an increasingly feasible choice for 
government. Savage's appeal, according to Sinclair (1991:266) was his 
image as 'a benign political uncle', a man who 'smelt of the church 
bazaar and not at all of the barricades'. Unlike Holland, who had been 
imprisoned in Australia for his Socialist politics, Savage did not 
'frighten the moderates' (ibid). If Savage's image was an electoral 
advantage, so too were the policy goals contained in the Labour 
manifesto: in addition to its commitment to extend welfare services, 
Labour intended to introduce guaranteed prices to farmers, statutory 
minimum wages for workers and to encourage the development of 
secondary industries. As the possibility of gaining the Treasury 
4 Savage, as Prime Minister of the first Labour Government, is widely revered on the 
political left as the founder of the 'cradle to grave' welfare state in New Zealand. 
98 
benches drew closer, and as Labour's overt commitment to socialism, 
according to Oliver (1977:19), 'gained in imprecision', an 'unholy 
alliance' (Rudd 1993) between farmers, trade unions, manufacturers, 
rural and urban voters was created in their support. In the face of 
strong public opinion that something 'more forceful' needed to be 
done to solve the unemployment crisis particularly (O'Brien and 
Wilkes 1993:114), the Coalition was decimated at the general election in 
November 1935, having gained only 17 of the 76 seats available 
(Wilkes and Shirley 1984:291). With 53 seats, Labour's victory was a 
landslide. 
(a) Welfare Legislation 1935-38: 
On gaining office, the new Labour government initiated a legislative 
programme that began the process of the transformation of the state 
into the post-war Keynesian Welfare State. In many respects, according 
to Rudd (1993), these measures were largely 'catch-up', merely 
regaining the ground lost through the relative inactivity of the 
previous decades. And in retrospect, it is clear that despite the range of 
reforms implemented, the essentially residual nature of the Welfare 
State remained unaltered - means-tested benefits were the norm and, 
again according to Rudd (1993), continued to be underpinned by the 
view they were a form of state charity to the deserving poor rather 
than a right conferred on the population by virtue of their citizenship. 
Compared to previous decades, however, the range and magnitude of 
reform undertaken by the Labour government between 1935 and 1938 
was impressive. State-provided health, education and housing 
services were extended, as were benefits and pensions - the essential 
foundations of the 'cradle to grave' welfare state (Oliver 1988). Given 
the circumstances in which Labour took office, some of the first 
measures to be introduced dealt with the problem of unemployment. 
The cuts to wages and award rates made under the previous 
administration were restored to their previous levels, and pension 
levels increased (Rudd 1993). In 1936, the Factories Amendment Act 
reduced the working week to a basic 40 hours and introduced 
compulsory unionism. In 1937, guaranteed prices to farmers were 
introduced, a minimum basic wage established and a major 
programme of public works initiated (ibid). The Social Security Act of 
1938 expanded welfare provision even further and increased pensions 
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and other benefits, extended the range of medical care available - albeit 
in the face of opposition from the medical profession (Oliver 1988) -
and introduced for the first time sickness and widow's benefits, 
extended unemployment benefits to women and introduced an 
emergency benefit for those in need of assistance but who did not 
qualify for any specific state support (O'Brien and Wilkes 1993). The 
only criterion to qualify for this benefit was an inability to 'provide an 
adequate livelihood ... because of age, physical or mental disability, 
domestic circumstances, or for any other reason' (Sutch 1,966:238 in 
O'Brien and Wilkes 1993). 
A significant factor underlying Labour's social welfare programme, 
however, was the expansion to the boundaries of what was 
legitimately the realm of 'social policy'. While government assistance 
did not originate with the Labour government of 1935, state 
intervention and regulation increased dramatically. As Koopman-
Boyden (1990) points out, defining social policy is a matter of 
interpretation - as well as political orientation. Some definitions 
construe social policy narrowly to include a basic provision of health, 
education and welfare services (vide Marshall 1970). Others extend it 
to include almost all government intervention - for instance, 
immigration, rural development, employment and housing 
(Koopman-Boyden 1990). While residualist elements of welfare 
provision characteristic of the former definition remained, the Labour 
reform programme of the 1930s marked a significant extension of the 
boundaries of legitimate state intervention. The spectrum of what was 
justifiably 'social policy', and the means by which the Labour 
government's objective of social and economic well-being for all 
citizens could be achieved, expanded to include increasing levels of 
state intervention in both economic and labour policy arenas. 
State intervention in the area of labour policy was already very 
significant, however, via the unique Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act of 1894 (1. C. and A. Act), as well as through an 
extensive legislative framework regulating wage rates and conditions 
of employment. Viewed by the bigger, industrial trade unions as 
'Labour's leg-iron' (Martin 1984), particularly in the more prosperous 
years following the First World War, the 1894 Act was the zenith of an 
intensive programme of industrial legislation initiated by the newly 
100 
elected Liberal government of 1890. In circumstances remarkably 
similar to the election of the Labour government in 1935, the Liberal 
party was elected to office at a time of industrial conflict and labour 
unrest in the wake of economic depression. Trade unionism had been 
increasing steadily throughout the 1880s and with it, the frequency and 
intensity of strike action (Walsh 1993). The Maritime strike of 1890, 
however, dealt a savage blow to the incipient labour movement, and, 
with the power of trade unionism all but destroyed, employers took 
full advantage of their strength to claw back gains made by the unions 
in the previous decades (ibid). 
The I. C. and A. Act was opposed by stronger industrial unions and 
urban employers alike: the former because it usurped unions' 
autonomy in the bargaining process, the latter because it allowed the 
unions legislative protection behind which to regroup (ibid). Neither 
were in any position to resist though; according to Holt (1976:107), the 
unions were too industrially weak to oppose the legislation, while 
employers were too politically weak to prevent it. The Liberal 
government, however, was concerned to secure stability and to see a 
peaceful resolution to continued industrial conflict, the main purpose 
of passing the act (Martin 1984), while at the same time offering 
workers statutory protection from the more rapacious employers 
(Sinclair 1991). It was a 'profoundly important' piece of legislation, and 
one which was to shape labour relations in New Zealand for the next 
century (O'Brien and Wilkes 1993:107). 
While unions had been legalised by the Trade Union Act 1878, the I. C. 
and A. Act required them to become an active part of a legal process of 
industrial relations. To gain coverage by the Act unions were required 
to register, in return for which they received monopoly coverage rights 
to workers deemed by the state to be under their jurisdiction. Strikes 
and lockouts became illegal. Employers were obliged by law to 
negotiate with registered unions and to refer disputes to regionally-
based Conciliation Councils. In the event of non-agreement, disputes 
were to be submitted for compulsory arbitration in the Arbitration 
Court, the decision of which was binding on both parties (Martin 1984; 
Wilson 1984; Walsh 1993; Jesson 1995). 
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For the first decade of the operation of the Act, no strikes (as defined 
within the legislation) were recorded (Martin 1984). However, the 
division between the stronger industrial unions and the smaller and 
weaker craft unions surfaced in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, with increasing numbers of strikes and the industrial unions 
voluntarily removing themselves from the arbitration system. Over 
the next two decades, until Labour came to power in 1935, the 
arbitration system suffered reversals of fortune. Union opposition 
increased at times of labour shortages; employers' support increased 
when the Arbitration Court appeared to hold down wage increases. 
Conversely, at times of economic downturn, unions sheltered behind 
the legislation, whereas employers called for the system to be 
dismantled (ibid). By the Depression of the 1930s, however, and under 
pressure from employers, the Arbitration court was used by the 
Coalition government to force through a 10% reduction in wage rates. 
In 1932 compulsory arbitration was removed and labour relations 
exposed to market forces. Following the withdrawal of the state, not 
surprisingly, wages and working conditions deteriorated. This was the 
situation that obtained until the Labour government enacted 
amendments to the I. C. and A. Act in 1936. 
The Keynesian Revolution 
The Labour government were committed, as Oliver (1988:26) points 
out, 'to the belief that economic planning was possible and necessary'. 
And although state management of the economy amounted to little 
more than a political conviction during its first term of office, in the 
years following the Second World War, the government's 
commitment to progressive welfare reform together with the newly 
developed management strategies of Keynesian macroeconomics 
consolidated to provide a putative 'third way' between capitalism and 
socialism (Gamble 1993:43), a system of economic control through 
market relationships that, according to Skidelsky (1979:55), '[made] it 
possible for rulers to achieve politically necessary economic results 
without sacrificing market and political liberties'. 
The 'Keynesian Revolution' was triggered by the publication of J. M. 
Keynes' book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, in 1936, the key feature of which was the principle of effective 
demand (Brittan 1993). In light of the extensive market failure of the 
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Great Depression, Keynesian economics advocated a significant role for 
states in the management of capitalist economies to mitigate the 
cyclical crises to which they were susceptible as well as to ensure full 
employment. Contrary to the prevailing neo-classical belief, Keynes 
argued that capitalism was not a self-regulating system - supply did not 
create its own sufficient demand (Pierson 1991). Indeed, this basis tenet 
of neo-classical economics, Keynes claimed, would not be 
automatically achieved by market forces (Dalziel 1993); it obtained only 
under the condition of full employment, a condition which could only 
be guaranteed by the manipulation of key economic variables by the 
state outside the market - namely, according to Pierson (1991:27), 'the 
propensity to consume and the incentive to invest'. With the policy 
mechanisms available to it - fiscal, monetary and incomes policies 
(Bertram 1993) - the role of the state was to stimulate consumption and 
investment, that is, to create 'effective demand', to ensure levels of 
economic production sufficient to utilise all available labour and, thus, 
maintain full employment and encourage economic growth, while at 
the same time protecting the economy from external destabilising 
influences. 
As Przeworski (1985) points out, the social democratic programmes of 
welfare and nationalisation of the early 1930s had, up to the 
publication of Keynes' ideas, often been 'precarious' or even 
'incoherent' (in Denemark 1990:273). In Keynesian macroeconomic 
strategies, however, lay not only the goal of social democratic state 
intervention, but its economic justification as well (ibid). Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, social democratic governments wishing to reject 
capitalism in favour of socialism, but lacking a 'compelling economic 
logic to supplant the predominance of economic liberalism', embraced 
Keynesianism enthusiastically as 'the new political-economic 
orthodoxy' (Denemark 1990:275). 
Corporatism and Keynesianism: Guilt by Association? 
At the heart of the Keynesian Welfare State in New Zealand, as 
elsewhere, lay the 'historic compromise' between capital and labour 
mediated by the state. In return for the political commitment to full 
employment, economic growth and a wide range of welfare services 
and benefits, the trade union movement traded off its capacity to 
pursue its goals of a socialist society through revolutionary means 
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(O'Brien and Wilkes 1993). While compromise with the state left the 
union movement divided, it was accepted and supported, particularly 
by the weaker unions, as a 'practical solution to their endless struggle 
with employers' (ibid:12). Capital, conversely, gained relative peace 
and stability and, according to Denemark (1990:274), 'accede[d] to 
taxation and labour consultation in exchange for non-cyclical business 
climates and continued productive control'. 
While the 'historic compromise' has been seen as central to the 
stability of the Keynesian Welfare State, the means by which the 
compromise was maintained, a corporatist tripartite alliance between 
the state, capital and labour, has itself become inextricably linked with 
Keynesianism. The association is such that corporatist organisational 
forms are believed, according to Gamble (1993), to be intrinsic to the 
logic of Keynesian political economy, a position argued by Keynesian 
supporters and detractors alike. 
The rise of Keynesianism and the development of corporatist 
organisational forms may have had a stronger association in the 
United Kingdom, but in the New Zealand context (as has already been 
discussed) a functional equivalent or a de facto corporatism, in the 
form of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894 (Perry 
1987, 1992), significantly predated the rise of the Keynesian Welfare 
State. As an institutionalised system of intermediation, according to 
Perry (1987:116), the I. C. and A. Act 'ensured that...the trajectory of 
trade union development was closely tied to the development of the 
state'. It was an Act, too, that gave the state 'unprecedented powers of 
regulation of the labour market and wages, and of both employer and 
worker organisations' (Martin 1984:156-6). More significantly, perhaps, 
in terms of postulating an existence for corporatism independent of the 
Keynesian Welfare State, according to Perry (1987) since the passing of 
the Act in 1894, the same set of institutional arrangements has clearly 
served different interests at different times - as the history of the Act 
demonstrates. Thus, as noted in Chapter III, as a particular form of 
political relationship, although corporatism is not a neutral political 
relationship, there is nothing to suggest that it is necessarily associated 
specifically with Keynesian state forms. 
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The Breakdown of Consensus 
From 1946 until the early 1970s, New Zealand experienced an era of 
unprecedented levels of economic growth, employment, security and 
prosperity. The stability apparently created by the social democratic 
interventionist 'compromise' of the first Labour government was such 
that it was upheld during these decades, albeit to varying degrees, by 
National and Labour governments alike. By the time the compromise 
began to fragment in the late 1960s, however, it was evident its success 
was rather more contingent upon the favourable economic conditions 
created by the post-war boom than by consensus. It was, as O'Brien and 
Wilkes (1993:122) have observed, 'a decidedly flawed compromise' 
premised on unusual economic circumstances rather than on a class-
based rapprochement. 
As James (1992) points out, until the late 1960s, New Zealand was a 
small and potentially vulnerable dependent economy which relied 
heavily on a narrow range of primary produce exported mainly to 
Britain. Foreshadowing the economic downturn that would occur in 
the early 1970s, the government received a warning in 1967 with the 
most severe balance of payments deficit since the Second World War -
a crisis, the World Bank reported, produced largely by New Zealand's 
over-dependence on its narrow export base (Sinclair 1991). For much 
of the twentieth century, exporting to Britain was a mutually beneficial 
arrangement. By the 1960s, however, the regular five-yearly access 
agreements with Britain were phased out. And when Britain entered 
the European Economic Community in 1972, New Zealand was forced 
into economic independence· as access to markets in the United 
Kingdom was restricted. Although moderately successful efforts had 
been made to diversify overseas markets in the years prior to 19725, 
New Zealand suffered in the international arena from the agricultural 
protectionism of its new trading partners, who attempted to 'regulate 
and minimise' New Zealand's extensive agricultural exports (Sinclair 
1991:315). By the early 1970s, falling prices in saturated markets 
combined with falling demand to result in a significant decline in New 
Zealand's terms of trade (Roper 1993). Although conditions improved 
during the commodity boom between 1971 and 1973 (ibid), as the effects 
5 For example, the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
negotiated in 1965. By 1970, though, Australia accounted for only 8% of NZ's exports, 
Japan 10%, and the USA 16%. The UK in the same year took 36% (Sinclair 1991:314). 
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of the OPEC oil crisis of late 1973 filtered through to New Zealand, the 
recovery was wiped out. Worsening terms of trade and economic 
stagnation combined with rising inflation and unemployment to 
plunge the country into a spiral of economic decline from which, in 
the mid-1990s, it is only recently showing signs of recovery. 
As in the 1890s and the 1930s, the welfare state of the 1970s underwent 
significant expansion, largely in response to demographic changes, 
increased demand for welfare services and rising expectations, but in 
the context of worsening economic conditions - a time when 
increasing demand was least sustainable. Unlike the earlier periods, 
however, there would be no world war to stimulate the economy into 
growth in order to fuel increased social service provision. While few 
major policy initiatives occurred during the 1970s6, welfare spending 
increased as a proportion of GDP and of total government expenditure. 
In 1970-71, spending on social benefits amounted to 15.4% of GDP, or 
just over 56% of total government expenditure; a decade later it had 
reached 22.4% of GDP and 60% of total expenditure (Rudd 1992:44-48). 
When placed in its global context, the economic downturn of the early 
1970s, while significant, was perhaps less serious than first thought as 
all major OEeD countries experienced a decline in economic growth 
through the 1970s and into the early 1980s (Roper 1993). What 
heightened the effects of the crisis in New Zealand, as in previous 
years, however, was the effect of economic mismanagement and, 
somewhat ironically given the election campaign attacks on the Labour 
government for exactly the same approach to the problem, of large-
scale borrowing by the Muldoon government of 1975-84. 
Although traditionalist and conservative, the National government of 
Muldoon persisted with Keynesian policies of intervention and 
economic protection (Jesson 1995). In an attempt to manage the 
growing economic crisis, Muldoon's strategy, according to O'Brien and 
Wilkes (1993:124), was to 'use state spending to alleviate employment 
problems, to support rural production and to stimulate exports' - in 
short, a reprise of the doomed strategy of the Coalition government of 
6 Except for the introduction of the Domestic Purposes Benefit, the Accident 
Compensation Scheme and National Superannuation - see Rudd (1993). 
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the early 1930s of trading out of the crisis, albeit minus the attendant 
reduction in state expenditure7. While some of Muldoon's initiatives 
were successful - for instance state support for increasing 
manufacturing exports (Roper 1993) - the immense state spending 
comJ;Ilitted to the 'Think Big'S projects was, at best,· ill-advised. 
Between 1975 and 1984, the percentage of GDP dedicated to debt 
servicing more than doubled, while debt servicing as a proportion of 
total government expenditure rose from 10% to 17.4% (Rudd 1992: 44-
8). In the same period, the registered unemployed had risen from 3000 
to 50,000 (Kelsey 1994:15). Worsening economic conditions encouraged 
further intervention, and culminated in a general wage and price 
freeze between 1982 and 1984 (ibid). Finding it increasingly difficult to 
generate support for his interventionist policies in the face of growing 
enthusiasm for free-market liberalism, in both the public and private 
sector, a 'tired and emotional'9 Muldoon called for a snap election in 
June 1984. 
The Neo-Liberal Revolution 
By the late 1970s, the monetarist opposition to interventionist 
management strategies was growing, both internationally and in New 
Zealand. While critics of state interventionism had never really gone 
away, they had been effectively silenced by the prosperity of the post-
War era. However, the impasse reached by the end of the Muldoon 
years - the growing economic crisis, questions over the efficacy and 
sustainability of the welfare state - provided an opportunity for a liberal 
revival. Advocated initially by the occupants of the New Zealand 
Treasury and Reserve Bank, the neo-Liberal agenda was affirmed by 
the Labour government elected in 1984 (although unknown to voters 
at the time of the election), and most enthusiastically endorsed by 
Roger Douglas, subsequently appointed Minister of Finance, and the 
principle architect of what came to be known as 'Rogernomics'. 
7 It has been argued that, as a populist politician, Muldoon was unwilling to increase 
unemployment and the general hardship generated by contracting state expenditure 
(O'Brien and Wilkes 1993). 
S Large-scale state-sponsored development of the energy sector - e.g Maui oil fields, the 
Clyde dam, etc - to produce greater self-reliance for fossil fuels as well as to stimulate 
the domestic economy and create employment opportunities. 
9 A media euphemism for the fact that, when Muldoon made the election 
announcement, he was, in fact, drunk. 
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The rise of neo-Liberalism needs to be viewed against the backdrop of 
the prolonged economic crisis of the early 1970s, a crisis triggered 
globally, according to Lauder (1990), by falling rates of profit and, hence, 
a decline in the conditions for capital accumulation. According to neo-
Liberal ideology, however, the real cause of the crisis lay with the 
economically unsustainable levels of state intervention characteristic 
of the Keynesian Welfare State. The growth of the bureaucracy of the 
state to accommodate its expanded role in society, with the 
concomitant increase in the revenue required for its operation -
funded mainly through taxation, deficit budgeting and state borrowing 
- was an unsustainable economic burden. The main thrust of the 
solution was to minimise state intervention in all spheres and reduce 
its spending by contracting the boundaries of, or in the wildest 
fantasies of some free-marketeers, dismantling entirely, the welfare 
state. However, whether a monetarist or Keynesian explanation is 
favoured for the crisis that beset New Zealand in the 1970s, both 
perspectives concur that its outcome, as has been noted already, was 
increasing unemployment, accelerating inflation and economic 
stagnation, creating what can be termed both a fiscal and legitimation 
crisis for the state (O'Connor 1973; Habermas 1976). 
As with most political and ideological perspectives, the political agenda 
commonly proclaimed the 'New Right' can best be understood as a 
collection of views encompassing a var~ety of differing strands of 
conservative thought. Although there are a number of common 
themes and shared values running through these strands of discourse, 
there are also many internal divisions and conflicts. Yet according to 
Gamble (1988:27-8), there are certain important beliefs which are 
common to all adherents of New Right philosophy: 
What all. strands within the New Right share ... is the 
rejection of many of the ideas, practices and institutions 
which have been characteristic of social democratic regimes 
in Europe and of the New Deal and the Great Society 
programmes in the United States. The New Right is radical 
because it seeks to undo much that has been constructed m 
the last sixty years. New Right thinkers question many of 
the assumptions which have become accepted for the 
conduct of public policy while New Right politicians have 
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sought to build electoral and policy coalitions which 
challenge key institutions and key policies .... As a political 
programme, the New Right is identified with opposition to 
state involvement in the economy. They are fierce critics of 
Keynesian policies of economic management and high 
public expenditure on welfare. But New Right politicians 
are also renowned as advocates of national discipline and 
strong defence .. " To preserve a free society and a free 
economy, the authority of the state has to be restored. 
According to Gamble, the New Right has two major strands: a liberal 
tendency which argues the case for a freer, more open, and more 
competitive economy, and a conservative tendency which is more 
interested in restoring social and political authority throughout 
society. For the neo-Liberal New Right, priority is given to the 
individuat freedom of choice, the free market, minimal government 
and laissez-faire. The central focus of this strand of thought is 
providing the optimal conditions for the operation of the free market. 
Taking its cue from classical liberal theory, this strand of the New 
Right claims that the free market - the free exchange between labour 
and capital, and competition between capitalists - is the only 
mechanism which maximises individual freedom of choice by 
impartially mediating conflicting interests, if left to operate 
unhindered by government interference. It is held that the market 
cannot discriminate and that it gives each individual equal 
opportunity to compete. The main assumption underpinning the 
essentialism of the market is that, as a purely economically driven 
mechanism, it is the only means by which the activities of a large 
number of self-interested individuals can be co-ordinated effectively 
and efficiently (Hindess 1987). 
The anathema of neo-Liberal philosophy is state intervention, 
especially in the form of public expenditure on welfare programmes. 
Indeed, it could be argued that neo-Liberal opposition to state activity 
does not constitute a theory of the state, but rather a theory largely 
against the state (Wilkes & Shirley 1984). The state is comprehensively 
criticised on the grounds that, in practice, it produces worse results 
than do market solutions. Its administrative and bureaucratic 
methods are believed inherently inferior to markets as a means of 
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allocating resources. It is also objected to on moral grounds - not only 
does intervention in the form of welfare provision reduce the 
incentive for individuals to work, but absolves them from personal 
responsibility and encourages a passive over-dependence upon the 
state (Gamble 1988). 
Not only does intervention distort the working of the free market, but 
it also poses a considerable threat to individual freedom and privacy -
with damaging consequences for economic activity and for social life 
generally. By drawing revenue in the form of taxation from the 
productive private sector and diverting it into the unproductive public 
sector, the state is responsible for stifling entrepreneurial freedom and 
initiative, creating what Offe (1982:8) has described as a 'disincentive 
to investment'. Taken together, these effects lead to a dynamic of 
declining economic growth and increasing public expectation which is 
less and less able to be satisfied by the state (ibid:9). To avoid the 
obviously malign effects of intervention, therefore, the role of the state 
in society should be a residual one - confined primarily to the 
protection of the free market, the protection of individuals from 
coercion, the administration of justice and mediation in disputes, the 
provision of basic amenities, and to the protection of members of 
society who cannot be regarded as 'responsible' (Johnson 1984:36). 
The liberal conception of a free economy denotes a spontaneous 
harmony of interests generated through the voluntary exchanges of 
free autonomous individuals within a framework of agreed rules. To 
safeguard the order which the market spontaneously generates a state 
is needed, but a state minimal in its functions and limited in its 
powers. Although the state is to be limited it needs to be strong in 
carrying out its functions. Policing the market order requires vigilance 
and firm action to enforce laws impartially so that competition might 
be fair and exchange voluntary (Gamble 1988). 
The conservative New Right, on the other hand, while sharing the 
neo-Liberal concern to restore the authority of the state to protect the 
free market, also endorses the need for a strong state in order to 
establish and maintain social order (ibid). The post-war state 
expansion, due to government intervention, resulted in the growth of 
public sector professionals, whose vested interests in the provision of 
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state services constitute a major threat to the authority and power of 
the state. To confront these special interests and reduce their power 
requires the restoration to the state of the authority 'usurped' by these 
groups (ibid). 
Surprisingly, conservatives have generally been fierce critics of the 
liberal doctrine of individualism which attempts to remove all 
restraints from the path of individual freedom, and which, in the 
tendency toward moral discourse often displayed in conservative 
writing, leads to the erosion of institutions that promote social order 
(ibid). According to Gamble (1988), while conservative suspicion of 
laissez-faire capitalism has not disappeared, their mutual respect for 
the traditions of property and agreement over the dangers presented by 
social democracy, provided a reasonably solid basis for a convergence 
between the two doctrines. 
While both the liberal and conservative tendencies are committed to 
the view that the state has to be 'rolled back', precisely how this will be 
achieved presents the New Right with something of a dilemma: how 
to reform the previously interventionist, high-spending, social 
democratic state using the same political institutions which, according 
to New Right analysis, have been responsible for the both the 
destruction of the market order and the undermining of social 
institutions required for the maintenance of social order (ibid). To 
restore the free economy requires firm and decisive action to cut state 
spending on welfare and to reduce taxes, to privatise public assets and 
services, and to abolish interventionist and regulatory agencies. To 
implement such a radical programme a state strong enough to resist 
challenges to its authority is required - especially challenges from 
public sector professionals. Yet the degree of regulation required to 
ensure the unhindered operation of the free market as well as 
maintaining a strong authoritative state may be considerable. As 
Gamble (1988:28) points out: 
The idea of a free economy and a strong state involves a 
paradox. The state is to be simultaneously rolled back and 
rolled forward. Non-interventionist and decentralised in 
some areas, the state is to be highly interventionist and 
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centralised in others. The New Right can appear by turns 
libertarian and authoritarian, populist and elitist. 
The amalgam of potentially opposing doctrines embodied within the 
goal of a free economy and a strong state has resulted in a neo-Liberal 
philosophy that is fraught with tensions, and which has 
fundamentally contradictory policy implications - contradictions that 
were to be exacerbated when combined with the erstwhile social 
democratic policy orientation of the Labour Party, instigators of the 
neo-Liberal reform agenda implemented in New Zealand during the 
1980s. 
Election of the Fourth Labour Government 1984 
As Boston (1991:233) has observed, 'the fourth Labour government 
initiated the most sweeping reorganisation of the machinery of 
government ever undertaken in New Zealand' - a programme of 
change comparable to the left-wing revolution of the first Labour 
government in the 1930s, but this time a revolution of the right 
(Sinclair 1991). Between 1984 and 1990 the public sector underwent 
massive structural, organisational and management changes with the 
corporatisation and subsequent privatisation of state trading activities, 
the introduction of a new management regime, substantial cuts in 
various government programmes, and a much greater concern with 
accountability and performance assessment. The speed of the reform, 
as Sinclair (1991:323) notes, left the population 'bewildered' - a tactic 
employed deliberately by Finance Minister, Roger Douglas, in order to 
'overwhelm the opposition'10. 
Policy advice concerning public sector restructuring was determined 
principally by officials in the Treasury, through gaining what Jesson 
10 In his book, 'Unfinished Business' (1993), Douglas outlines in detail the formula to be 
followed when undertaking any restructuring: 
'Do not try to advance a step at a time. Define your objectives clearly and move 
towards them in quantum leaps. Otherwise the interest groups will have time to 
mobilise and drag you down.' 
And: 
'Once the programme begins to be implemented, don't stop until you have 
completed it. The fire of opponents is much less accurate if they have to shoot at 
a rapidly moving target.' 
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(1988) has described as a 'policy coup', in which a monetarist solution 
was presented as the only viable response to the economic crisis faced 
by the government (in Codd 1990:196). Much of this advice was based 
on an analytical framework grounded in public choice theory, 
managerialism and the new economics of organisations - most notably 
agency theory and transaction-cost analysis - in which concerns to 
reduce the role of the state, curb the functions of government agencies, 
maximise government efficiency and accountability, and to increase 
individual freedom were clearly evident (Boston 1991). 
The opportunity to embark upon such a radical restructuring 
programme was aided considerably by a foreign exchange crisis 
precipitated by the pre-election sabre-rattling of Muldoon and Douglas. 
In the weeks running up to the election, Douglas 'accidentally' released 
a background paper indicating Labour's intention to devalue the dollar 
by 20% immediately after the election (Kelsey 1995). Muldoon, still 
Prime Minister, refused to intervene to staunch the massive flow of 
funds overseas precipitated by the release of the paper, in spite of 
exhortations to act by the Treasury and the Reserve Bank. The result, 
by election day, was a near crisis in which New Zealand's overseas 
reserves were within one week of being exhausted (Sinclair 1991). It 
was four days after the election, and only under the threat of the mass 
resignation of his Cabinetll, that Muldoon agreed to close off the 
foreign exchange market - a post-election exercise in brinkmanship 
with the Labour Party that eventually cost the New Zealand taxpayer 
nearly $800 million (James 1992). 
What the crisis created, however, was a 'window of opportunity' for 
Douglas to pursue his economic agenda. According to David Lange, 
the Labour Prime Minister elected in 1984: 
The circumstances of those first few days in government 
gave Roger the opportunity to do what he had always 
wanted to do anyway. But he wouldn 't have been able to do 
that had we gone through the orthodox routine of an 
election in November, then a budget in June .... When the 
crisis hit in July 1984 it was Roger Douglas who, above all, 
11 All ministers with the exception of Bill Birch. 
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had thought through the economic issues - so when, the 
Cabinet needed to fall back on an economic philosophy, it 
was Douglas who had one (in Kelsey 1995:29-30). 
The 'Phoney Corporatism' 
According to O'Brien and Wilkes (1993), the Labour Party had gone 
into the 1984 election, having 'papered over the cracks' between the 
emerging monetarist faction headed by Douglas and its more 
corporatist members, with a 'Clayton's manifesto'12 - promising much 
but specifying little, with the excuse that the snap election provided 
little time to elaborate on details13 (Kelsey 1993). What had been 
promised, though, was 'a more democratic approach to economic 
management', to be facilitated initially by a series of summit 
conferences on prices and incomes and on employment (Kelsey 1995). 
There was to be, amongst other things: 
• consensus on the programme of economic and social 
reconstruction; 
• a fair prices and mcomes policy; 
• an investment strategy to help restore full employment 
and reduce the external deficit; 
• a fair tax system (ibid:31). 
And in the months immediately following the election, superficially at 
least, it appeared that the corporatist wing of the party still held sway. 
A multi-sectoral economic summit was convened at Parliament in 
September 1984 which included representatives from the trade unions, 
the primary and business sectors, as well as unemployed workers and 
community groups (Dalziel 1989). The proceedings, notes Kelsey 
(1995:32): 
... resounded with talk of unity and self-sacrifice. There were 
calls to maintain the pace of reform, with participation by all 
sectors at all levels in public decision-making, and on-going 
12 'Clayton's' was a brand of non-alcoholic whiskey marketed with little success in 
New Zealand during the late 1970s with the advertising catch-phrase, 'it's the drink 
you have when you're not having a drink'. The name survived, but the drink didn't, 
and is now used to refer to things that look authentic, but are not. 
13 Roger Douglas himself argues that this lack of detail was, in fact, a deliberate 
strategy to disguise elector ally unpalatable policies. 
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consultation and distribution of information to build on the 
new-found spirit of co-operation. 
Indeed, through the rest of 1984 and even into 1985, no real indication 
was given of the extent to which the summits were not 'the start of a 
happy reconciliation between capital and labour' (O'Brien and Wilkes 
1993:128), but rather a contrived performance designed, as Douglas later 
admitted, 'to dramatise the problems of the economy to the nation and 
create the right climate for change' (Douglas 1991, in Kelsey 1995:33). 
He stated even more frankly, after his retirement from politics in 1990, 
that the purpose of the summits had been to 'blunt the power' of 
.J-
interest groups: 
By giving them nationwide television exposure, in a sense, 
we put them on public trial. Under such a spotlight they had 
enough sense to realise that if they persisted in seeking their 
own selfish, short-term' interest at the expense of the wider 
community, then they would instantly lose the support of 
the public .... Having forced them into a commitment to put 
New Zealand first, or at least publicly to do so, we used the 
1984 budget to hit the privileges of all the interest groups at 
once (ibid). 
According to Oliver (1989), the proponents within the Labour 
government of a corporatist approach to economic restructuring had 
widespread support within the caucus. It was a majority view, 
although not publicly articulated, that extensive economic 
restructuring was necessary, and that the immediate effects would be a 
significant increase in unemployment and general social upheaval 
(ibid). But the idea of extensive economic restructuring, and a 
corporatist approach to it, were not viewed as incompatible - a view 
which a more charitable interpretation of the summit conferences 'may 
illustrate. 
If a negotiated solution to the economic crisis seemed a possibility in 
1984, the electorate were unaware of the extent to which, behind the 
scenes, an important transition had already been made: the corporatist 
versus monetarist debate, which had long since declined into 
factionalism, had been resolved in favour of Douglas' 'more-market' 
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strategies. As O'Brien and Wilkes (1993) note, by December of 1984, it 
was becoming increasingly clear to the trade union movement, if not 
the wider public, that the government's reform agenda would include 
the deregulation of the labour market to encourage 'flexibility' in 
wages and conditions. The government's dalliance with compromise, 
a corporatist tendency of questionable authenticity at best, was over. 
Restructuring the State Sector 
According to Kelsey (1995:85), Labour's restructuring programme 
centred on five key areas: liberalisation of domestic markets and trade; 
reduction in the size and scope of the state; monetary policy driven by 
the goal of price stability; labour market deregulation and 
deunionisation; and fiscal restraint through broadening the tax base 
and cutting state spending. Discussion of market and trade 
liberalisation and monetary policy in the New Zealand context are 
extensive and need not be considered in detail here (for example, see 
Easton, 1989; Holland and Boston 1990; Boston, Martin, Pallot and 
Walsh 1991; Boston and Dalziel 1992; Deeks and Perry 1992; Roper and 
Rudd 1993; Kelsey 1993, 1995). However, in relation to events that 
impinged upon the later establishment of the Schools Consultative 
Group, limiting the size and scope of the state and the restructuring of 
the labour market were significant. 
(a) Withdrawal of the State: 
Given the extent to which state intervention had, historically, 
politicised significant portions of the economy and civil society in 
New Zealand, the scope of the programme undertaken by the Labour 
government to ·withdraw the state from some arenas, while 
strengthening its control in others, was immense. 
The fundamental neo-Liberal aim of extending the discipline of the 
market to the state sector was embodied in two pivotal pieces of 
legislation: the State-owned Enterprises Act 1986 and the State Sector 
Act 1988 - the former directed towards a reorganisation of state 
commercial activities, the latter with redefining the relationship 
between ministers and permanent heads of departments and with 
applying private sector labour regulations to public sector employment 
(Scott, Bushnell and Sallee 1990). 
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Labour's corporatisation and commercialisation programme for 
commercial state operations was contained in the 1984 Treasury 
briefing to the incoming government, Economic Management. 
According to this document, the inherent inefficiency and inflexibility 
of state trading activities, as well as their susceptibility to influence by 
political not economic considerations, could be overcome by simply 
separating out the commercial from non-commercial state operations 
and subjecting them to the same performance objectives found in 
private sector corporations (vide Mascarenhas 1991). Where possible, 
state commercial activities were to be converted into state-owned 
enterprises - analogous in every way to private sector commercial 
organisations but with government ministers as share-holders. Profit, 
not social considerations, was to be the prime objective of their 
operation. 
In December 1986, the conversion of state trading activities into 
limited liability companies was achieved with the passing of the State-
owned Enterprises Act14. In the four years following its passing, SOE 
Act criteria were applied to nearly every state activity with commercial 
potential: for example ports, government computing, radio and 
television networks, even meteorological services (Kelsey 1993:30). 
While Douglas insisted that the purpose of the corporatisation 
programme was to encourage economic efficiency (ibid), following the 
re-election in of Labour in 1987 it became abundantly clear that 
corporatisation had been, all along, preparatory to eventual 
privatisation - or 'selling the family silver' (Mascarenhas 1991) - an 
objective strategically withheld from the electorate15 . While 
14 Five corporations existed prior to the passage of the act: Air New Zealand, 
Petroleum Corporation of NZ Ltd, NZ Railways Corporation, the Shipping 
Corporation of NZ and the Tourist Hotel Corporation. The SOE Act created nine 
additional companies: Airways Corporation, Coal Corporation, Electricity 
Corporation, Government Property Services, Land Corporation, NZ Forestry 
Corporation, NZ Post, Post Office Bank, and Telecom Corporation (Mascarenhas 
1991:49). 
15 The Minister of State-owned Enterprises, Richard Prebble, denied the allegations in 
Parliament thus: 
'The government opposes the suggestion by the opposition members that 
they will sell off taxpayers' assets. The government does not regard itself 
as the owner ... of the state corporations affected. The government is the 
guardian on behalf of the people. No government has the right to sell off 
state trading enterprises to its cronies' (in Kelsey 1993:42). 
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supposedly one-off sales of assets was mooted prior to 1987, Douglas 
announced in his December 1987 economic statement, his intention to 
initiate a Treasury review of all state-owned enterprises with the aim 
of establishing whether government ownership was justified or 
whether proceeds from asset sales would be more productively spent 
on debt repayment16 (Kelsey 1993). Predictably, the Treasury argued for 
privatisation and retirement of debt. 
In 1988, SOE minister Richard Prebble established a steering committee 
to oversee the privatisation process chaired by Ron Trotter, a leading 
member of the New Zealand Business Roundtable, Chief Executive of 
multinational company Fletcher Challenge and, later, major purchaser 
of state assets (Kelsey 1995). By 1990, when Labour announced the end 
of its asset sales programme, although the government had sold off 
eighteen SOEs17 and generated over $8.3 billion in revenue (James and 
McRobie 1993:16), total overseas debt had reached $49 billion, or 77% of 
GDP (ibid:13), and a significant proportion of the country's 
infrastructure had been placed under foreign control (Kelsey 1995). 
What remained of the state following the reform of the State-owned 
Enterprises Act also underwent an equivalent restructuring process 
under the auspices of the State Sector Act 1988. The main purpose of 
the Act was to introduce private sector management practices into 
what was now termed the core public sector, and created what Kelsey 
(1993:60) has described as 'an entrepreneurial public service'. What 
Scott et al (1990) described as the 'residual' services provided by the 
state - for instance, health education, defence, policing and justice -
were to be subjected to the management discipline of the market. 
Under the State Sector Act, permanent heads of departments - still 
appointed by the State Services Commission, but with the approval of 
the Governor-General - were transformed into chief executives and 
lost permanent tenure in favour of renewable, performance-related 
16 This argument was later admitted by Douglas to be a 'poor one', but one that was 
'the easiest to use politically' (in Birchfield and Grant 1993). The real reason was, of 
course, an ideological one to get the state out of the economy. 
17 The most significant of these was: Telecom $4.25 billion to Bell Atlantic and 
Ameritech and which returned in excess of S620M profit for 1995; State Insurance for 
$735M; Post Bank for $665M to ANZ Banking Group Ltd; Air New Zealand for $660M; 
the Rural Bank for $550M after the government wrote off $1.1 billion of its debts; NZ 
Steel for $327M after a debt write-off of nearly $2 billion (Mascarenhas 1991:47). 
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contracts for periods of up to five years (ibid). Salary packages became 
more 'flexible' in order to recruit managers from the private sector. 
The old Westminster-style relationship between minister and 
permanent secretary was replaced with the requirement for chief 
executives to enter into annual performance agreements with their 
minister, something analogous to a corporate statement of intent, and 
subject to approval by the Prime Minister and Minister of State 
Services. These agreements were to stipulate the 'outputs' required by 
the minister, the expenditure targets to be reached in supplying them 
and the management practices by which they would be accomplished 
(Kelsey 1995). In the new devolved environment, chief executives 
were also given complete autonomy to hire and fire staff, in sharp 
contrast to the previously centralised employment structure of the 
State Services Commission. 
The State Sector Act 1988 changed the industrial relations 
environment for all state sector employees. Workers who had 
transferred to the newly formed State-owned Enterprises were no 
longer considered public sector employees, and were employed under 
the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 1987 - the act governing 
conditions of employment for the private sector. Under the State 
Sector Act 1988, the public sector personnel remaining in the core state 
services were also brought under the provisions of the Labour 
Relations Act. Security of tenure for public servants, as with their 
chief executives, was removed, as was the Annual General 
Adjustment - the mechanism through which public sector pay 
maintained parity with the private sector (Jesson 1995). 
(b) Labour Market Reform: 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 was the result of the struggle to 
deregulate the private sector labour market between private sector 
employers and the trade union movement. In the radically 
deregulated post-1984 economic and trading environment, an 
'aggressive employer offensive' emerged (Harvey 1992:63), 
spearheaded by the Business Roundtable, aimed at minimising 
employment costs and maximising flexibility in terms of pay and 
conditions. According to its advocates, labour market deregulation 
was the necessary final step to allowing employers the freedom to 
operate effectively in the new economic enVironment, to stimulate 
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growth and, thus, to facilitate the 'long-awaited' economic recovery 
(ibid). 
As Walsh (1993) notes, the Labour government did not achieve the 
same level of labour market deregulation as it achieved in the 
economy. According to Kelsey (1993), following the election in 1984, 
the government put labour market restructuring in the 'too hard' 
basket, and focused instead on economic and financial reforms. 
Deregulation of the labour market presented something of a dilemma 
to Labour. While the Employers' Federation, the Business Roundtable 
and the Treasury were forceful in their advocacy of radical 
restructuring and the abandonment of the government's commitment 
to full employment18, the historical alliance of the Labour Party with 
the trade union movement ultimately made attempts at deregulation 
(at least to the extent that would satisfy its advocates) during its two 
terms of office impossible19 . The trade unions, according to Deeks 
(1992), when faced with the neo-Liberal onslaught in favour of 
deregulation, were able to successfully exploit their position within the 
Labour Party organisation to oppose plans for labour market 
restructuring. 
For advocates of reform, the Labour Relations Act was an 
unsatisfactory outcome; a campaign of opposition towards it by the 
Business Roundtable was initiated almost immediately after its 
enactment (Walsh 1989). The Act guaranteed registered unions 
monopoly jurisdiction over its members, maintained blanket award 
provision for all workers regardless of union membership and 
retained compulsory union membership (Walsh 1992). The Act did, 
however, dispense with compulsory arbitration, giving unions the 
right to strike, and required a minimum membership figure of 1000 
for unions to be registered, a provision which forced a number of the 
smaller unions to merge. As a result of the Act, the number of 
registered unions fell from 256 in 1986 to 112 in 1989 (Kelsey 1995:176). 
18 According to the Treasury's 1984 briefing papers, unemployment would only be 
resolved by allowing wages to move; if wages could not move, employment levels would 
- downwards. The trade-off was lower wages but higher levels of employment. In 
addition, in a 'responsive and dynamic' economy, unemployment was an unavoidable 
fact of life, therefore any political commitment to full employment was misguided. 
19 Indeed, deregulation was not achieved until the enactment by the National 
government of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991. 
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Although reduced in number, the trade unions that remained were, 
paradoxically, 'stronger and more efficient' (ibid). 
(c) Restructuring Education: 
Throughout its first term of office, the reform programme of the 
Labour government was firmly focused on economic deregulation. In 
the election campaign of 1987, however, Labour indicated that, if 
elected, the focus of its next three year term would be on social policy. 
According to David Lange (in James and McRobie 1993:17-8), the 
Labour government had already taken: 
'" those tough [economic] decisions so that in the second 
term ... we [can] have an economy fitter for people to live in. 
The emphasis will be on social policy and on the traditional 
basic Labour objectives in the areas of health, housing, 
education and social welfare. 
Labour were returned riding the crest of an economic wave created by 
the investment frenzy following Douglas' deregulation of the finance 
sector - a wave which crashed a scant two months after the election, 
taking with it over half the value of the share market20 in a matter of 
days (Easton 1989). 
Throughout its first three years of office, the Labour government had 
demonstrated broad support for Douglas' programme of economic 
liberalisation. During its second, however, there was no such 
consensus over the restructuring of social policy. In the run-up to the 
second election, some ministers, including the Prime Minister, had 
become increasingly alarmed at Douglas' determination to reduce state 
expenditure and to apply the principles of economic reform in 
education, health, housing and social welfare (Boston 1990). Conflict 
developed over the direction of social policy reform within the Labour 
government, manifested by an acrimonious split between David Lange 
and Roger Douglas, and which ended with Lange's sacking of Douglas 
as finance minister in September 1988. Minus Douglas, the 
government sought to formulate a coherent social policy in which old 
20 Market capitalisation had risen from $17.6 billion in 1985 to reach $42.8 billion by 
September 1987. By December, capitalisation had plummeted to $24.2 billion (Kelsey 
1995:89). 
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social democratic objectives could be reconciled with the new 
economic environment, but only achieved, according to James 
(1992:136), an 'awkward hybrid of policies'. 
In spite of the contradktory objectives in the social policy arena, 
significant structural and managerial changes occurred nevertheless. 
And although social policy was the area in which the government 
proved to be the 'least radical' (ibid), in the education sector at least the 
reforms heralded by the Education Act 1988 were described by Codd 
(1990:200) as 'the most radical restructuring' of education for more 
than a century. 
Education had historically played a prominent role in the construction 
of the egalitarian social democracy embodied by the welfare state - it 
was an important means by which equality of opportunity could be 
distributed fairly through society. And while there had been 'no 
ground swell of dissatisfaction with the education system to justify 
reform' undertaken during the late 1980s (Kelsey 1995:219), questions 
had long been raised regarding the capacity of the education system to 
fulfil much of what was expected of it, particularly concerning the 
underachievement of Maori students, putative low educational 
standards, educational inefficiency, inflexibility and lack of choice, and 
the capture of education by specific interest groups, namely the 
teaching profession (Grace 1990). Although many features of the 
'crisis' in education bore the unmistakable stamp of ideological 
manufacture, in seeking to undermine the educational settlement in 
New Zealand, the critics of education were able to highlight very clear 
deficiencies in the system - most notably the failure of schools to 
achieve real equality of opportunity, particularly for Maori, the 
working-class and for women (ibid). 
(i) Tomorrow's Schools 
According to Jesson (1995), Lange attempted to forestall the Douglas-
Treasury21 agenda for reform in education, by announcing in July 1987 
the formation of a taskforce to review the system of education 
administration. In a little under a year, it had produced its report, 
21 The Treasury was so concerned to restructure the education system that in 1987, their 
brief to the incoming government, Government Management, contained an extensive 
second volume, Volume II: Education Issues, dedicated to outlining their proposals. 
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Administering Education - Effective Administration in Education, 
commonly abbreviated to the Picot Report, after taskforce convenor 
and supermarket magnate Brian Picot. Three months later, the 
government's policy statement based on the Picot Report, Tomorrow's 
Schools, was released. 
According to Martin (1991:284), the changes contained in Tomorrow's 
Schools were underpinned, as was reform in other social policy 
sectors, by the twin goals of devolution and decentralisation. Under 
Tomorrow's Schools, the Department of Education was to be 
dismantled and replaced by a number of smaller agencies: a Ministry 
of Education responsible for providing policy advice only to the 
Minister - it was no longer the direct provider of education services; a 
Review and Audit Agency, subsequently renamed the Education 
Review Office, for the monitoring of education institutions through a 
regime of compliance, efficiency and effectiveness audits; and a Parent 
Advocacy Council to assist parents to promote their views and to 
become better informed about the working of the system22. 
In place of the old school committees, a Board of Trustees was to be 
established for each individual primary and secondary school, to 
which local parents would be elected. In partnership with the teachers 
and principal, the mainly voluntary board would govern the school in 
accordance with community wishes. Devolved to each board was 
responsibility for staffing, for the dispersal of the bulk grant received 
from government to cover running costs of the school, and also for 
the maintenance of school buildings and grounds. In collaboration 
with the principal, staff and the community, the board was also 
responsible for the preparation of a charter in which the purposes of 
the institution and the intended educational outcome for its students 
were to be defined (Barrington 1990), with their achievement 
monitored by the Education Review Office. The school charter, 
although in practice a 'non-negotiable and directive document' 
(Kelsey 1995:220), was a key mechanism by which the accountability of 
22 After a short life, the Council was disbanded. According to Jesson (1995) this was 
because parent input into policy development did not readily cohere with the 
managerial principal-agent relationship developing across the state sector generally. 
She also notes that the Parents Advocacy Council might have been perceived as a 
threat by some government departments. 
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school boards, both to central government and to parents, was to be 
ensured. 
It was also intended, under Tomorrow's Schools to devolve 
responsibility for the payment of teachers' salaries to individual school 
boards of trustees, a method of payment that became known as bulk 
funding. As a component of the total bulk grant dispensed to all 
schools, boards of trustees, albeit with some centrally prescribed limits, 
were to be given greater flexibility to determine the numbers of 
teachers to employ and the salary scales at which they would be 
appointed, as well as the capacity to utilise salary funding for other 
purposes. Severe technical difficulties over the calculation of the 
salaries grant for each school, however, together with mounting 
suspicion by trustees that the government was trying to reduce 
funding, forced the postponement of bulk funding when the rest of 
Tomorrow's Schools came into effect in October 1989 (Gordon 1991). 
In the end, legislation was introduced by Phil Goff, Associate Minister 
of Education, 'defer[ring] the devolution of the teacher salaries 
component of the bulk grant until 31 December 1991' (ibid:40) or even 
later. 
A further factor that contributed to the difficulties of devolving 
teachers' salaries to individual boards was the teachers' National 
Collective Award. A key rationale underlying the proposals to 
devolve responsibility for teachers' wages and conditions of 
employment was the managerialist concern to provide boards of 
trustees with greater flexibility in terms of recruitment and salary. 
However, with rates of pay still determined by a centrally negotiated 
collective award, boards were not permitted to pay anything other than 
the stipulated rates of pay. In short, in an industrial relations 
environment still regulated by a national collective award, a devolved 
salary structure made little sense. Until national awards were 
removed, and site-based bargaining introduced, the direct funding of 
teachers' salaries would not be possible. With the defeat of Labour in 
the 1990 general election, however, and a National government who 
embraced the neo-Liberal reform agenda with 'evangelical fervour' 
(Kelsey 1993:21), the teacher unions were given notice that all three 
were likely to be pursued. 
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The disintegration of the Labour government that had begun even 
before the 1987 election continued apace during its second term of 
office. With the sacking of Roger Douglas from the finance portfolio, 
business sector support for Labour was eroded, convinced that the 
government were no longer committed to 'Rogernomics'. 
Paradoxically electorate support also declined severely, unconvinced 
that the commitment had moderated at all. Polling up to the election 
indicated a rout was imminent: possibly only fifteen seats out of 
ninety-seven (Kelsey 1993:21). And, despite belated attempts to 
rekindle support through the Growth Agreement23 with the trade 
unions and a claim to have 'rediscovered' their roots (Kelsey 1995), 
defeat for the Labour government was decisive: National gained sixty-
seven seats, Labour twenty-nine24 (James and McRobie 1993:311). 
The Election of the National Government 1990 
National campaigned in the 1990 election with the slogan 'Creating a 
Decent Society'. However, as Boston and Dalziel (1992) note, the 
economic and social policies pursued by the government during its 
first year in office were utterly incompatible with the achievement of 
their erstwhile worthy goal. The Labour government had bequeathed 
to National a programme of economic liberalisation that was virtually 
completed. Their failure to achieve a similar restructuring of social 
policy and labour market reform, however, gave the National 
government an immediate target for their own restructuring agenda. 
In Ruth Richardson, the National government had a Minister of 
Finance with an economic vision for New Zealand that 'would 
surpass [Roger] Douglas' for ideological purity' (Kelsey 1995:40)25. Any 
notions of reprieve from the 'rapid and disorienting' changes made by 
Labour (James and McRobie 1993:31) harboured by the electorate at 
large, were quickly dispelled by the economic statement made by 
23 A reprise of labour corporatism of old - an agreement with the unions to trade off 
smaller wage increases in return for a commitment from the Reserve Bank to facilitate a 
drop in interest rates and for the government to consult the Combined Trade Unions over 
expenditure cuts and economic policy (Walsh 1991). Employers and the Reserve Bank 
showed little inclination to participate. 
24 As a result of the vagaries of the FPP electoral system, although National only 
increased its percentage of support from 44% in the 1987 election to 47% in 1990, they 
gained 70% of the seats in the House. It was not an election National won, but rather 
an election that Labour lost. 
25 Richardson's extreme monetarist agenda was commonly referred to as 'Ruthanasia'. 
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Richardson in December 1990. Concerned to reduce the 'crushing 
burden' of government spending on welfare, Richardson announced 
massive cuts to benefits and welfare services totalling $1.3 billion 
(Kelsey 1993) - cuts made all the more galling by the government's 
simultaneous rescue of the financially crippled Bank of New Zealand, 
for the second time26, with taxpayer funds to the tune of $720 million 
(James and McRobie 1993:33). Included in the December package, to 
take effect in April 1991, were: Guaranteed Retirement Income and 
Invalids benefits to be frozen at 1990 levels; Family Benefit abolished; 
unemployment rates reduced, while the benefit stand-down period 
was increased from six weeks to six months; Widow's and Domestic 
Purposes Benefits were reduced by 9-16%; medical subsidies were cut 
and prescription charges trebled (Kelsey 1993:83). 
In education, Labour had successfully embedded many of the 
structural changes endorsed by the National government. The most 
important policy proposal still outstanding, however, was bulk 
funding. Although Labour had been forced into deferring its 
implementation through the vigorous and sustained opposition of 
both the teacher unions and boards of trustees, in the 1991 Budget 
National indicated its intention to proceed with the policy. In his 
Budget statement Investing in People, Our Greatest Asset, Minister of 
Education Lockwood Smith announced the establishment of a three-
year bulk-funding pilot scheme. While it is arguable that his own 
preference would have been for the policy to be imposed, the trial was 
clearly a compromise position intended to mitigate the enormous 
opposition by teachers and trustees that still existed. However, the 
gambit failed, resulting instead in renewed campaign of opposition 
from both the secondary teachers' union, the Post Primary Teachers 
Association (PPTA), and the primary teachers' union, the New 
Zealand Education Institute (NZEI) (vide Carpenter 1992). 
The government's agenda in labour market reform was revealed as 
quickly as its intentions to dismantle what was left of the welfare state. 
Employer opposition to the Labour Relations Act 1987 had continued 
unabated and become more militant between the passing of the Act 
26 The BNZ had also been rescued by the Labour government in 1989 by a capital 
injection of $600 million. In the investment frenzy following deregulation, the BNZ 
had become a key lender to the 'corporate cowboys' of the late 1980s. 
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and the election of National in 1990 (Walsh 1992). In response, 
National delivered an act, in May 1991, that completed 'the process of 
dismantling the industrial relations system established by the 
Industrial Relations and Conciliation Act 1894' (ibid:59). 
The Employment Contracts Act (ECA) 1991 transformed the industrial 
relations environment in New Zealand. Whereas collective 
employment rights had previously been conferred on workers by 
virtue of trade union coverage, the ECA changed the nature of the 
relationship between capital and labour to one where rights were 
conferred on individual workers by virtue of their employment 
contract with their employer, and where separate industrial legislation 
was largely replaced by the contractual principles of common law (ibid). 
National awards and compulsory unionism were abandoned in favour 
of negotiations between individual employers and workers, who were 
'freed' to negotiate on their own behalf or to nominate a bargaining 
agent of their choice. Under the Act unions ceased to exist, referred to 
instead as 'employee organisations', undifferentiated from any other 
representational body, and placed in the position of competing with 
each other and with non-union agencies for members (Kelsey 1993). 
Strikes were made illegal, except where a collective contract had 
expired. Collective awards, although permitted, were discouraged by 
the ECA - there was no compulsion in the Act for an employer to 
negotiate such an agreement. Conversely, and a further 
discouragement to collective coverage, the Act required bargaining 
agents to demonstrate their authority to bargain for each individual 
member - a time-consuming and costly process. 
Conclusion 
By the beginning of 1992, a conflictual environment had been created 
in the education sector, as elsewhere, shaped not only by the general 
reform programme undertaken in the wider state sector, but also by the 
specific education restructuring, which most significantly included the 
resumption by the National government of the policy to bulk fund 
teachers' salaries, and by the new industrial relations conditions 
created by the Employment Contracts Act. As outlined in Chapter VI, 
the hostility between the government and teachers that resulted from 
this complex background appeared, during 1992, to be intractable and 
without obvious solution. The SCG was to constitute a specific, and, 
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given the nature of the reform programme of the state sector, an 
uncharacteristic response to the impending crisis. Before examining 
the formation of the Schools Consultative Group, however, Chapter V 
outlines the research methods used and also some of the difficulties 
encountered in conducting 'political' research. 
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CHAPTER V - THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
The Problem of Political Research 
The state sector restructuring that has taken place in New Zealand over 
the last decade, as in other countries, has prompted increasing 
amounts of what Walford (1994) has described as 'researching up'. 
Educational research until recently has largely been focused on those 
with less power than the researchers - for example, children and. 
teachers are typically the subject matter of this kind of 'researching 
down'. In contrast, however, 'researching up' involves an 
examination of those who wield considerably more power in the 
education system than the researcher. Ball's (1990) Politics and Policy 
Making in Education, Edwards, Fitz and Whitty's (1989)The State and 
Private Education: a Study of the Assisted Places Scheme and Whitty, 
Edwards and Gewirtz' (1993) Specialisation and Choice in Urban 
Education: The City Technology College Experiment, are all prime 
examples of this type of researching upl. 
Conducting research on situations or events in which key participants 
can range from Prime Ministers, Cabinet Ministers or senior 
government officials down to those whom Deem (1994) describes as 
'the locally powerful' - occupants of key positions in local 
communities or organisations, councillors, business people, even 
school principals - is problematic. Indeed, as Walford (1994:3) again 
notes, this kind of research has several features that differentiates it 
greatly from most other educational research. The difficulties 
commonly experienced revolve mainly around issues of access to key 
participants and to sources of documentary information. The 
educationally powerful are able to exert sometimes complete control 
over access for interviews, the release of information and also its 
censorship - a problem likely to be intensified by the frequently 
politically sensitive subject matter of this kind of research. 
This examination of the Schools Consultative Group falls into 
Walford's category of 'researching up' for two reasons, one intrinsic to 
1 See Whitty and Edwards' 'Researching Thatcherite Education Policy' in Walford 
(1994) for an account of the difficulties encountered while researching the Assisted 
Places Scheme and City Technology Colleges. 
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the SCG itself, the other intrinsic to my own position as researcher. 
Participants in the SCG clearly fit into Deem's category of the locally 
powerful - occupants of key positions within a variety of national 
education organisations - and the subject matter was, and still is, a 
matter of extreme political sensitivity. The SCG exists at the political 
level and is, thus, self-evidently 'up', with all the difficulties of access 
that entails. The second factor is the relative nature of power relations 
between researcher and researched. While the concept of 'power' is, in 
. itself, problematic, as a student researcher occupying a much lower 
rung of the academic hierarchy, the power inscribed in such a position 
is significantly less than that, say, of an experienced senior academic or 
researcher. Not only was the SCG 'up', but the position of researcher 
was simultaneously 'down', as it were. The point I want to emphasise 
here is that the capacity exists for the former characteristic to be 
significantly amplified by the latter, and, in this research, may have 
been to some degree. 
As outlined more fully in the introduction to this thesis, this 
examination of the Schools Consultative Group is a theoretical and 
empirical analysis of state relationships within the education sector in 
New Zealand. In the context of neo-Liberal state restructuring, the re-
establishment of links with education 'interest groups' represented a 
significant and somewhat contradictory development. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, while New Zealand's post-war education 
'settlement' was characterised, as were other public sectors, by a high 
degree of policy consensus, negotiation and union involvement in the 
policy-making process2, the removal of vested interests from the policy 
arena and their active exclusion from involvement in the 
management of change was a central feature of the reorganisation of 
the state that occurred during the 1980s. 
The emergence of the SCG, it was suggested, was due to the failure of 
government policy, both educational and industrial. It was a step back 
towards a weak form of corporatism characteristic of the old education 
settlement in order to solve specific political crises which had arisen as 
a result of the new neo-Liberal state form. The major initiative with 
which the self-management of schools would have been accomplished, . 
2 For Example, Grace 1990; Kelsey 1993, 1995; Walsh 1993; and Oliver 1989. 
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the bulk funding of teachers' salaries, had, up to 1992, been effectively 
resisted by the two teacher unions. In addition to this, the new 
industrial relations environment prevailing in education, as in other 
sectors, had been reformulated by the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
Disputes over wages and conditions of employment, an industrial 
interpretation of the bulk funding debate, were no longer subject to 
state mediation or arbitration. Indeed, the mechanisms by which such 
a conflict might have been resolved had been restructured out of 
existence. Thus, the settlement of industrial disputes in education, as 
elsewhere, were no longer part of the function of government and 
were, thus, to be played out in the public arena. 
As is the case in a great deal of political sociological research, the 
essentially political, as opposed to educational, nature of the Schools 
Consultative Group proved to be the most significant factor 
throughout the research process. While disbanded by October 1994, 
access to information regarding its operation did not improve because 
the conditions which determined the context of the SCG continued to 
exist beyond its demise. Indeed, immediately following the ending of 
the SCG, the Minister of Education established another consultative 
group, the Ministerial Reference Croup, whose terms of reference 
were to consider, yet again, mechanisms to deliver teachers' salaries to 
schools. Thus, the education politics in which the SCG was embedded, 
and which continued beyond the term of the group, overwhelmingly 
determined access to information, underpinned the decisions of SCG 
members', both representatives of education groups and government 
agencies, to participate in interviews, and also shaped the responses of 
interviewees that would become 'public' through this research. 
The politics of the SCG was a significant factor in the decision to make 
the focus of the research an examination of the SCG as a systemic, 
structural event. As a way of avoiding a highly individualised and 
idiosyncratic interpretation of the SCC, a 'Days of our Lives'3 approach 
to political research, the more theoretical orientation was an attempt to 
minimise becoming enmeshed in what Dale (1992) has described as 
'education politics' as opposed to the 'politics of education'. 
3 A somewhat over-wrought American daytime soap opera. 
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In this chapter, some of the issues raised during the research process 
will be outlined, particularly those that relate to the sources of 
information utilised and the problem of access to written records. 
Before doing so, however, consideration needs to be given to one of 
the major issues in sociological research - bridging what has become 
known as the 'macro-micro' gap (vide Ozga 1987). 
Bridging the 'Macro-Micro' Gap 
As Hargreaves (1985) notes, this term has become shorthand for what 
is, in fact, a multi-dimensional problem. It has been used to refer to 
the gulf between 'grand theorising' on one hand, and 'the retreat to 
empiricism' on the other - in other words, the relationship of 
explanatory theory to evidence. It has also come to refer to the 
theoretical difficulties of integrating macro-level perspectives with 
micro theory - similar to, but not quite the same as, reconciling 
structure and agency4. Its third permutation within the sociology of 
education has been as representing the distinction between school and 
society. 
The 'macro-micro' distinction has been responsible for establishing, in 
some instances, a misleading assumption that there is necessarily a 
direct connection between the two. According to Dale (1994:37), 
research in which political processes are taken to translate directly into 
education practice is underscored by this assumption - research in 
which education policy is 'read off' directly from political changes. As 
noted again by Hargreaves (1985) and also by Dale (1994), the gap 
between social structure and individual interaction is impossible to 
bridge without the use of what Merton (1967) termed 'theories of the 
middle range'. 
Corporatism, in the context of research on the SCG, was employed for 
two reasons. Firstly, postulating that the SCG might be a corporatist-
type body clearly required some consideration of this theoretical 
perspective on state-interest group relations. The second reason was to 
avoid the difficulties of 'grand theorising' outlined in Chapter 1. The 
utility of approaching a systemic event such as the SCG with a state-
4 For instance, Hargreaves notes that an event such as conversational turn taking, 
something that occurs clearly at the level of individual agency, is subject to structural 
constraints. 
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theoretical framework pitched at the level of understanding the entire 
political edifice and its relationship to capital is dubious at best, and the 
need to mediate the links between the SCG and the political system, 
broadly construed, is obvious. The need for middle-range concepts is 
demonstrated unequivocally when researching the articulation of the 
state and civil society. 
Key Actors and Sources: the Problem of Access 
The sources of information available concerning the establishment 
and operation of the Schools Consultative Group were characterised by 
a very high level of selectivity. While not a unique experience in the 
realm of sociological - or, for that matter, any other - research, the 
extent to which information concerning the SCG was 'filtered' was 
significant, and considerably exacerbated by the political nature of the 
group itself, by the issues it considered and its mode of operation. 
As will be outlined more fully in the following chapters, the removal 
of educational conflict from the public gaze was a crucial function of 
the SCG. For example, the operating protocols observed by members of 
the SCG specifically prevented them from commenting publicly on the 
work programme of the SCG or on the content of internal discussions 
(see Chapter VII). All public pronouncements concerning the group 
were made by the chairperson, John Anderson, and only when he 
deemed it necessary. The information concerning the work of the SCG 
was deliberately and strategically 'privatised' and was, thus, highly 
amenable to control and screening. Two key censors of documentary 
sources were the Minister of Education and Patricia McNeill5, a 
member of the secretariat to the SCG. 
Personal Interviews 
The dearth of documentary material meant that information derived 
from personal interviews took on added importance. Although a 
strategy frequently utilised to provide a voice for the disempowered 
and disenfranchised, the interviews with SCG members were not 
intended to function in this manner. As Ball (1994a) points out, 
interview data serves the dual purpose of providing evidence as well 
5 While correspondence concerning this research on the SCG was directed to John 
Anderson personally, all responses were made via Patricia McNeill. In the whole 
research process, there has been no direct contact with Anderson himself. 
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as background information for research. In this instance, interviews 
were to be a major source of background material on the life of the 
SCG. Where relevant, direct quotations from the interviews would be 
used when of particular interest but, as will be seen in the following 
chapters, employed only sparingly. 
Invitations to participate in the interview process were issued to all 
individuals who appeared on the membership list supplied by the SCG 
secretariat. This list included representatives of the constituent groups 
as well as the government officials who attended the meetings. All 
invitations to government officials were declined - some more politely 
than others. The reason given by all officials was that, as members of 
the SCG as observers and advisors and, it was inappropriate to discuss 
their role on the group. Interestingly, and discovered only after the 
release of documentary material from the SCG, this was not actually 
their official role; government officials were active participants in 
much the same way as representatives from education sector groups. 
While an interview was almost agreed to by Judith Aitken, Chief 
Executive of the Education Review Office, when contacted to arrange 
the details of the meeting in Wellington, I was informed she no longer 
had the time - this was in October 1994. Although I attempted to 
arrange an alternative meeting - my suggestion was any time during 
1995 - the response was the same. She clearly had a very busy schedule. 
John Anderson, too, declined on the grounds that, as the minutes of 
the meetings were already a matter of public record, everything of 
interest was, by implication, available for scrutiny. He noted: 
My own role was purely Chairman of the Schools 
Consultative Group and as all the matters covered at the 
meeting are contained in the minutes, it is not necessary or 
appropriate for me to then carry out an interview covering 
that material (personal correspondence 3.5.95). 
Again, discovered subsequently, Anderson's role was hardly restricted 
to 'purely' chairing meetings. 
In comparison, most of the representatives of groups making up the 
SCG were happy to be interviewed. Ian Simpson, President of the 
Secondary Principals' Association, however, could not participate due 
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to ill health. Others, though, were not so forthcoming; for instance, 
Les Maxwell of the School Trustees Association did not respond to 
several requests for an interview. Jan Kerr, of the Independent Schools 
Council, refused to participate on the grounds that 'it was not 
profitable' - quite what constitutes 'profitable' in this context was 
unclear. Iri Tawhiwhirangi, on the other hand, after repeated 
telephone and facsimile messages, advised, via an associate, she would 
not be in Wellington on the dates suggested and no alternative times 
were offered. 
The Written Record 
(a) SCG Minutes and Correspondence: 
The written record of the work of the SCG was selective both in its 
release as well as in its compilation. In spite of John Anderson's claim 
that the minutes were a matter for public record, in practice this 
proved not to be the case. After requesting access to the minutes, a 
request Anderson diverted to Patricia McNeill, a selection of only those 
relating to full SCG meetings was released - eleven meetings in all. 
The minutes for the sub-groups, where the bulk of the work took place, 
were omitted. Although there was one accidental acquisition of 
minutes for a sub-group meeting - as an attachment to a report tabled 
to a full SCG - repeated requests to McNeill to release both the missing 
full group and sub-group minutes were ignored. 
Released with the minutes of the meetings were copies of the major 
reports produced by the SCG, some discussion papers prepared by 
various participants of the group as well as various items of 
correspondence, mostly that of Anderson and the Minister of 
Education. These latter documents also indicated a considerable degree 
of censorship. While most letters were simply acknowledgements of 
information exchanged or notification of extensions to deadlines and 
so on, some correspondence was issue based and of no small interest in 
terms of the work and operation of the group. Crucial letters in which 
instructions were issued, questions responded to, etc, were not 
included. For example, in the early part of 1993, Anderson had cause to 
dispense with the original secretariat of the group, comprised largely of 
government officials from the Ministry of Education, the State Services 
Commission and the Education Review Office. What provoked their 
replacement was the matter of some discussion between the Minister 
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and Anderson - as indicated by the content of other correspondence -
yet the correspondence related to this matter was not released. 
While the documents available were certainly released 'judiciously' by 
Patricia McNeill, the nature of the documents themselves presented a 
selective account of events. Four hour meetings would yield two pages 
of information - one page of which would be devoted to listing 
attendees, apologies and to accepting the minutes of the previous 
meeting. For example, the position of the SCG in relation to the 
government's intention to introduce the Salaries Grant for 
Management was recorded in the minutes of the second meeting held 
in November 1992, after what must have been at the very least 'a frank 
exchange of views', thus: 
SCG will not issue any statement about the Bill as it passes 
through its legislative process. SCG has no opinion on the 
issue. 
It seems quite clear, given that the minutes of full meetings were the 
'public' face of the proceedings of the SCG as well as the obvious 
sensitivity of the issues being discussed, the information disclosed by 
them would be brief. 
Added to difficulties presented by the brevity of the written record are 
questions regarding its precision. Towards the end of its existence, 
some members had cause to raise this issue formally at a full SCG 
meeting. There were concerns that the record did not accurately reflect 
the content of the discussion that had taken place. In this particular 
instance, over the recording of members' views on bulk funding at a 
time when sheer weight of numbers was being used as a strategy to 
force the SCG into adopting a supportive position on the issue. While 
the minutes were 'filtered' for a variety of reasons, questions regarding 
their accuracy was politically motivated, underscored by a particular 
view of the process of decision-making, and more concerned with 
opposition to the kind of filtering taking place, not the filtering per se. 
The secretary recording the minutes, an ex-PPTA staff member, was 
perceived, by some, to have a more sympathetic view to the opponents 
of bulk funding and was supposed to have demonstrated this by 
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recording biased minutes. Whether the question of bias would have 
been raised if it was in favour of bulk funding is a moot point. 
While objectivity in the recording of events has long since been 
exposed for the myth it is, this issue raises more general questions 
about the nature of documentary evidence as a whole. As is aptly 
demonstrated in the case of the SCG, the record of any event is 
authored by individuals who adhere to particular views of the world 
and which may be, explicitly or implicitly, designed to serve particular 
purposes. What this necessitates, therefore, is the consultation of a 
variety of sources of information. However, the two major avenues of 
data on the SCG - material obtained from the Ministry of Education 
under the Official Information Act and personal interviews of 
members - were themselves the subject of censorship and selection. 
(b) The Official Information Act: 
The paradox of requesting material under the Official Information Act 
is the need to know what exists in order to request it - or, at the very 
least, be able to formulate a query of sufficient scope to net the relevant 
documents and to know which government agency it is most useful to 
direct it. Armed with this knowledge, an open-ended request was 
formulated that appeared to be quite comprehensive6: 
[material relating to] background documents or Ministerial 
Briefing Papers that were prepared either prior to, or at the 
time of, the establishment of the SCG in 1992 that are 
relevant to its formation and/or operation, and any other 
papers that may be related. 
In response, the Ministry of Education responded, as required by the 
Act, detailing the charges to be incurred by the request: approximately 
four hours to search for and photocopy relevant material, a procedure 
charged out at the rate of $28 per half hour or part thereof, plus 
photocopying. As a student surviving on a student allowance, the 
charges involved were not insignificant. In fact, it was decided not to 
6 In retrospect, it appears naively optimistic to assume that the Ministry of Education 
would take note of the final clause of the request, and forward 'any other papers that 
may be related' without a specific request. The MOE and/ or the Minister were 
impervious to this 'trawling' technique. 
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pursue the inquiry simply on the grounds of cost. However, the value 
of educational networks came into their own, with a Ministry contact 
able to action the request as a low priority in return for not being 
charged search fees. In the normal course of events, Official 
Information Act requests are required by law to be actioned within a 
maximum of 20 days from receipt of the query. As it was, this 
particular query took five months. While some delay was anticipated 
in return for not charging, even this length of time appeared a little 
excessive. 
While it was not treated as an official request for charging purposes or 
speed of response, its status quickly reverted back to an official request 
with the Minister of Education withholding some of the information 
unearthed by his Ministry. Under both the Official Information Act 
and the Privacy Act 1993, the Minister is entitled to withhold the 
names of individuals identified in the material unless 'outweighed by 
other considerations which render it desirable in the public interest' to 
make them available (personal correspondence). And in the 
information released, the material had been edited to prevent the 
identification of those individuals being considered as prospective 
members or as chairperson of the SCG. 
It was somewhat surprising to find, however, that a four-hour search 
yielded only three letters: two from Ministry of Education officials and 
one co-authored by the MOE with an Assistant State Services 
commissioner. At potentially $75 per letter, this could have been 
expensive research, and certainly not a procedure to be repeated with 
other government departments involved in the SCG such as the 
Education Review Office, the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet or the State Services Commission. It appeared, perhaps, that 
more than names had been withheld. That this might have been the 
case was suggested when other information, also obtained under the 
Official Information Act from another source, was forwarded to me 
containing Ministry advice regarding the future of the bulk funding 
trial - an issue that clearly impinged on the operation of the SCG. 
As with the minutes of the SCG, information obtained under the 
Official Information Act might also have been subjected to extensive 
filtering. Clearly discretion is exercised over the release of information 
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at the political level, particularly where the release of the names of 
individuals is involved and where, thus, the aim of the Official 
Information Act to release information clearly contradicts the 
provisions of the Privacy Act, the purpose of which is to prevent 
release. However, the view implied by material obtained from the 
Ministry of Education, that so little correspondence or so few briefing 
papers were exchanged by government officials over the whole issue of 
the establishment, membership and operation of the SCG, appears 
entirely implausible. What was obtained was extremely revealing, and 
therein lies the cause of censorship. What official material actually 
exists concerning the SCG, though, there is no way of knowing. 
The Process of Interviewing 
The shortcomings of interviews as a source of data are well 
documented (vide Yin 1994) - information or insights obtained are 
only as good as the questions asked, the accuracy of individual 
interpretation or recall of events, and so on. Using interviews as a 
source of background material, however, had the advantage of 
encouraging some interviewees to discuss the SCG more frankly than 
might have been the case if their personal views had been openly and 
directly solicited as evidence to be used publicly and extensively7. 
Although not a deliberate research strategy, the 'apolitical' nature of 
many of the questions asked might have encouraged some 
interviewees to involuntarily divulge quite 'political' responses. 
The nature of the exchanges, too, might have encouraged this 
frankness. Out of nine interviews, seven were conducted in person or 
over the telephone; two interviewees, at their suggestion, were sent a 
list of questions to which they audiotaped their responses. While 
questions were formulated prior to the personal interviews, they were 
conducted in a more conversational and less structured style than a 
simple 'question and answer' format. This had advantages and 
disadvantages. A clear benefit was an avoidance of the rather stilted 
and unnatural character of simply interrogating interviewees with a 
list of questions. While I had a clear idea of the material to cover over 
the course of the interview, it was revealed more by letting the 
7 One SCG participant took exception to this process, and implied it was a deliberate 
strategy to prompt indiscreet responses. 
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interviewee speak, sometimes at great length, without interruption, 
than by adhering to a pre-formulated schedule. It required active 
engagement with the interviewee in the exchange; it was not simply a 
case of listening to their responses when transcribing the interview 
later. As such, it was a much less formal and much more interactive 
approach. 
The disadvantage was that each interviewee, while being asked 
approximately the same kinds of questions, were not all interviewed in 
the same way or asked to respond to the same issues. This resulted in a 
lack of uniformity in the interview data when it came to be analysed 
later. A further disadvantage was the lack of control over responses 
that unstructured interviews generate. With a question and answer 
format, the turn-taking between participants is more formalised. 
However, the more conversational approach gave some interviewees 
too much freedom to range discursively over a variety of educational 
issues - only some of which were relevant to the research although this 
happened only rarely. 
A further disadvantage was the need, as the researcher, to be 'on 
guard', as it were, for questions from interviewees concerning the 
responses of other SCG members This happened once or twice, and 
may have been encouraged by the informality of the interviews. Such 
questions from the interviewees were a salutary reminder that the 
interviews were, in fact, governed by the usual ethical constraints on 
research data gained in this way. Such probing for other participants' 
views demonstrated, too, the continuing political importance of what 
happened within the SCG, and was a reminder that the context of 
struggle over the issues considered remained. 
Ethical Considerations 
Interviewing SCC members in their capacity as representatives of 
public organisations did not require the same sort of ethical 
considerations as interviewing them as private individuals8 . 
However, when they were approached initially for interviews, 
information concerning a number of ethical issues were included with 
8 For example, prior to conducting the interviews, it was not necessary to seek the 
approval of the University's Ethics Committee. 
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the short summary of the research proposal. These covered: the 
confidentiality of the material, the interview procedure itself, the use 
to which the information would be put and withdrawal from the 
research (refer Appendix I). In addition to this, prior to being 
interviewed, the purpose of the interview and how it would be used 
was reiterated, as was the invitation to decline to respond to particular 
questions. 
None of the participants expressed a particular interest in seeing 
completed transcripts as originally suggested in the contact letter. In 
light of this, it was decided to send only those parts of the interviews to 
be used directly back to participants for comment. This was done not 
only to reduce the time involved for interviewees, but also to avoid 
disputes over material that would not be used as attributed direct 
quotations in the text of the thesis. 
Once the substance of the chapters concerning the SCG had been 
completed, transcripts of all direct quotations (with sufficient context to 
make them intelligible) were forwarded to each individual participant 
for their comment and approval. The only modification required for 
the majority of participants was that quotations be made more 
grammatical, as they had been used verbatim from the text of the 
interview. Only one interviewee requested that material be removed 
entirely, having been used, in their view, in an intemperate manner. 
In the text of the chapters, footnotes have been used to indicate where 
material was removed at the request of the interviewee. 
Responses received from two interviewees were quite problematic, and 
demonstrated a concern with 'image management' that is probably 
characteristic of all research on political issues. In order for 
interviewees to make sense of how their interview quotations were to 
be used, they were sent portions of the text accompanying the quotes. 
When returned, however, as well as the content of the quotations 
being amended, the content of the accompanying text had been 
modified by the interviewees to reflect a slightly more sympathetic 
view, putatively that of the researcher, towards the associations and 
views being discussed. The suggested alterations to the text were 
partially accommodated only insofar as they related to the presentation 
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of the view of the sector group in question; where the view of the 
researcher was being modified, the alterations were ignored. 
Additional information was obtained from individuals involved with 
the various sector groups represented on the SCG, and who were well-
informed regarding the involvement of their group. This material 
was not solicited by interview, but was obtained informally over the 
course of the research, and usually in relation to specific, more 
'politically sensitive' aspects of the group, issues to which members 
formally interviewed could be expected to have given 'political' 
responses. Given the often frank nature of the information obtained 
from these informal sources, these individuals were not identified by 
name, at their request. Material derived from such sources is indicated 
by footnotes. Although the concealment of sources of information is a 
delicate issue, the continued involvement of these individuals in the 
education sector generally, and with the various interest groups 
particularly, anonymity was a necessity. 
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CHAPTER VI - THE FORMATION OF THE SCHOOLS CONSULTATIVE GROUP 
The Political Environment 1992 
The Schools Consultative Group was formed in October 1992, a year in 
which the relationship between education sector groups and the 
government plunged to new depths. For the teacher unions 
particularly, opposition to various aspects of educational reform had 
been building over a number of years. At the same time, the 
government, and the Minister of Education in particular, was clearly 
frustrated by the lack of progress in implementing the final policy 
measures to achieve desired levels of school self-management. While 
relations between various parts of the education sector and the state 
had begun to deteriorate prior to the implementation of Tomorrow's 
Schools in 19881, three specific events brought tensions to a critical 
point in 1992: the negotiation of the teachers' collective employment 
contract under the new Employment Contracts Act; the announcement 
in July of the government's intention, from 1993, to bulk fund the 
salaries of senior staff - the Salaries Grant for Management (SGM); and 
the commencement of the voluntary salaries bulk funding trial at the 
start of the 1992 school year. 
Contract Negotiations 
Negotiation of teachers' collective employment contract was extremely 
volatile, due largely, according to the PPTA, to the National 
government's attempts, under the auspices of the new Employment 
1 From the perspective of the PPTA, the beginning of the breakdown in their 
relationship with the government occurred with the rejection of their post-wage freeze 
pay claim in 1985-86: 
'It was a deal that was negotiated between us, Russell Marshall and 
David Caygill when they were Ministers of Finance and Education 
respectively .... We thought we had negotiated a deal, we certainly shook 
hands, prior to Christmas 1985. The deal was to be ratified by Cabinet by 
its first meeting in 1986, and at that first meeting when we didn't hear 
from either of those two ministers until very late in the afternoon we began 
to wonder what was going on. Essentially, Cabinet didn't ratify the 
deal.. .. [The breakdown] became confirmed later in the year by a number of 
initiatives: there was the State Sector SOE reform bill, there was an 
instruction given to the Department that the government wanted 
uncontaminated advice, so the Department stopped seeking advice, and so 
on. (Bunker, PPTA General Secretary, interview 6.10.94). 
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Contracts Act, to 'savage conditions' (Bunker, interview 6.10.94). The 
contract round, which commenced in March 1992 between the State 
Services Commission (SSC) and the Education Sector Union2, was 
particularly bitter, protracted and according to Jesson (1995:434), clearly 
revealed that 'the agenda of the [State Services Commission]3 was 
about extending the "flexibility of a free labour market" to include 
schools and State cost cutting.' The Minister of State Services, Bill 
Birch, made the position of the government absolutely clear in a 
speech to education sector employers in March prior to the 
commencement of negotiations: there would be no additional funds 
for pay increases - pay rises, if any, would be funded through 
'productivity improvements'. Nor did he expect the existing national 
award document to be renewed; it was an 'outmoded industrial 
practice' that needed to be dispensed with, and he accused the unions 
who supported collective bargaining of wrecking the school system 
(Birch 1992). 
Throughout the negotiations, media campaigns and confrontational 
posturing by both the government and the teacher unions contributed 
to a significant deterioration in their relationship. By mid-June, 
negotiations between the unions and the SSC had broken down, 
largely over attempts by the government to introduce individual 
contracts and performance-related or 'merit' pay. In response, the 
unions threatened rolling stoppages and limited co-operation with the 
new . Curriculum Initiative. The Minister of Education (The Press 
26.6.92) accused unions of: 
... misusing their powers by disrupting the education sector, 
falsely representing the issues, refusing to support positive 
change and attempting to preserve self interest instead of 
quality education. 
2 An alliance between the PPTA, NZEI and CECUA established in 1991 for the purpose 
of mounting a united campaign against bulk funding. It was used to present a joint 
approach at the contract negotiations although each union still negotiated separate 
agreements (Jesson 1995:433). 
3 For the purposes of collective contract negotiations, the State Services Commission 
was the employer party. 
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After securing a commitment from the SSC to roll over their existing 
contract beyond its expiry while negotiations continued, the NZEI 
called off their intended strike action on 26 June. By the end of July, 
after the threat of further stoppages, settlement was finally reached. 
The PPTA could not reach agreement with the SSC, however, and 
marked the expiry of their contract on July 1 with industrial action in a 
series of one day stoppages around the country. According to Birch, the 
PPTA were 'a backwards-looking union losing credibility' (The Press 
1.7.92), and, in a joint statement with the Minister of Education on 9 
July, declared that 'the days of vested union interests dictating to the 
government' were over (ibid 9.7.92). 
Salaries Grant for Management 
Either as a direct provocation, or with singularly inept timing, the 
Ministers of State Services and Education jointly announced their 
intention to bulk fund the salaries of senior teachers from 1993 in the 
midst of strike action by the PPTA. Prompted by a 'premature leak 
from the bureaucracy' (Jesson 1995:440), details of the proposal were 
released at an urgent government press conference on 7 July. The 
proposal, subsequently submitted to the House as the Education 
Amendment (No.5) Bill, stipulated that from May 1993 teachers who 
occupied designated senior positions would be paid from grants to be 
given directly to Boards of Trustees, a scheme called Salaries Grant for 
Management (SGM). 
Outraged by the lack of consultation over the proposal, the New 
Zealand School Trustees Association (STA)4 and the two teacher 
unions were united in their opposition. The ST A was particularly 
concerned as the policy effectively made school trustees directly 
responsible for decisions taken by the government regarding future 
levels of funding. The teacher unions shared the STA's concerns but 
4 The national representative body for school trustees. Under the devolved system of 
teacher salaries, the STA would be the equivalent of an employers' association. 
However, with the continued central payment of salaries in the education sector, the 
State Services Commission undertakes the role of employer party in collective contract 
negotiations. While funding for the STA derives from membership .fees levied on 
individual school boards, it is also contracted by the Ministry of Education to perform 
specific functions, for instance encouraging individuals to stand for election to boards, 
running the elections and providing post-election training for new trustees (Wylie 
1991). 
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were also aggrieved because senior positions were, at this time, still 
under negotiation with the SSC in the contract round. In response, the 
STA called for the government to withdraw the bill containing the 
SGM proposal, while the PPTA imposed the threatened moratorium 
on the implementation of the Curriculum Initiative and organised 
another round of rolling stoppages for 27 July (Manson 1992:329-31). 
The Minister of Education was unmoved, however, and declared that 
'no industrial action will make me buckle', considering the PPTA's 
intention to strike 'stupid' (The Press 24.7.92). In retaliation to the 
PPTA curriculum moratorium, the Minister refused to attend their 
annual conference in August, claiming he was not prepared to speak 
with the union 'until they pull the guns away from our students' 
heads' (The Press 26.8.92). By 27 August, however, he had been 
persuaded to change his mind - not though, the public were assured, at 
the behest of the Prime Minister (The Press 27.8.92)5. 
Yet by the beginning of September, the PPTA retreated from the 
curriculum moratorium without, it seemed, having gained any clear 
commitment from the Minister that the government intended to drop 
the SGM proposals. According to a press report at the time, the PPTA 
settled instead for inclusion in a consultative group set up 'by school 
trustees and government to consider funding' (The Press 7.9.92) - the 
Schools Consultative Group. For the rest of September and 
throughout October, the retaliatory campaign previously conducted 
through the media was notable by its absence. On 3 November the 
government suddenly announced that the implementation of the 
SGM was to be delayed for a term, citing 'administrative reasons' for 
the postponement. According to the Minister, 'by giving schools more 
time to prepare for the SGM its education benefits [would] be more 
pronounced' (The Press 3.11.92). 
The Education Amendment (No 5) Bill arrived back in the House of 
Representatives on 11 November virtually unchanged, and brought 
with it a renewed round of opposition from within the education 
5 According to Jesson (1995:449), the Prime Minister was informed, through behind-the-
scenes contact with 'influential members of the National Party hierarchy', that the 
Minister's behaviour over this issue was entirely inappropriate. Bolger compelled 
Smith to attend. The 'influential member' in contact with the Prime Minister was none 
other than John Anderson, later appointed as Chairperson of the SCG. 
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sector. The PPTA immediately placed a ban on co-operation with the 
government over the SGM proposal and president, Martin Cooney, 
considered withdrawing from the Schools Consultative Group in 
protest (The Press 20.11.92). The NZEI responded with a proposal to 
ballot members to ascertain support for their own curriculum boycott. 
Later in November the PPTA, in addition to non-co-operation, 
confirmed the curriculum moratorium6. In December, the NZEI did 
likewise. 
Bulk Funding 
Perhaps the most important backdrop to events occurring during 1992 
was the bulk funding trial. Bulk funding of teachers' salaries was the 
most contentious of the major policy platforms deemed necessary for 
school self-management and had been, up to 1991, trenchantly and 
successfully opposed by both the NZEI and the PPTA. The STA's 
position on bulk funding, as Gordon (1991:45) notes, was 'rather more 
muted', despite the opposition of the majority of their members to the 
policy7. Trustees had been advised by their president at the time, Graye 
Shattky, to 'stay neutral' until clear government guidelines for its 
implementation were released (Gordon 1991:45). It appeared that the 
STA were concerned with the administration of the policy, rather than 
the policy per se, leaving open the possibility of STA support for the 
scheme if the administrative pitfalls could be overcome (ibid). 
Since bulk funding had been adopted as government policy in 
Tomorrow's Schools in 1988, however, vigorous union opposition had 
been an ongoing feature of the debates concerning education. In 
January 1991, the Ministry of Education released a preliminary report 
outlining the main points of the bulk funding policy, indicating the 
government's intention to proceed with its implementation, a process 
to be undertaken either by 'trialling' or 'phasing in' (Ministry of 
Education 1991)8. In the budget of that year, in spite of the teacher 
6 This was later lifted on 18 December in a bid to settle their collective contract (The 
Press 18.12.92). 
7 A NZ Council for Education Research survey conducted in 1990 showed 79% of trustees 
were opposed to bulk funding, 11% unsure and 9% in favour (Wylie 1991:176). 
8 According to the MOE, bulk funding was a 'very major step' towards completing self-
management of schools. As such it was politically a high risk. Implementation would, 
therefore, need to be 'gradual and careful' (Gordon 1991:45). The difference between 
the two modes of implementation lay in the ostensible commitment to be demonstrated 
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unions' extensive campaign of opposition to the policy9, the 
government confirmed its commitment by announcing a bulk funding 
trial, with participation to be determined on a voluntary, opt-in basis. 
By October 1991, when it became clear very few schools would 
participate, the deadline to opt in was extended to November. The trial 
went ahead at the beginning of the school year in 1992, the opposition 
evinced by the lack of interest notwithstanding, with only 62 out of 
almost 2,700 primary and secondary schools choosing to participate 
(Carpenter 1992:183). 
Whose Idea? - Variations on a Theme .... 
Attributing the initiative for the Schools Consultative Group to any 
one individual or organisation is a complex exercise. From interviews 
with various SCG members, however, it was clear there were a 
number of candidates willing to claim the proposal as their own. In 
one sense, the idea of establishing a forum in which education sector 
groups participated to consider future policy directions was hardly 
novel. Regular consultation and interacti0n between the former 
Education Department and sector groups had been the modus operandi 
in education prior to the ascendance of provider-capture10 arguments 
in the mid-1980s. So as an organisational form, a sector-wide 
consultative group was an historically legitimated strategy - and one 
that had been consistently called for by the teacher unions. Overall, 
though, four different perspectives were discernible concerning the 
source of the idea for the SCG. 
by the government and the education sector. Trialling did not require a firm 
commitment to the policy, whereas phasing in did. 
9 The only opposition to bulk funding acknowledged in the 1991 Budget education policy 
statement, however, was that of the school trustees. 
10 The exclusion of education sector groups from input into government policy applied 
only to those groups who were opposed to the direction of education restructuring - most 
obviously the PPTA and NZEI. Other groups, such as the Association of Integrated 
Schools, headed by Pat Lynch, still had access to the Minister over the period of major 
restructuring in the late 1980s as well as throughout the early 1990s when 
communication appeared to have broken down completely between the Minister and 
the unions. In fact, the input of certain groups which previously had no claim to policy 
input was actively sought from 1992 onwards in order to bolster support for government 
policy. 
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The first attributed the impetus for its formation to Les Maxwell, who 
in 1992 was the newly-elected president of the STAll. While the 
teacher unions had always argued against their general exclusion from 
policy development and the management of change, and thus were 
always advocates of a return to consultative forums, it was Maxwell 
who was responsible for approaching the Minister of Education and 
suggesting that the SCG be established. Indeed, the reporting of the 
intention to form the SCG confirmed that, publicly at least, its 
establishment was the combined effort of both the government and the 
School Trustees' Association (The Press 7.9.92). 
There were clear parallels being drawn at this time by the STA, and 
also the PPTA, between the difficulties the National government had 
faced with the mass protests at the increases to the National 
Superannuation surcharge12 contained in the 1991 budget, and the 
conflict occurring in education over bulk funding. The establishment 
of a multi-party Superannuation Accord, designed to find a consensus 
solution to the problem of superannuation, was a potential model for 
the resolution of conflict in the education sector that 'shone like a 
beacon' (Cooney, in The Press 19.11.93). As a result of Maxwell's 
approach to the Minister, discussions took place between Maxwell, 
Smith and the Minister of State Services, Bill Birch, to find 'ways in 
which groups such as NZSTA [could] have a more significant input 
into government's consideration of school funding issues' 
(O'Rourke13 to Smith 30.9.92). The outcome of these discussions was 
the decision to form the Schools Consultative Group. 
A second perspective on the origin of the SCG identified the Minister 
of Education as initiator of the group - a view he promoted. Prompted 
by the need to advance the reform of education, which up until 1992 
had been resisted by the teacher unions with varying success, Smith 
11 Unfortunately, Les Maxwell did not respond to several requests for his input into this 
research and was, thus, not able to confirm this version of events. 
12 The tax rate on superannuitants' personal income designed to claw back government 
superannuation. Introduced by Labour in 1985, state-provided pensions fully abated at 
$71,000 for married couples and $43,000 for a single person. In the 1991 budget, 
National lowered the income thresholds for full abatement to $23,700 and $16,200 
respectively. The outrage this measure provoked from superannuitants forced the 
government to back down. From 1992 the income levels were modified to $54,940 and 
$35,908 (Kelsey 1995:289). . 
13 Maris O'Rourke was Secretary for Education at the time. 
149 
established the SCG in order to break through the impasse that had 
been reached. In his 'State of the Nation's Education' speech to the 
Wellington Central Rotary Club he observed: 
As it turned out, 1992 was not a good year for education in 
New Zealand. The mistrust between the government and 
the teacher unions ... did not dissipate. If anything it 
intensified, and by the end of the year I realised there was a 
need for a new approach in the management of change. 
Associated with this view are clear images of the Minister as the, by 
then, frustrated voice of reason and advocate of progress in education 
understandably losing patience with the recalcitrance and short-
sightedness of the 'cloth-capped' teacher unions. Not surprisingly, 
Smith was promoting this view as recently as February 1996, claiming, 
in response to a letter from the President of the PPTA, Martin Cooney, 
that he was personally responsible for the establishment of the SCG. 
The involvement of Lockwood Smith, as Minister of Education, in the 
formation of the SCG can scarcely be disputed. There is, however, very 
little evidence to suggest that he actively sought, was pivotal in or 
supportive of, its establishment. Indeed, what evidence there is 
concerning the Minister's involvement would suggest a quite contrary 
view. As a perspective on the SCG's formation, then, this view 
perhaps demonstrates more about the extent to which history can be 
reconstructed in a politically more complimentary light than it does 
about the actual role the Minister played. 
There is a third view of the formation of the SCG which could most 
usefully be described as the 'kingmaker' perspective of the PPTA. 
According to this view the PPTA were responsible, not for the specific 
initiative to form the SCG, but rather the shaping of the environment 
in which the establishment of an SCG-like forum was the only sensible 
outcome. With a strategy that took full advantage of the PPTA's dual 
role as both union and professional association, they pressed the 
Ministers of Education and State Services for a collective process at the 
political level through which the various disputes in the education 
sector could be settled in a professional manner, while simultaneously 
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conducting a campaign of militant industrial action. This was a 
deliberate strategy adopted by the PPTA to attract support for their 
actions. It was a strategy designed to make the developing conflict in 
education appear the outcome of the Minister's intransigence in the 
face of their reasonable requests for 'professional' involvement, and 
thereby make Smith look responsible for the hostilities. 
As part of the process of creating a suitable context for the formation of 
the SCG, the PPTA was instrumental in encouraging the idea of an 
SCG-like forum with Les Maxwell. According to the president at the 
time, Martin Cooney (interview 27.10.94), the PPTA maintained a high 
level of communication with the STA, with the explicit strategy of: 
pushing [the idea] into them all the time - 'can't we have a 
group to deal with [bulk funding] like they did superan, can't 
we treat bulk funding like ... isn't it like superannuation '. So 
while we had no direct influence ... 
There is a fourth, implicit, perspective on the formation of the SCG, 
related more to the political environment at the time, and one which 
sheds some important light on the role of the Minister of Education. 
According to this view, the SCG was not established at the explicit 
behest of the Minister, but was imposed on him by the Prime Minister, 
Jim Bolger, and the Minister of State Services at the time, Bill Birch. 
According to Kevin Bunker of the PPTA, Smith, by mid-1992, was 
prepared to heed advice given to him by his Ministry and simply 
impose bulk funding, in spite of the conflict the policy was generating. 
Bolger and Birch, however, were concerned that the consequences of 
friction in the education sector would be reaped electorally if bulk 
funding was implemented this way; a general election was barely 
twelve months away and reforms in other sectors were also generating 
considerable electorate hostility. The Prime Minister was known to be 
particularly angry, too, that the Salaries Grant for Management had 
been introduced in his absence; at the time he was overseas attending a 
South Pacific Forum meeting (The Press 27.7.92). 
These issues concerning political legitimacy were alluded to by both the 
PPTA and the NZEI. The involvement of the Prime Minister was 
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demonstrated, it is claimed, by the appointment of John Anderson 
(later Sir John Anderson) as chairman - who,at the time of the 
formation of the SCG, was Chief Executive of the National Bank of 
New Zealand, 'dissident member of the NZ Business Roundtable' 
(Jesson 1995:451), member of the Prime Minister's Enterprise Council, 
influential member of the National Party and close personal friend of 
the Prime Minister. It is fairly clear, too, that from what little official 
information is available from the Ministry of Education, the 
involvement of senior members of the government other than 
Lockwood Smith, in particular Jim Bolger and Bill Birch, was quite 
extensive and most unusual. Indeed, the PPTA and the NZEI 
representatives negotiated their participation, as well as the terms of 
reference for the SCG, directly with Birch. 
While this view relies rather heavily on the personal perceptions or 
speculations of those involved in the formation of the SCG, it could be 
considered in this context as the informed reflections and impressions 
of individuals closely involved at the political level with the 
restructuring in education. Given that this view reflects negatively 
upon the Minister of Education, if any corroborative evidence existed, 
it is not likely to ever see the light of day. 
SCG Appointment Process 
Chairperson: John Anderson 
The process of appointment of the chairperson to the group is not 
particularly transparent. What is clear, though, is that John Anderson 
was not top of the list of preferred candidates of any MOE or SSC 
officials who sought to lobby the Minister of Education for their choice 
of chairperson. The thrust of advice to the Minister regarding the 
selection of chairperson was that, given the 'large and diverse nature 
of the group an independent chairperson would seem desirable' 
(O'Rourke to Smith 30.9.92). Detailed in Appendix C of this letter were 
suggestions for where such a candidate might be found. The first 
option was an Associate Minister who would be able to ensure 
government policy was 'understood' by the group. Unfortunately, the 
drawback of this option was the possibility that this person might be 
compromised by potential opposition to government policies that may 
be articulated by the group. 
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The second option, judging by the positive language it was couched in, 
appeared to be the option most favoured by the Ministry of Education: 
a former senior government official. The obvious benefit of this 
option was that 'such a person would understand the government 
process, and take direction from you' (emphasis added). For the 
Ministry, not surprisingly, there was nothing to detract from this 
option. The third option was for a community figure, someone 
'involved in education administration, but not schools'14 (ibid). John 
Anderson was the only nomination identifiable in this category; the 
rest were deleted 15. The positive aspect of this option cited by the 
Ministry was the high profile such a chairperson might bring to the 
group. The negative aspect, however, was the potential that such a 
person 'may be less inclined to follow your [that is, the Minister of 
Education's] direction' (ibid). The fourth and final option was an 
independent consultant,on which the Ministry of Education had little 
to say, although the language used was revealing; this option was 
labelled a 'complete outsider'. 
On the 6 October 1992, the Ministry of Education and State Services 
Commission made a further joint eleventh-hour bid to the Minister of 
Education for the appointment of a current or former senior 
government official. Indeed, this was the only option presented for the 
Minister's consideration. While the names of these possible 
candidates were all deleted from the official documentation, a further 
letter on 12 October from the MOE to the Minister indicates that two of 
the people on the list suggested by officials16 had, in fact, been 
approached to ascertain their availability - an approach approved by 
both Smith and Birch. Neither were available, however. Given the 
unavailability of the two preliminary candidates, officials suggested the 
next step should be to consider an ex-official. Failing this, their second 
14 John Anderson is, in fact, chairperson of Wellington College's board of trustees. 
Presumably this advice was intended to exclude anybody who might have a teaching 
background. 
15 The release of any names other than Anderson's was, according to the Minister 'not 
in the public interest'. 
16 It is not clear whether the two candidates were from the initial list drawn up by the 
Ministry of Education, or the list of government officials drawn up by the MOE and the 
sse. There is also the distinct possibility these two were drawn from a list not made 
available. 
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suggestion was a business person (identified as John Anderson) or, 
thirdly, a university person17. 
Only a few members interviewed referred to the process of Anderson's 
appointment. Those that did, though, all consistently identified 
Anderson as Bolger's appointment - given Anderson's close personal 
ties with both the National Party and the Prime Minister, this is of no 
surprise. Indeed, it seems to have been such common knowledge that 
it was not necessary for it to be 'revealed', as it were, in the interviews 
of other members. According to Joanna Beresford of the NZEI 
(interview 6.10.94), the fact that Anderson was appointed by Bolger was 
a contributing factor to the considerable tensions that surrounded the 
operation of the group: 
... basically, Bolger, Birch and Lockwood 
involved with the setting up [of the SeG]. 
Smith were 
The Group, 
through the chairperson, reported to Lockwood Smith. But 
the chairperson was actually appointed by and accountable to 
the Prime Minister. So there were, through the processes, 
meetings with Bolger, Birch and Lockwood Smith. So it 
wasn't just Lockwood Smith's committee - and that led to 
tensions on the part of officials. 
The dual accountability was also a factor alluded to by Martin Cooney 
of the PPTA, although he speculated on the tensions this created for 
the Prime Minister, not just government officials. On the one hand, 
the SCG (via Anderson) were providing the Prime Minister with a 
particular perspective on the resolution of the issues referred to it; 
while on the other, the Ministry was advising its Minister (who, 
presumably, was advising Cabinet) often to the contrary. 
While John Anderson ran a distant third as a prospective chairperson 
for MOE and SSC officials, their appeals to Smith for the appointment 
of a government official were falling on the wrong ears. It was quite 
clear that most SCG members interviewed believed the appointment 
of chairperson was not the Minister's to make; rather it was the Prime 
17 Dr Dean Halford of Massey University, although not mentioned by name in this 
correspondence, was appointed as Deputy Chairperson. 
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Minister's, Jim Bolger. Given the prevalence of the view that Smith 
was fundamentally opposed to the formation of the SCG, the risk of an 
ideological appointment by him, on the advice of his officials, could 
not be taken by the government. Such a move had the potential to not 
only undermine the government's ability to demonstrate a genuine 
commitment to the resolution of education conflict, but also to 
undermine the future operation of the SCG, particularly in view of the 
general election that was to be held in 1993. Furthermore, and more 
crucially perhaps, the appointment of a chairperson by, or with 
affiliations to, a Minister of Education so publicly committed to 
implementing the policy being debated within the SCG, would present 
a clear disincentive to those education sector groups whose 
participation in the SCG was vital to its legitimacy. Unfortunately, as 
noted in Chapter V, Anderson declined to be interviewed on the 
grounds that he merely chaired the meetings of the SCG - an 
extraordinarily apolitical view of a very political exercise, although 
understandable given the context in which the SCC operated. 
Anderson's reluctance to discuss his involvement was shared by all 
government officials who took part in the SCC, and even by some who 
did not18, and who were contacted for interviews. All declined. 
Education Sector Groups 
Having accepted the idea of establishing an SCC-like forum, 
invitations to participate in the Croup were issued after discussions 
between the representatives of various education sector groups, Smith 
and Birch. According to Ministry correspondence, formal invitations 
to participate were first issued to the STA, the PPTA and the NZEI 
(Perris and Martin to Smith and Birch 6.10.92) as the major 'stake-
holder' groups in education. A provisional membership list, however, 
was contained in a letter from Maris O'Rourke, Secretary for 
Education, to Smith on 30 September 1992, in which it was stated: 
The organisations that have been invited (at least 
informally) to join the Consultative Group are NZST A, 
18 The coyness bordered on paranoia with one MOE official. When contacted with a 
preliminary query about how to obtain information on the SCG, they suggested 
contacting the secretariat. However, I was further informed that should I disclose my 
contact with them, they would deny all knowledge. A curious position given they were 
not involved with the SCG directly, but merely knew the Ministry officials who were. 
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SP ANZ19, PPTA Principals (sic) Council, Area Schools (sic) 
Association, Intermediate School Principals (sic) Association, 
NZ Principals (sic) Federation, NZEI Primary Principals (sic) 
Advisory Committee, Association of Proprietors of 
Integrated Schools, and NZEI. Ministers met with PPTA to 
discuss their involvement. 
In the letter to the Minister of Education from Perris and Martin dated 
6 October, both NZEI and PPTA membership of the SCG was 
confirmed: 
NZEI and PPT A have been formally invited to take part and 
have accepted that invitation. Representatives of principals' 
groups have been told that principals' groups also will be 
represented but no invitations have yet been issued. 
In apparent contradiction to the letter from O'Rourke of 30 September, 
though, Perris and Martin claimed that: 
Although NZSTA, NZEI and PPTA have been invited to 
participate, no decisions have yet been made about the 
numbers of members from each organisation, or about other 
members of the group. 
The PPTA at this time had already been in contact with John Anderson 
who had acted as an intermediary between the PPTA and the State 
Services Commission in relation to the stalled collective contract 
negotiations. Prior to the formation of the SCG, Anderson again 
played a significant intermediary role between government officials 
and the PPTA. Given the extent to which the relationship between the 
PPTA and the Minister of Education had broken down, as the strike 
action and moratorium on curriculum reforms were in place, it was 
reasonably clear a third party would be required to facilitate 
negotiations between the two in order for the PPTA to join the SCG. 
Before the PPTA could be formally invited, according to Kevin Bunker 
(interview 6.10.94), they were required to make some concessions: 'that 
19 the Secondary Principals' Association of New Zealand. 
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we ceased industrial action, and the threat thereof, and agreed to 
participate in a genuine kind of way.' 
According to Kevin Bunker (ibid), the PPTA deliberated at length 
whether or not to participate in the SCG: 
... the Executive, it would be fair to say, debated long and hard 
whether or not to go with that approach because the 
experience of recent years had said that the only way to, shall 
we say, hold ground was by fairly deep and bitter struggle. 
The argument, I suppose, that persuaded them at the end of 
the day was that we [were] capable of long and bitter struggle, 
[but] we ourselves had been articulating publicly that long 
and bitter struggle isn I t the answer. So, to give some 
credibility to our position, we were more or less stuck. 
While the participation of the PPTA was brokered through John 
Anderson, the participation of the NZEI was the result of several direct 
meetings with the Ministers involved: Bill Birch, Lockwood Smith, 
Roger McLay, at the time Associate Minister of Education, as well as 
various government officials. Given that the NZEI had settled their 
employment contracts and had conducted generally less militant 
campaigns of opposition, negotiating participation in the SCG was 
comparatively straightforward in that they were able to conduct 
discussions with government ministers directly. Unlike the PPTA, 
there were no particular impediments to their participation, except, of 
course, for the general reluctance of the government to involve or 
consult with any group over issues of policy. 
Although the NZEI were aware that its participation in the SCG, in the 
words of its representative, Joanna Beresford, 'could be seen to let the 
government off the hook' in terms of the public anger directed towards 
politicians at this time, it was aware that exclusion from the political 
arena meant little opportunity for input into the future direction of 
education policy (interview 6.10.94). The Schools Consultative Group 
gave the NZEI the opportunity it had been demanding for inclusion in 
the policy process. And although the SCG was not perfect, it offered a 
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more constructive solution than continuing with hostilities 'in 
isolation from trying to influence the policy process' (ibid). 
For the teacher unions, the government's formation of the sec was a 
fait accompli of sorts. Both unions had argued against their wholesale 
exclusion from the policy and restructuring process on the grounds 
they were merely self-interested. Teachers were education 
professionals and, as such, had a legitimate part to play in policy 
development and the management of change. Furthermore, without 
teacher involvement in and support for educational reform, the 
process would inevitably be conflictual. Both unions had argued, too, 
that the specific conflicts that had arisen during 1992 would be solved 
only when appropriate consultative processes were established 
between themselves and the government. Thus, the invitation to 
participate in the sec was not only a test of union commitment to 
resolving the specific conflicts of 1992, but also a test of their credibility. 
Understandably, both unions were sceptical of the commitment of 
either the Minister of Education or his Ministry to negotiate a solution 
to the problem of bulk funding, given the determined support of both 
for the policy. Moreover, the sec would effectively remove the 
conflict in education from the public arena, and thereby spare the 
government continued embarrassment; in effect, the complete 
antithesis of the PPTA's strategy. As Kevin Bunker pointed out, 
though, the PPTA were of a mind that 'if it works, then it's 
constructive; if it doesn't, then we know where we stand' (interview 
6.10.94)20. 
With industrial relations issues at the heart of the dispute between 
teachers and the government, the STA and the unions were essential 
participants, as employer and employee organisations, if the outcomes 
of sec negotiations were to have legitimacy. While opposition to bulk 
funding was presented by the unions as a professional concern to 
maintain a high quality, state-funded education system, it was, at the 
same time, an industrial conflict over pay, working conditions and the 
continuation of collective contracts, to be settled by negotiations 
20 According to one unnamed source, however, there were grave concerns within the 
PPTA at this time over its ability to sustain the levels of opposition. Thus the issue of 
participation was never really in question. 
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between the parties to the dispute - the government, school trustees 
and teachers. The appointment of other groups to the SCG, however, 
was viewed, according to the PPTA, as 'an appeasement to Dr Smith, to 
allow him to determine who else would be there'. From Ministry 
documentation it was evident that, on advice from both the Ministry 
of Education and the State Services Commission, Smith acted to 
ensure the membership of the group was intentionally weighted in 
order to neutralise the influence of the two teacher unions. This 
deliberate stacking of the SCG ensured that advocates of bulk funding, 
within the SCG, had a proportionally greater representation than 
would ordinarily be warranted; some of the pro-bulk funding members 
had no organised constituency, yet were given proportionally the same 
input into SCG deliberations as the two teacher unions and the STA. 
Concern was evident in· official correspondence at the initial stage of 
formation over the composition of the group in terms of its 
representation of 'other viewpoints'. According to O'Rourke 
(O'Rourke to Smith 30.9.92), both the Ministry of Education and SSC 
expressed: 
... concerns about the relative strengths of employer-
management interests as against employee-union interests 
within the group. In practice, we expect most of the 
principals I representatives to side with the unions against 
bulk funding and against SCM. 
As already indicated, the PPTA Principals' Council and the NZEI 
Primary Principals' Advisory Committee (along with NZ Principals' 
Federation and the Intermediate School Principals' Association) were 
among the original list of groups to which informal invitations to 
participate had been extended by the Minister. However, in the same 
letter, O'Rourke suggested to Smith that: 
You might wish to exclude PPT A Principals I Council and 
NZEI Principals I Advisory Committee from membership. It 
would be possible to further strengthen the employer side by 
including membership from the State Services 
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Commission's Industrial Relations and Structures and 
Systems Branches (emphasis in original). 
Apart from fearing the alignment of Principals' groups with the 
teacher unions, the Ministry of Education and the State Services 
Commission (Perris and Martin to Smith and Birch 6.10.92) were also 
concerned that: 
'" the group should have sufficient representation of other 
interests to balance the views of the teacher unions. In 
addition to the groups already mentioned we suggest that the 
SCG also include people from the TSG21 trial schools ... 
While the Ministry took the ostensibly reasonable line of pointing out 
that representation from the TSG trial schools was justified on the 
grounds that such schools were the only ones within the compulsory 
state education sector to have any direct experience of bulk funding, 
the underlying reason was clearly revealed in further correspondence 
from the Ministry of Education to the Minister (12.10.92)22: 
The people suggested to fill this role are [David Jackson, 
Board Chairperson, Churchill Park Primary School and Phil 
Raffills, Principal, Avondale College]. Both are committed to 
the concept of full self-management. [Avondale] was one of 
the first schools in the trial and [Phil Raffills '] recent 
experience in visiting Grant Maintained Schools in Britain 
will be very useful to counter the views of ....... 23 ....... . 
Concerns were raised, too, about keeping the size of the group 
manageable - to the extent that some of the invitations initially 
extended and accepted were, in fact, withdrawn24. In addition to their 
21 Teachers' Salaries Grant - the official name for bulk funding. 
22 Although the text of this letter had been edited prior to its release under the 
Official Information Act, it was possible in places to discern some of the information 
that had been deleted. The 'reconstructed' material is indicated by square brackets. 
23 While this name has also been deleted, and cannot be discerned completely, an 
educated guess would identify this person as Kevin Bunker of the PPTA. 
24 The Intermediate School Principals' Association had, by 12 October, received and 
accepted an invitation from Birch and Smith to participate in the SCG. The invitation 
was later withdrawn (Perris to Smith 12.10.92). 
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recommendation to exclude both the PPTA and the NZEI Principals' 
Associations, Ministry officials considered that the interests of the 
Intermediate Principals could be adequately represented by the NZ 
Principals' Federation. Area School representation was also deemed 
unnecessary; their concerns could be adequately represented by the 
STA. 
The Intermediate Principals' Association (NZISP A) objected strongly 
to their exclusion, however, and endeavoured, in the months 
following the establishment of the group, to persuade the Minister to 
reconsider the withdrawal of their initial invitation. After meetings 
and correspondence with the Minister, Smith did accept there was an 
independent role the Association could play within the SCG (Sutcliffe, 
interview 26.10.94). As a result, John Sutcliffe, as president of NZISPA, 
formally joined the Schools Consultative Group on 28 April 1993, 
albeit six months after its establishment. Appointment of a 
representative from the Maori community was also suggested by the 
Ministry. The organisations that were eventually represented at the 
first full SCG meeting on October 22 1992 were: NZSTA; NZ Secondary 
Principals' Association; NZ Principals' Federation; NZEI; PPTA; 
Association of Proprietors of Integrated Schools; and bulk-funded trial 
schools (for full membership details refer Appendix II). 
A representative from the Independent Schools Council25 , Jan Kerr, 
was also appointed to the SCG in January 1993. The reason for the 
appointment of an additional member was not clear in official 
documentation available from either the Ministry of Education or the 
SCG. Nor was it possible to ascertain the reason for the appointment 
from Jan Kerr herself, as she declined to be interviewed on the 
grounds that it 'would not be profitable' to do so. It would be 
speculative only but, by this stage, 'imbalances' in the representation of 
some views may have become apparent, resulting in the recruitment 
of an additional countervailing voice. 
In addition to representatives from education sector groups, it was 
proposed by the Ministry of Education and the State Services 
Commission that their officials, as well as those from the Treasury and 
25 Essentially, the association for private schools in NZ. 
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the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, would attend 
meetings 'as observers' only, in order to 'retain their independent role 
of separate policy advice' (Perris and Martin to Smith and Birch 
6.10.92). However, between the suggested operating protocols dated 6 
October, and a revised set of protocols contained in a letter to the 
Minister dated 12 October, this view had been revised; officials had the 
' ... rights to attend all meetings of the group with full participation' 
(Perris to Smith 12.10.92). It is interesting to note, too, that in the 
protocols of 6 October, it was designated the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Education to provide secretariat services to the SCG. By 12 
October, the composition of the secretariat had been amended to 
include officials from the Ministry of Education, the State Services 
Commission and Treasury. It was this secretariat that was later 
replaced by John Anderson, who arranged for the formation and 
funding of an independent secretariat. 
Contrary to Ministry and SSC advice regarding the composition of the 
SCG, the NZEI ended up with two representatives, much to the 
consternation of some members. From the outset, Neville Lambert 
was the official NZEI delegate on the SCG. However, his sudden death 
in July 1993 meant that an immediate replacement needed to be found. 
Joanna Beresford, who had been a frequent temporary participant of 
the SCG as an advisor to Lambert, took over until the NZEI National 
Executive elected another representative, Bruce Adin. But at the 
request of the chairperson, John Anderson, Beresford remained as a 
member of the group, thereby giving the NZEI two positions instead of 
the original one envisaged by the Ministry. Not surprisingly, there 
were strong objections to this26 . 
Issues of Representation 
Concerns were expressed by several participants in the SCG over its 
composition in terms of the adequacy of its representation of views in 
the education sector. According to Joanna Beresford of the NZEI 
(interview 6.10.94), the composition of the group was 'unbalanced': 
26 Discussion of events arising from these objections was removed at the request of the 
interviewee disclosing the material. 
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... there was clearly a role for PPTA and NZEI, clearly a role 
for STA, clearly a role for officials, but beyond that I think 
you're beginning to get a little bit questionable. When you 
extend it out to ... a tiny minority, then you're reaching 
slightly ludicrous proportions. 
For some members, though, the issue of representation versus 
representativeness was irrelevant, and, indeed, was an issue not 
perceived by most members. Broadly construing the SCG as an 
education consultative group, not as a mechanism for resolving an 
industrial relations impasse, the majority of participants interviewed 
believed the membership of the group reflected fairly the views of the 
education sector as a whole, and saw the diversity of views as one of 
the strengths of the group. Quite clearly, though, the representation of 
a variety of views rendered problematic the notion of proportionality 
or of fairly representing the extent to which particular views were 
shared or opposed throughout the education sector. Furthermore, it 
introduced into what was essentially a forum for industrial 
negotiation, the minority views of particular interests in the education 
sector that ordinarily would have no part in contract settlement. As 
mentioned earlier, however, the constitution of the SCG in this way 
was a deliberate strategy of the Minister and his officials to manipulate 
membership in order to neutralise the views of the teacher unions. 
The issue of representation versus representativeness was alluded to by 
John Fleming of the NZ Principals' Federation. In response to a 
question of how representative the group was, he responded: 
Undoubtedly it is. I don't know of any group in the 
education sector that wasn't represented there. That doesn't 
mean necessarily that the outcomes of the SCG were 
representative of the education sector - you've got 22-24 
people, maybe more, seated around the full SCG meeting 
table. It was identified and discussed that there was over-
representation from the Unions in some cases (interview 
26.20.94). 
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David Jackson, the chairperson of the board of trustees of a 
participating trial schoot in answer to a question concerning how his 
membership was decided, responded: 
I'm not sure. The reason I was there was because I'm the 
chairman of a board of trustees of a bulk funded 
school.. .. [T]he Ministry of Education had had a meeting of 
the bulk funded schools when we were isolated and alone in 
the world, being criticised by every man and his dog .... [W]ell, 
they had these meetings to make sure we knew what was 
going on. So basically I was there representing bulk funded 
schools, but in actual fact I don't believe I did represent them 
because there was no organisational structure for me to refer 
back to (interview 12.10.94). 
Phil Raffills, as the principal of a bulk funded trial school, was in the 
same position. While there was a loose constituency of the schools 
participating in the trial, they were not organised into an identifiable 
structure whose collective concerns were able to be represented. So 
while Raffills saw his role on the SCG 'very clearly as saying what [is] 
actually happening in my school and in bulk funded schools, this is 
how bulk funding is working' (interview 29.9.94), his input was 
limited largely to his own personal experience of the success or 
otherwise of the triaP7. According to David Jackson, while there was 
some attempt made towards the end of the life of the SCG to get 'a 
lobby group going of the bulk funded schools' (interview 12.10.94), this 
attempt to organise was of limited success in terms of representing 
other views of the trial within the forum of the SCG, given that it 
occurred after the bulk of the work of the SCG had been completed. 
The issue of the size of the constituencies SCG members represented 
was of particular concern, not surprisingly, to the teacher unions. With 
27 This point is clearly illustrated in minutes of the sub-group established to consider 
the vexed question of salary funding mechanisms. At a meeting held in August 1993, 
John Anderson tabled a discussion paper in which he outlined a possible framework for 
an 'official' position for the group. The minutes record that various members undertook 
to refer the paper back to their particular organisation for feedback. Phil Raffills 
registered an immediate objection to one particular clause on behalf of the bulk funding 
trial schools. 
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their combined constituencies numbering approximately 35,000 
teachers, as Kevin Bunker of the PPTA pointed out: 
in terms of the weighting of numbers, essentially you had 
some people representing just themselves - if you cared to be 
gracious, they might have represented another five or six 
people. Whereas we, the NZEI and STA, represented a 
constituency and had an internal accountability .... [The 
membership1 was stacked, if I could use that word, with 
(looking back in light of more recent experience) what I've 
come to call the pro-bulk funding, pro-choice, non-aligned 
groups (interview 6.10.94). 
While the NZEI raised the issue of constituency representation at 
other political forums, it was never raised formally within the SCG. 
Given that the membership imbalance had been deliberately 
engineered by the Minister and his officials, it was extremely unlikely 
that action to redress it would be taken28. 
Strategic Selectivity and the Representation of Interests 
The process of establishing the SCG, when considered as an example of 
bipartite sectoral-level corporatism, demonstrates precisely a dual 
dilemma frequently encountered by corporatist groupings: that is the 
dilemma of delimiting constituencies and of determining 
proportionality of representation - in short, which interest groups get 
to participate in corporatist groupings and how much power ought 
they to wield in the decision-making process. 
The question of delimiting constituencies of interest to participate in 
corporatist bodies lies at the heart of the criticism of corporatism as an 
elitist form of state-group relations. As Linz (1975) points out, the 
involvement of pre-existing and organised interests in corporatist 
relationships immediately exposes the very unequal capacities of 
interests to be represented. Without wishing to labour an obvious 
point, an interest group needs to be organised in order to have an their 
interest represented via a corporatist arrangement with the state. Quite 
28 An underlying reason for not pursuing the issue of representation formally within the 
SCG was removed from this account at the request of the interviewee who disclosed it. 
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clearly those interests that are unorganised or difficult to mobilise, 
unless specifically defined, organised and licensed by the state itself29, 
remain outside the purview of such structures and hence are in effect 
denied the opportunity of representation through corporatist means. 
In relation to the SCG, consumers of educational services, for example 
parents, students or employers, would have an obvious interest in the 
outcome of deliberations concerning the future direction of education 
policy - assuming, of course, that this was the purpose of establishing 
the SCG. Consumers, however, have a diversity of interests, are 
fragmented and dispersed throughout civil society. As such, they are 
difficult to organise into a monopolistic representational form 
amenable to inclusion in a corporatist-type body. More importantly, 
though, consumers have no functional significance in the education 
system, that is they wield little power in terms of the delivery of 
education, and thus have no capacity to sanction the state for non-
inclusion. Without immediate power to compel the state to 
acknowledge them as legitimate participants within an organisation 
such as the SCG, there is no need for their inclusion. As consumers, 
their input into questions of policy in relation to education, and indeed 
in other areas of policy, occur at the ballot box and are, perhaps, better 
captured by a more pluralistic framework of analysis. 
A more significant problem in relation to the Schools Consultative 
Group, however, was the issue of attribution of power to member 
groups in the decision-making process, a problem identified 
particularly by the representatives of the NZEI and the PPTA. 
Decisions of political weight can be made on several grounds - for 
example, according to membership numbers of constituent groups or 
of perceptions of functional importance or significance of a group to a 
particular corporatist arrangement. In the constitution of the Schools 
Consultative Group it is plain that the latter criterion prevailed, as 
determined by the Minister of Education, in the attribution of equal 
weighting to all members of the group in spite of the size of the 
constituencies they represented. This was of clear benefit to the 
representatives who were selected on the grounds of their experience 
29 This is, of course, a characteristic of forms of corporatism usually associated with 
more authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. 
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in the bulk funding trial and whose constituents numbered 
significantly fewer than the membership of the teacher unions. 
However, again according to Linz (1975), there are no obvious or 
rational criteria on which to base decisions of proportionality or 
weighting of influence. But, as demonstrated quite clearly by the 
process of selection of SCG members, proportionality particularly was 
an issue to be resolved according to political, not obvious or rational, 
criteria. It was also an issue intimately linked to political expectations 
concerning the outcome of the decision-making process as well as to 
the purposes for which the SCG, as a political strategy, was formed. It is 
clear that the Group was established to deal with a particular set of 
conflicts arising out of what were patently industrial relations issues. 
The appearance of the group, however, indicated a quite different set of 
issues were being dealt with; broader educational issues on which the 
education sector felt legitimately entitled to be consulted. 
The discrepancy between the appearance and the reality of the SCG, 
however, was not something the teacher unions could draw formal 
attention to. As Jesson (1995) has pointed out, the unions were caught 
between their role as industrial organisations and their need to look 
'professional'. The Schools Consultative Group was, in reality, focused 
on issues that concerned the unions' industrial function, yet sheltered 
behind a broader set of educational, or 'professional' concerns. The 
unions could not protest against the composition of the group, as a 
collection of professionals considering various educational issues, 
because to do so would reveal their industrial relations agenda, and 
expose the 'professional' position that they, too, were sheltering 
behind, in relation to the conflicts of 1992. Jesson (1995) has referred to 
this tension in the PPTA as a form of 'rational opportunism'. 
Given that the constitution of the SCG was determined by political 
criteria, then, questions regarding the process of selection, 
representation and attribution of power within it can only be answered 
by a closer examination of the state itself. More specifically, by viewing 
corporatist arrangements as a particular configuration of interest 
representation and intervention, the Schools Consultative Group can 
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be effectively analysed within the framework of what Jessop (1990) has 
termed the strategic selectivity of the state. 
Jessop employs the concept of strategic selectivity in order to 
demonstrate the non-neutrality of the state and how particular forms 
of interest representation produce 'functionally unequal and 
asymmetrical effects on the ability of different social forces to realise 
their interests through political action' (in Barrow 1993:67). While not 
a structural characteristic of the state itself, strategic selectivity is the 
outcome of the dialectic relationship between state structures and past 
strategies adopted towards it by various groups which, amongst other 
things, has the effect of favouring access into the political arena of 
some interests over others3o. Echoing this view of corporatism as a 
biased filter on interest representation, Weber, too, (1968) identifies one 
of its latent functions as permitting the 'disenfranchising [of] certain 
strata' (in Linz 1975:309). 
The main point to be taken from Jessop's notion of state selectivity in 
relation to the formation of the Schools Consultative Group is that if 
the state is not neutral, then corporatism, as a form of interest 
representation operating in conjunction with it, cannot be neutral 
either. Corporatism as a manifestation of strategic selectivity, 
however, begs the question of which particular interests are favoured 
by such an arrangement. According to Linz (1975:310), in a context in 
which corporatism is the mode of interest representation: 
... power ultimately ends up in a ruling group that organises 
the system, delimits its constituencies, assigns the share in 
representation, arbitrates conflicts between interests, and 
decides all those issues on which the representatives have 
no basis for choice. 
Williamson (1985), endorsing the arguments of both Jessop and Linz, 
also views corporatist arrangements as constraining or enabling what 
can be done within them, to the benefit of whoever has the capacity to 
30 The question of precisely which interests are privileged is, according to Jessop, one 
that needs to be answered empirically in relation to a specific state at a particular 
historical conjuncture. 
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constitute such an arrangement. In the instance of the SCG, and 
according to Linz's criteria, the power to organise the group, to select 
participants as well as to attribute influence to member groups within 
the decision-making process, was firmly located within the arena of the 
state. The question that remains to be answered, therefore, is what 
interests of the state or of its agents were being advanced through the 
SCG and what interests were 'disenfranchised'. 
It seems wholly naive to suggest, however, that the deliberate 
'stacking' of the SCG with supporters of government policy was going 
to produce a resolution to the conflict evident in education in 1992 -
that a simple majority in favour of bulk funding, for example, would 
provide the government with sufficient support for it to continue its 
education agenda for increasing the level of school self-management 
unimpeded. If the SCG was, in fact, a corporatist strategy, then it was 
only ever going to be very 'weakly' corporatist. This raises the further 
question of quite what the government intended to achieve with the 
formation of the SCG, given that the outcomes of a weakly corporatist 
process would prove difficult to sustain. Was it genuine consultation 
or simply a stand-off between the government and the teacher unions, 
a public reprieve for the government to exploit with work 'behind the 
scenes' to advance its educational agenda. Or was it an exercise in 
political risk management, a wider government strategy made 
necessary by a Minister's intransigent commitment to completing, as 
he saw it, the government's agenda for school self-management, in 
spite of overwhelming hostility to the processes by which this was 
being achieved? 
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CHAPTER VII: THE OPERATION OF THE SCHOOLS CONSULTATIVE GROUP 
Terms of Reference 
The Schools Consultative Group was formally convened for its first 
meeting on October 22, 1992. It was, according to some members, a 
predictably chilly and lengthy affair devoted, in large part, to discussing 
draft Terms of Reference and Operating Protocols. According to 
Ministry of Education correspondence with Minister, Lockwood Smith, 
the SCG was formally established to 'consider policies associated with 
school management, including funding reforms' (O'Rourke to Smith 
30.9.92). In a joint communication from the MOE and SSC to their 
Ministers at the beginning of October, however, the scope of SCG 
deliberations had been significantly narrowed and confined to 
providing advice to the Minister of Education 'on a range of matters 
concerned with the funding arrangements for teachers'salaries' (Perris 
and Martin to Smith and Birch 6.10.92). The terms of reference tabled 
for consideration at the first meeting confirmed the domain of the SCG 
as the funding of teachers' salaries. 
The terms of reference were initially developed as the result of direct 
negotiations between the Ministers of Education and State Services, the 
STA and the NZEI (Perris and Martin to Smith and Birch 6.10.92). In 
several communications from officials to the Ministers of Education 
and State Services prior to the convening of the group, the initial 
terms of reference negotiated between Smith, Birch, the STA and the 
NZEI were appended: 
To advise, evaluate and make recommendations on: 
(a) the adequacy of current policies and practices of the 
funding arrangements for teacher salaries within the context 
of the 'Tomorrow's Schools' reforms. 
(b) the direction and future policy development on the 
funding arrangements for teacher salaries. 
(c) the mechanisms and resources for implementing any 
recommended changes. 
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Implicit in these terms of reference, the group will consider: 
• the teacher salaries grant trial; and 
• the salaries grant for management. 
The Group will receive regular reports from the Ministry of 
Education, including reports on the evaluation of the 
Teachers (sic) Salaries Grant Trial (ibid Appendix A). 
While the discussion of the terms of reference recorded in the minutes 
of the first meeting is extraordinarily abbreviated, the outcome was a 
significant modification, with the expansion of clause (a) and the 
addition of a whole new section. The amended clause read: 
To advise, evaluate and make recommendations on: 
(a) A set of principles within the context of the 'Tomorrow's 
Schools' reforms that should form the basis of an equitable 
and efficient funding scheme for the management of teacher 
salaries. 
(b) The extent to which current policies and practices meet 
these principles. 
The clauses (b) and (c) of the original terms were retained as (c) and (d). 
The original clause (a) was clearly an attempt by Smith and Birch to 
restrict the boundaries of the SCG in advance, and thus shape the 
outcome of the deliberations of the group. While the extent of salaries 
devolution within Tomorrow's Schools was ambiguous (vide Gordon 
1991), the existing system of centralised payment of teacher salaries was 
clearly contradictory to the National government's stated commitment 
to greater self-management for schools (Smith 1991). The amended 
terms of reference, however, introduced a space in which the adequacy 
of bulk funding, in terms of its 'equity and efficiency', could be 
evaluated. And although it is with the benefit of hindsight, the later 
difficulties of the SCG could be predicted from this quite significant 
departure from the terms of reference suggested by officials. 
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The modified terms formulated at that first meeting also contained a 
whole new section: 
The consultative group should have regard to the 
government's commitment: 
• To ensure excellence in educational outcomes by 
enhancing the knowledge, skills and aptitudes of 
students from the school sector; 
• To recognise school principals and teachers are the key 
element in ensuring that these outcomes are achieved; 
• To devolve operational management to Boards of 
Trustees, thus allowing schools to become more 
responsLVe to community priorities. 
The new terms of reference were thus of significantly broader scope 
than those originally negotiated between STA, NZEI, Birch and Smith, 
and included a number of clauses under which government policy, or 
specific government actions could be challenged. The new wording 
shifted the focus somewhat from the narrow industrial question of 
funding mechanisms for teacher salaries, towards a much wider focus 
on how 'excellence' in education could be achieved. In that respect, 
the new wording reflected the emerging 'modernisation' programme 
developed by the PPTA, although there is no direct evidence that it was 
this group that suggested the changes. Given that the PPTA did not 
appear to have significant input into negotiations for the initial terms 
of reference, however, it seems highly likely that the first full meeting 
of the group would provide an opportunity to make some 
amendments. 
Operating Protocols 
From official information obtained, it is quite clear that both the 
Ministry of Education and the State Services Commission were 
concerned to establish rules for the operation of the group which not 
only detailed specific ways in which the SCG would be conducted, but 
which also defined and delimited the relationship between the group 
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and government officials1. In a joint letter from MOE and sse officials 
to Smith and Birch, it was suggested that a set of operating protocols be 
formulated to augment the terms of reference. With no little irony, 
perhaps, given the subsequent expansion of the terms of reference, the 
initial terms of reference were considered too 'broad' and did not 
'provide sufficient guidance to the group or to officials to enable the 
group to be called together' (Perris and Martin to Smith and Birch 
6.10.92). The protocols were to cover such things as: 'reporting lines, 
media contacts, frequency of meetings [and] procedures covering 
requests to government departments' (ibid). The Ministry of 
Education was particularly concerned with the latter, and to ensure 
that it would 'not to be at the whim of the Group'2 (O'Rourke to Smith 
30.9.92). 
Preliminary operating protocols were appended to the letter from 
Perris and Martin (6.10.92) for Ministerial consideration: 
1. The sec is an advisory group to the Ministry (sic) of 
Education, and will report to the Minister through the 
group's chairperson. 
2. The group's sphere of advice is that covered by the agreed 
Terms of Reference. The group does not have the power to 
veto any decisions or implementation processes agreed by 
the government. 
3. No substantive comment is to be made to the news media 
on the work and internal discussions of the group. When 
media comment is deemed necessary by the chairperson, it 
can only be released by the chairperson. 
4. Members of the group, including the chairperson, are 
appointed by the Minister of Education. 
1 This concern was apparent to at least one or two members of the SCG; according to one 
person, 'the Ministry of Education obviously had a concern to make to sure the SCG 
headed in a direction which related to their vision of where we should go' 
(unattributable). 
2 Officials advised the Minister to recommend to the SCG that 'requests from the Group 
to the Ministry for reports or investigations' should be made via the Minister himself 
(O'Rourke to Smith 30.9.92). 
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5. A budget for the group will be established by the Ministry. 
A schedule of activities for the group will be determined by 
the chairperson within the constraints of the budget. 3 
6. Requests for information or reports from government 
departments, within the brief of the group, would normally 
be met by the officials associated with the group. Substantial 
requests outside the approved work programme of the 
department, or requests outside the brief of the group, would 
need to be referred to the responsible Minister for approval. 
7. The Ministry of Education will service the group, and 
officials of the Ministry, SSC, the Treasury, and the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet will have rights 
to attend all meetings of the group as observers. 
In one of the communications from officials, some friction was 
apparent between the Ministry and the State Services Commission 
over the SCG. The Ministry of Education was concerned that the SSC 
would be officially appointed to the group. Its inclusion, as employer 
representative, had been suggested as part of the strategy to ensure a 
membership that would counteract the views of the teacher unions 
(O'Rourke to Smith 30.9.92). The Ministry of Education was 
concerned, however, that '[t]here could be some awkwardness if the 
SSC was a formal member of the Group, while the Ministry was not' 
(ibid). Precisely what form this 'awkwardness' might take was not 
elaborated upon. Thus, the MOE and SSC jointly advised the Ministers 
of Education and State Services that, to ensure officials' ability to 
provide independent policy advice, representatives from government 
departments should attend meetings but not be formal members of the 
Group (Perris and Martin to Smith and Birch 6.10.92). 
In a subsequent letter from the Ministry of Education to its Minister, 
however, it was clear that the advice to make officials observers only 
had not been taken. Clause seven, detailing the role of government 
officials on the group, had been modified, following discussions with 
3 The Ministry of Education included in the letter the estimated annual operating costs 
for the SCG as between $25,000 and $35,000, 'depending upon the composition of the 
group and the frequency of its meetings'. 
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the Minister of Education and Bill Birch, to read 'officials ... will have 
rights to attend all meetings of the group, with full participation' 
(Perris to Smith 12.10.92, emphasis added). 
These amended protocols were tabled by John Anderson at the first full 
SCG meeting, and were adopted with two significant changes. Clause 
seven was amended to include representation from the Education 
Review Office and reference to the servicing of the SCG by the Ministry 
of Education was deleted. An eighth clause was added which read: 
8. Officials from the Ministry of Education (Lyall Perris, Neil 
McDonald and Chris Randall), SSC, the Treasury and Don 
Cowie, Director, Southpac Corporation Ltd will form the 
Secretariat to service the group (SCG minutes 22.10.92). 
A potentially crucial change to clause one was also evident. Instead of 
being an advisory group to the Minister of Education, the SCG were 
an advisory group to the Ministry of Education. It is not clear whether 
this was a substantive change or merely a typographical error, as the 
protocols do not reappear in any other minutes or correspondence of 
the group, nor are they reproduced in any of their completed reports. 
Where reference is made to the official purpose of the SCG in any 
documentation, it is as advisors to the government. However, 
subsequent events and the conduct of the group appear to favour the 
latter interpretation. For example, recommendations were made and 
group reports were submitted directly to the Minister of Education, the 
correspondence from the chairperson, John Anderson, was directly to 
the Minister4, and the Ministry already had an education sector 
advisory group, the Schools Consultative Committee, convened by 
Secretary for Education Maris O'Rourke. Individual SCG members, 
too, had no doubt they were advising the Minister, not the Ministry. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the ensuing 'difficult' relationship 
between the SCG and the Ministry would have developed, had the 
SCG been officially subordinated to the Ministry. 
Of more significance, however, is the contradiction between clauses (a) 
and (b) of the terms of reference and clause two of the protocols. The 
4 The correspondence that was available to be viewed. 
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capacity of the SCG to consider the viability of salary funding 
mechanisms in terms of 'equity and efficiency' under the amended 
terms of reference, presented a clear challenge to the operating protocol 
that denied the SCG the 'power to veto any decisions or 
implementation processes agreed by the government', with bulk 
funding already a stated policy goal. While power to veto policy was 
unlikely to be vested in the SCG, this seems to have been exactly what 
was embodied within the reformed terms of reference decided by 
members at the first meeting. Thus a crucial discrepancy between the 
purpose of the SCG as viewed by its members and its purpose as seen 
by government ministers and officials was, from the very beginning, 
intrinsic to its overall operation. However, with the Ministry of 
Education and other government officials providing secretariat 
services, the conflict between the terms of reference and the procedural 
guidelines, the purpose of which was to constrain the operation of the 
group, could be mitigated somewhat by 'official' control exercised via 
the secretariat. Its importance would only be realised later when the 
official secretariat was dispensed with by Anderson in favour of an 
'independent' secretariat staffed by his appointees, which, in effect, 
severed the main means by which official control of the group could be 
maintained. 
Negotiating the Truce 
To reach a position where the resolution of any issue was possible, 
. however, the first task of the SCG was to address what were perceived 
to be the immediate barriers to their operation: the opposition of the 
teacher unions to the Salaries Grant for Management and the 
continued recruitment of schools into the bulk funding trial, as well as 
the antipathy between the unions and the SSC generated by the stalled 
employment contract negotiations. According to SCG minutes, the 
resolution of these issues to a point where the group could begin 
considering mechanisms for the funding of salaries took until April 
1993 - almost one third of the total time the SCG was in existences. 
At the first meeting in October 1992, in addition to terms of reference 
and operating procedures, the SCG also considered a Ministry of 
S The sec was in existence exactly two years - October 1992 to September 1994. 
Negotiating outstanding conflicts took seven months. 
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Education circular to schools concerning the Salaries Grant for 
Management and a document pertaining to the bulk funding trial. 
The only recommendation to the Minister of Education made at this 
first meeting was to delay the implementation of the SGM until May 
19936, a recommendation which was accepted. The delay was 
announced in a press statement on 3 November, citing 'administrative 
reasons' as the cause. A request was also made by the SCG for the 
establishment of an extensive data base to facilitate their 'informed 
debate' on the question of funding, and covered such areas as: the level 
of funding, staffing and student roll by education sector from 1989; the 
operation of the employment and salary system for teachers; 
superannuation provision for teachers and demographic details of 
members of the Government Superannuation Fund; and statistical 
information pertaining to the relationship between teacher supply and 
demand. The majority of these requests were to be actioned by the 
Ministry of Education (SCG minutes 22.10.92). 
Two days prior to the second meeting of the group on 13 November, 
however, the Education Amendment (No 5) Bill, containing details for 
the introduction of the SGM, had returned to the House virtually 
unchanged. As a result, the second SCG meeting was devoted entirely 
to a discussion of the Bill with Tony Steel MP, at the time chairperson 
of the Education and Science Select Committee. The main concerns 
reported in the minutes centred around the whole purpose of the SGM 
for the government and the potential of the legislation to impose a 
system to limit salaries. After a lengthy discussion, almost four hours, 
the minutes recorded that the group would not release any statements 
on the subject as the Bill passed through the legislative process. The 
official position of the SCG was that it '[had] no opinion on the issue' 
(SCG minutes 13.11.92). 
If the SCG had no official opinion on the matter, the two teacher 
unions were not nearly so reticent. The response of the PPTA was to 
confirm its curriculum moratorium and, on 20 November, to threaten 
6 This recommendation was amended in the minutes of the following meeting, 
November 13, to read 'That the SCG recommend to the Minister of Education that if the 
Salaries Grant for Management was to proceed, the implementation of the SGM be 
delayed until May 1993' (SCG Minutes 13.11.92, emphasis added). 
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to withdraw from the SCG in protest. By mid-December, the NZEI had 
also withdrawn its support for the new curriculum. 
By the third SCG meeting at the end of January 1993, it was clear that 
behind-the-scenes negotiations were being conducted between the 
government and the teacher unions in an attempt to resolve the public 
conflict that was brewing again over the SGM, and also over the on-
going negotiation of employment contracts. By mid-December, the 
PPTA had suspended its curriculum moratorium in a bid to settle its 
contract; and by the beginning of January, the NZEI offered to trade-off 
the lifting of its curriculum moratorium in return for entry to the bulk 
funding trial being closed (The Press 6.1.93). At the end of the meeting 
on 27 January, however, again devoted entirely to discussion of the 
SGM, both unions confirmed that bans on the implementation of the 
SGM and the Curriculum Initiative were both still in place7. 
The outcome of this meeting, however, was an eliptical plea for 
'certain confirmations from the government' (SCG minutes 27.1.93) to 
assist in overcoming the unions' curriculum moratoria. The 
recommendation from the SCG to the Ministers of Education and State 
Services was that confirmations be given to 'assist representative 
education groups to ensure that there will be no blockages in the 
implementation of the Salaries Grant for Management and the 
[Curriculum] Initiative' (ibid). These were: 
a) Confirmation that the level of funding for the Salaries 
Grant for Management as provided by government in a 
school's financial year is not less than the amount needed by 
boards of trustees to meet their contractual arrangements 
with teaching staff where in terms of employment contracts 
the board must pay a particular level of salary. 
7 At the beginning of the meeting, John Anderson thought it necessary to remind 
members that the SCG 'was not a forum to score points but rather an opportunity for 
each representative to advance the logic and reasoning on the issues being examined'. 
He also thought it necessary to remind them of the provisions of protocol two: that the 
SGM was, by the end of January, now law; the main purpose of the meeting was to 
discuss its implementation. 
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b) Confirmation that due and timely consultation between 
representative education groups and the Ministry of 
Education will take place in: 
i) implementing the SGM; and 
ii) setting the annual Order in Council for staffing 
prOVlSlOns. 
c) Confirmation that the Salaries Grant for Management 
would be reviewed at the same time the Teacher Salaries 
Grant trial is reviewed in 1994 (ibid). 
Anderson formally advised the Minister of Education of these 
recommendations on 17 February by letter, confirming the details of a 
personal 'report back' made by him to both Smith and Bill Birch on 2 
February (Anderson to Smith 17.2.93). 
In a memorandum to all members of the SCG dated 26 February 1993, 
John Anderson advised of Smith's responses. Confirmation of request 
a) was conditional. While alluding to the fact that senior teachers' 
salaries were determined by the provisions of their collective 
employment contract and would not be changed for 1993 and 1994, it 
was made clear that salary provisions needed to be viewed in the 
overall context of government budgetary allocations which were 
'subject to change over time' (Smith to Anderson 23.2.93). In response 
to request b), the Minister indicated that consultation with education 
sector groups was, in fact, one of the purposes of the SCG. Request c) 
was confirmed unreservedly, as, according to Smith, it had always been 
the intention of the government to review the SGM policy at the time 
of the review of the bulk funding trial in 1994. Included in 
confirmation c) was also the guarantee by the Minister that the bulk 
funding trial was closed to new participants - a brief sentence 
containing little more than a statement that entry was closed (ibid). 
In return for the assurances given to the SCG, the Minister demanded 
some of his own: that the bans on the Curriculum Initiative be lifted 
and that implementation of the SGM proceed 'without disruption'. In 
addition, he expected 'the pressure placed on the schools in the [bulk 
funding] trial to cease so a proper evaluation of the trial can be made' 
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(ibid)8. John Anderson concurred with the Minister's request, 
believing conditions were appropriate for the unions to remove all 
moratoria and for the SCG to move onto consideration of the issues 
contained within its terms of reference. Accordingly, on 2 March, the 
NZEI recommended to its members that, in light of government 
assurances given via the SCG, the curriculum ban be lifted. Similarly, 
the PPTA, on 3 March, withdrew their opposition to the SGM. 
Finally, settlement of the secondary teachers' employment contract was 
achieved in March, with, it would appear, an agreement to refer the 
secondary teachers' collective contract provisions to a working party of 
the SCG, in order to 'tune it in more with the devolved environment' 
(Cooney, PPTA News, April 1993). By the fourth meeting of the SCG at 
the end of April, John Anderson noted that it was possible 'for the 
group to now examine areas relevant to its terms of reference without 
outside influences' (SCG minutes 28.4.93). 
The Operation of the SCG 
Organisational Structure 
The Schools Consultative Group had a three-tiered organisational 
structure: full group consultation, issue-based working-parties and 
individual meetings of members with the chairperson. Over the 
course of the two years it was in existence, the full complement of SCG 
members was convened only eleven times, with three of those 
meetings devoted to negotiating the truce between the government 
and the teacher unions. The function of full group meetings was 
largely to maintain an overview of the work of sub-groups. It was also 
the forum in which sub-group reports were considered and where 
completed reports containing recommendations to the Minister were 
debated and approved. Full group meetings were also, according to 
John Sutcliffe, the 'final resort for contentious issues' (interview 
26.10.94). 
The second tier of operation was that of working parties or subgroups. 
Given the complexity of the issues considered by the SCG, it was not 
feasible, in terms of both time and relevance of issues to individual 
8 Schools opting into the bulk funding trial had been targeted for 'special treatment' in 
the unions' campaigns of opposition. 
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representatives, to conduct extensive discussions through full group 
meetings. There was considerable difficulty, however, in establishing 
details of the membership of subgroups, when they met or the 
substance of their discussions. With the exception of one inadvertent 
acquisition, the minutes of the various subgroups were not a matter of 
public record and were not made available. As a result, information 
regarding their work is only what can be gleaned from brief references 
made to them in minutes of full SCG meetings. However, these 
minutes routinely recorded only the issue to be referred to particular 
subgroups and, infrequently, the membership thereof. The non-
disclosure of subgroup minutes was unfortunate, and probably 
intentional, as they were described by one member as the 'engine 
room' of the SCG, the place where 'all the work gets done' (facsimile 
John Sutcliffe 26.10.94). That this was indeed the case was indicated by 
the frequency of subgroup meetings. If the full group met only eleven 
times over two years, subgroups were meeting as often as every three 
weeks. These were full-day meetings, sometimes even two. And, 
according to John Fleming of the NZPA (interview 10.94), if you were a 
member of several, as he was: 
... the time commitment was really quite heavy ... particularly 
from when the three groups were meeting at the same time, 
probably from July 1993 through to about July 1994. So for a 
period of about a year there was a heavy commitment. I 
would find myself involved for two full days each week at 
the peak. But certainly you could expect one meeting every 
one or two weeks. 
Subgroup membership appears to have been largely a matter of self-
selection, in terms of the interest of SCG member groups in the subject 
matter being considered. Members of subgroups were not necessarily 
members who participated in full SCG meetings, however, as member 
groups were able to nominate appropriate official(s) from their 
organisation to represent them. Overall, though, there was a core, 
stable membership of the full SCG, in terms of the individuals who 
participated, as well as a peripheral and fluctuating membership of the 
subgroups - individuals who participated according to their particular 
expertise in certain issues and at the behest of their parent body. 
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At the fourth full meeting on 28 April 1993, a subgroup was established 
to consider structural flexibility and work organisation, to be chaired by 
Les Maxwell of the STA, but with John Anderson as an ex officio 
member. According to the minutes, this group was to consider 'a pot-
pourri of issues', including the provisions of teachers' collective 
employment contracts, the ageing of the teacher workforce and issues 
of teacher supply. It was this group whose task it was to deliberate on 
the question of salary funding mechanisms. In addition to this group, 
reference was also made in the minutes to two apparently pre-existing 
groups: one considering post-compulsory education and training, the 
other considering issues related to primary staffing (SCG minutes 
28.4.93). With the referral of other issues to the SCG by the Minister 
later in 1993, further subgroups were established to consider: the Titter 
Taskforce Report on school property; entry/exit and retirement 
provisions for teachers; school operations grants; the funding 
implications of the seamless education system; and a review of the 
teacher staffing formulae (SCG minutes 5.10.93). 
The third tier of SCG operation was more invisible still than the 
subgroup structure: the informal meetings held between individual 
SCG members and the chairman, John Anderson, initiated by him in 
order to resolve differences of opinion, particularly in the subgroups. 
While not a surprising strategy for the resolution of conflict, these 
meetings took place on what appeared to be a sufficiently regular basis 
for one member of the SCG to view them as part of their 'normal' 
operation. For example, one such round of meetings replaced a 
scheduled meeting of the Structural Flexibility and Work Organisation 
subgroup. Given the contentious nature of the subject matter under 
discussion, disagreement in this particular forum was predictable. The 
most interesting outcome of this informal meeting process, however, 
was that the recommendations on funding mechanisms subsequently 
submitted by the subgroup to the full SCG for consideration were, in 
fact, developed by Anderson himself in conjunction with the 
Secretariat (Structural Flexibility and Work Organisation subgroup 
minutes 18.8.93). 
Secretariat 
The provision of an official secretariat to service the SCG was 
originally made in the suggested operating protocols forwarded to the 
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Minister of Education by officials from the Ministry of Education and 
from the State Services Commission. It was recommended that the 
Ministry of Education provide the personnel for support services for 
the SCG. This recommendation was changed at the first SCG meeting, 
however, when officials from the State Services Commission and the 
Treasury were added to the secretariat. An independent member, Don 
Cowie (the director of Southpac Corporation Ltd) was also appointed9. 
Between January and April 1993, Anderson dispensed with the services 
of the secretariat as originally established and set up his own 
'independent' secretariat. The minutes of the SCG meeting in January 
1993 record that government officials were still functioning in the role 
of secretariat at that time. By the next meeting in April, however, two 
members of the new secretariat were recorded as in attendance10 . 
While a representative of the Ministry of Education was still an official 
member of the newly-formed secretariat, the three other members 
were Anderson's own appointments: Don Cowie of Southpac 
Corporation, one of the original secretariat and a close business 
associate of Anderson's; Doug Martin, who, as Assistant State Services 
Commissioner, had been one of the SSC's representatives on the SCG, 
but was now officially listed as a partner in labour market and 
communications consultants Martin Jenkins de Lorel1; and ex-PPTA 
negotiator, Patricia McNeill12. 
The circumstances that precipitated the establishment of a new 
secretariat are unclear. Only one SCG member interviewed perceived 
the operation of the secretariat to be problematic, but in reference to the 
secretariat established by Anderson, not the original collection of 
9 John Anderson, as well as being SCG chairperson and chief executive of the National 
Bank, is the chief executive and/or director of two other companies: South Pacific 
Merchant Finance Ltd and Southpac Corporation Ltd; Doug Cowie is also a director of 
South Pacific Merchant Finance Ltd. 
10 There were no meetings held over this period of three months, although the 
intention to have another meeting approximately mid-March was noted in the minutes 
of the January meeting. Why this did not eventuate is not known. 
11 He was also one of the SSC officials advising the Minister of Education, in October 
1992, of the ways in which SCG membership could be manipulated to counteract the 
views of the two teacher unions. 
12 According to a source who wished to remain anonymous, McNeill had been involved 
in the high-level negotiations between the PPTA, Anderson and Ministers prior to 
their participation in the SCC. 
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ministry officials13. What several members did identify as particularly 
problematic, however, was the general relationship between the SCG 
and the Ministry of Education14. Given their extensive representation 
on the original secretariat - from the records of the first three SCG 
meetings, MOE officials outnumbered all others - it seems highly likely 
that tensions between the SCG and the Ministry were a major 
contributor to the original secretariat being dispensed with by 
Anderson. Indeed, one person spoken to about the SCG observed that 
an independent secretariat was a necessity if independent opinions 
were to be expressed by the SCG15. From some comments it is quite 
clear that the Ministry of Education were considered to be far too 
ideologically driven, particularly in terms of their support for bulk 
funding, to provide secretariat services to a group whose participants 
mayor may not have shared their views. 
It was evident from official correspondence prior to its formation that 
tensions would exist between the Ministry of Education and the SCG. 
As already noted, the Ministry was at pains to point out to their 
Minister it did not want to be 'at the whim of the group', nor should 
the group have direct input into Ministry advice to the Minister; SCG 
views would merely 'be taken into account' (O'Rourke to Smith 
30.9.92). The root cause of the difficulties, it would seem, lay in the 
perception by the Ministry that the SCG, in Joanna Beresford's words 'a 
group of non-officials chaired by a banker' (interview 6.10.94), was 
usurping its professional role as providers of policy advice to the 
Minister. In short, the SCG were trespassing on territory the Ministry 
considered to be its exclusive domain, and, as such, was in direct 
competition for the ear of the Minister and of government. Moreover, 
13 Phil Raffills consid.ered the minutes of some meetings as recorded by secretariat 
member, Patricia McNeill, were inaccurate and biased. When he challenged her over 
this, she suggested such a serious matter be referred to Anderson. Whether he did is not 
known. It certainly was not raised at any meetings, except for one comment by John 
Fleming of NZP A recorded in the minutes of the Structural Flexibility and Work 
Organisation sub-group meeting held in August 1993 - while he confirmed the minutes 
of the previous sub-group meeting were accurate, he 'expressed concern about whether 
all views represented at the meeting were represented'. This is the only official 
allusion to the problem of bias. 
14 There was a strange reluctance on the part of a number of SCG member to talk about 
the role of all government officials on the SCG. Some did, but in very eliptical terms. 
Interestingly, the frankest comments came from the David Jackson, the chairperson of 
the board of trustees of a TSG trial school - the only member of the SCG not embroiled 
in education politics at a national level. 
15 The source for this comment did not wish to be identified 
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they were a competitor whose policy advice might contradict their 
own. Given Smith's commitment to bulk funding and his antipathy 
towards the SCG, as well as the group's role as merely 'advisory', it 
seems highly unlikely the Ministry would view the SCG as a serious 
threat to its own role. A much simpler and more likely explanation is 
that Ministry hostility to the SCG was due largely to the impediment it 
represented in terms of completing its already well-established work 
programme to implement the education self-management agenda. 
Having the Ministry of Education, in addition to other government 
officials, acting as secretariat to the SCG can be seen to be underpinned 
by two competing dynamics. The first would be the need for the 
Ministry to be in a position, if not to influence or control policy 
recommendations produced by the SCG, to at least know what the 
advice might be in order to prepare countervailing arguments and to 
be able to inform its Minister which direction the SCG was taking on 
various issues. In response to a letter from the Minister of Education 
querying the role and future work of the SCG, Anderson (Anderson to 
Smith 6.10.93) outlined the main tasks of the secretariat16: 
• to provide secretarial services during the meetings; 
• to prepare the agenda and co-ordinate papers for 
meetings; 
• to prepare relevant papers for consideration and 
discussion; 
• to complete the report of the SCG to the Minister. 
Given the potential of these tasks to shape the parameters of debate 
within the SCG, and, thus, the outcome of its deliberations, the 
Ministry could not forego the opportunity to participate. At the same 
time, however, there was a competing dynamic of 'reluctant' 
participation. According to Joanna Beresford of the NZEI, the Ministry 
'bitterly resented' the SCG (interview 6.10.94). Acting in such a capacity 
for a group of people it considered to be usurping its role might not rest 
easily with the Ministry - it was an inappropriately hierarchical 
16 Although by the time this letter was written, October 1993, government officials no 
longer played a decisive part in the secretariat, this is the only detailed record of the 
specific tasks of the secretariat. There is no reason to believe these were not also the 
tasks of the original secretariat. 
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relationship that may have violated MOE perceptions of their own 
role. Furthermore, the SCG was perceived to be revisiting issues the 
Ministry believed to be beyond negotiation, such as the question of 
bulk funding. In short, the SCG was an 'irritant and wasted [the 
Ministry's] time and resources' (ibid). Thus, the Ministry was placed in 
a somewhat untenable position of acting to influence the SCG as far as 
possible, yet the price of securing that influence was to act as underling 
to a group of people they believed should not exist; a case of the tail 
wagging the dog, perhaps. Given such circumstances, their conduct as 
secretariat support may have been unacceptable - and was, at least to 
John Anderson, although quite how this manifested itself within the 
forum of the SCG is not known. 
While the establishment of an 'independent' secretariat served to 
minimise the influence of the Ministry, the underlying hostilities 
between the two continued over the term of the SCG. This appeared to 
be manifested in a low-level campaign by the Ministry of Education of 
what could best be described as 'non-co-operation'; at worst, it was 
considered by one member of the SCG as completely unprofessional 
behaviour17. The Ministry worked to undermine the decision-making 
processes by being selective with the information" provided to the SCG 
as well as supplying complex information on which decisions were to 
be based at exceptionally short notice. Complaints regarding the short 
notice were recorded in the minutes of the meetings held in March 
and April 1994, where Ministry material had been forthcoming the day 
before the meeting in March and on the day of the meeting in April. 
SCG Work Programme 
The issues considered by the SCG fell into two distinct categories. The 
first category of work focused on the tasks set out in the terms of 
reference, with the SCG's main objective of advising on 'the financing 
and payment of teachers' salaries. The report containing preliminary 
advice, the Principles and Mechanisms for the Financing and Payment 
of Teachers' Salaries, was presented to the Minister in December 1993. 
As a result of the work done on the funding mechanism for salaries, 
17 According to this member, the only time the Ministry of Education 'behaved 
themselves' was during the interregnum between the general election in October 1993 
and the confirmation, ten days later, that the National Party had been re-elected - by 
a very slender one-seat majority. 
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the SCG recommended to the Minister that two related issues also 
needed to be considered: a review of the teacher staffing formula and 
the method of its allocation to schools; and the provisions for entry, 
exit and retirement in the teaching profession. Subgroups to consider 
these issues were formed at the SCG meeting held in October 1993, 
with work on these issues producing two further reports: the 
Arrangements for Entry and Exit from the Teaching Profession 
presented to the Minister in July 1994, and an interim report of the 
Teacher Staffing Formulae Review Subgroup forwarded at the same 
time. 
The second category of work covered those issues subsequently referred 
to the SCG by both the Minister of Education and the Associate 
Minister, John Luxton during 1993. These were: 
• consideration of the Titter Taskforce report on school property, 
referred by Luxton in June; 
• the funding implications of a seamless education system, referred 
in April; 
• a review of a Ministry of Education discussion paper on the 
operations grant, referred in June; 
• proposed changes to the resourcing of outside the classroom 
learning experiences. 
Two further issues were referred with the agreement of the Minister of 
Education: the review of primary staffing undertaken by a committee 
convened by the NZEI18, and a Ministry of Education discussion paper 
on supplementary resources. Out of SCG deliberations on all of these 
issues, however, only one further report was produced and presented 
to the Minister, the School Property for Better Education, submitted in 
July 1994. Two further reports were submitted to the Minister at the 
termination of the SCG, Education Priorities in the Schools Sector, and 
Teacher Staffing Resource Delivery Mechanisms: Options. These were, 
however, authored by John Anderson himself, and were not the 
collective effort of the full SCG. Although they were intended to be a 
summary of the prevailing views in the group at the time of its 
18 This was in addition to the review of the staffing formulae already identified as an 
issue for consideration by the SCG. In effect, there were two staffing reviews. 
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dissolution, these reports were, to varying degrees, disowned by some 
SCG members on the grounds that they contained Anderson's 
personal view of the issues traversed in them (see Chapter VIII). 
None of the SCG members interviewed saw the government's referral 
of broader educational issues, such as the Titter Taskforce report, as 
extraordinary. Indeed, it corresponded exactly with the purpose most 
SCG members saw themselves serving, that of providing advice to the 
Minister and to government on wider issues in education. For the 
PPTA, the referral of the property report was something of a 'coup' that 
helped extend the life of the SCG and aided in the positioning of the 
group as a logical forum for the resolution of wider education issues. 
The NZEI achieved much the same goal with the referral of the review 
of primary staffing undertaken by the SCG in early 199419. The majority 
of members interviewed firmly believed that the SCG was more than 
simply a single-issue group designed to reach some sort of settlement 
of the bulk funding crisis. Hence, the referral of issues unrelated to 
bulk funding was perceived as perfectly legitimate. 
Underlying the operation of the group, however, was the significant 
discrepancy between the official perception and members' perception 
of the purpose of the SCG, demonstrated by the expansion in the terms 
of reference discussed above. Although individual members quite 
clearly saw the SCG as an opportunity for input into future education 
policy, broadly construed, a different interpretation of events suggests 
the SCG was a political strategy to contain and defuse an immediate 
crisis in education in 1992, rather than a forum for consultation as 
perceived by its members - a position supported, perhaps, by the 
attempts to constrain the operation of the SCG by defining both terms 
of reference and operating protocols very narrowly, as well as by the 
fate of the reports produced by the SCG. According to one member 
interviewed, official feedback on all the recommendations submitted, 
prior to the final reports of John Anderson, was nil. While receipt of 
reports was acknowledged by the Minister, the recommendations made 
by the SCG appear, thus far at least, to have been largely ignored. 
19 As the only forum in which the unions had input at the political level, both were 
concerned to keep it going for as long as possible. The source of this comment wished to 
remain anonymous. 
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Renegotiation of the Terms of Reference 
The extension of the life of the SeG by the referral of other issues 
necessitated a revision of the terms of reference adopted at the first 
meeting in October 1992. This occurred between August and October 
1993, with the formation of working parties to consider the revised 
work programme established at the full meeting held on 5 October 
1993. The revision of the terms of reference also provided the Minister 
of Education with an opportunity to attempt a review of the 
membership of the group. In a letter to Anderson (Smith to Anderson 
5.8.93), the Minister suggested additions to the existing terms of 
reference (op. cit. ppl-2) to incorporate the new tasks of the group: 
To provide advice on the following issues and undertake the 
following tasks: 
(i) Seamless Education: 
• Confirm an information base on tertiary funding 
arrangements. 
• Consider the implications of a seamless PCET system for 
the resourcing of the Senior Secondary School. 
• Advise on funding systems for resourcing secondary 
schools systems that are consistent with tertiary funding 
arrangements. 
• Identify the resource implications of options funding 
systems. 
(ii) Operations Grants: 
• Identify components of the operation grant that may 
need to be modified. 
• Advise on the parameters of the review of the operations 
grant. 
• Provide feedback on the final discussion paper. 
(iii) School Property: Provide advice to the Minister of 
Education on School Property related resource issues, prior 
to the government making final decisions on the 
administration of school property, and in particular: 
• Provide comment on the principles and the options 
identified in the School Property Report. 
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• Consider the implications for schools on implementing 
these options. 
• Identify the implementation and transition issues to be 
addressed. 
Retained, too, was the section added by SCG members at their first 
meeting (op. cit. p3). A report-back date of 15 December 1993 for the 
completion of the review of the School Property Report was also 
included. 
The amendment of the terms of reference was, according to the 
Minister, 'an opportune time to confirm the current membership of 
the group and to identify where it may be necessary to appoint new 
members' (Smith to Anderson 5.8.93). By August, after almost twelve 
months of operation, the attendance of some representatives at SCG 
meetings had become problematic. Attendance of the Maori 
community representative, lri Tawhiwhirangi, was noted as being of 
particular concern - she had yet to attend any meetings. Ruma 
Karaitiana, the Maori representative of the STA, had, up until this 
time, deputised in her absence. With his resignation, however, the 
SCG had no effective Maori representation. The bulk-funding trial 
schools' board of trustees representative, David Jackson, was also 
finding attendance difficult. The Minister expressed concern with the 
lack of Maori representation, and believed it was necessary to find a 
replacement 'to fill the gap'. He was much more sanguine over the 
capacity of Phil Raffills to represent the views of TSG trial schools in 
David Jackson's absences, although he did suggest that 'it may be 
possible to find a Wellington based board member who reflects a 
similar perspective' (ibid). 
The Minister also suggested to Anderson that: 
It would be sensible at this stage to add to the group a Board 
of Trustees member who has some experience and interest 
zn school property Issues. A [board of trustees] 
representative interested in pursuing ownership of their 
school would be an ideal choice (ibid). 
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Also referred to in the same letter was a memorandum for a draft 
time line for the completion of the SCG work programme and a draft 
'memorandum of understanding' concerning the operation and 
resourcing of the secretariat20 . 
Anderson did not reply to the Minister until October (Anderson to 
Smith 6.10.93). Interestingly, and quite contrary to some members 
perceptions of the 'unexpected' termination of the group, Anderson 
included in his response an approximate date for the work of the SCG 
to be completed, and, by extension, the end of the SCG itself. He 
expected the work contained in the new terms of reference to be 
completed by April 1994, at which stage 'the government [would] need 
to determine whether there [was] a further or ongoing role for the 
Group or not' (ibid). 
In response to the Minister's suggestions for additional terms of 
reference, Anderson had a few amendments of his own. These had 
been discussed at the SCG meeting held on 5 October and so, it could be 
assumed, had the endorsement of the group. Section (iii) regarding the 
property taskforce review was accepted unaltered, as was section (ii) 
concerning the review of operations grants, although the requirement 
to provide feedback on the final discussion paper was omitted. The 
four clauses of section (i), however, were condensed into one sentence: 
. To consider the implications of a seamless post compulsory 
education and training system for the resourcing of 
secondary schools and advise on an appropriate funding 
system consistent with this concept (ibid). 
It is clear from other correspondence not released that the Minister 
questioned this particular alteration. However, Anderson justified it 
on the grounds that the seamless education process was not fully 
developed as policy. As such, what consideration the SCG could give it 
would be largely speculative (Anderson to Smith 29.10.93). No further 
mention of this was made in either correspondence or minutes of 
20 Neither of these, unfortunately, were included as attachments to the letter in the 
copy released to me. 
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meetings, so it would appear this particular alteration to the Minister's 
suggested terms was retained. 
The most interesting change, though, was to one of the clauses in the 
section inserted by the SCG themselves into the original terms. This 
read in the original: 
The consultative group should have regard to the 
government's commitment: 
• To ensure excellence In educational outcomes by 
enhancing the knowledge, skills and aptitudes of 
students from the school sector; 
• To recognise school principals and teachers are the key 
element in ensuring that these outcomes are achieved; 
• To devolve operational management to Boards of 
Trustees, thus allowing schools to become more 
responslVe to community priorities. 
The final clause, however, had been changed to read: 
• To recognise the role of Boards of Trustees, as 
representatives of parents, in ensuring that schools are 
responsive to community priorities. 
By dispensing with the focus on boards of trustees as merely the 
recipients of devolved funding, the clause appears to signal a retreat 
from the position that bulk funding was necessarily the most 
appropriate means of ensuring schools' responsiveness to their 
communities. The emphasis had shifted to the boards' role as 
representatives of parents, not simply as the mechanism by which 
schools were to be managed - a clear advocacy of the 'community' 
arguments for devolution. 
Anderson dismissed the Minister's requests to reconsider the 
composition of the group. In reference to the problems of attendance 
indicated by the Minister, Anderson noted that independent members, 
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in contrast to representatives from the major interest groups, were 
'specifically appointed to consider the issues contained in the original 
Terms of Reference' (Anderson to Smith 6.10.93) - a pointed, if 
somewhat oblique, reminder to the Minister that he was the one 
responsible for the original appointees. Anderson considered, too, that 
the group had reached its maximum size, given that additions to the 
membership had already been made since October 1992. His final 
recommendation was to make no changes at all. And none were 
made. The issue of Maori representation was resolved for a short time 
by the attendance of Iri Tawhiwhirangi at three SCG meetings in 
September, October and December 1993. From December until its 
termination, however, she attended no further meetings. 
Consensus or Majority Rules? 
Although government ministers and officials endeavoured to define 
and constrain the boundaries of the operation of the SCG through a 
particular membership configuration as well as through its terms of 
reference and operating protocols, one factor that could not be 
predetermined was the SCG's internal processes of decision-making. 
Although the role of government officials on the group would be to 
'guide' its operation, any overt attempt by the government to 
influence how the group reached its decisions would have been 
entirely unacceptable to those education sector groups whose 
participation was required to give legitimacy to the SCG in the 
education sector. Moreover, given that an important underlying 
rationale for the SCG was its capacity to divert the very public hostility 
between the teacher unions and the government occurring in 1992, 
such manipulation of its operation, and hence its outcomes in terms of 
advice to the Minister of Education, would have exacerbated, not 
relieved, the conflict. In the end, Ministers and officials did what they 
could to shape the outcomes of the Group by manipulating those 
factors under their direct control. 
A key figure in determining the internal processes of the SCG was its 
chairperson, John Anderson. According to Kevin Bunker of the PPT A, 
one of Anderson's main concerns was that, regardless of the direction 
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the government was taking in education policy21, the process by which 
they were attempting to implement their agenda was wrong. It was 
disaffecting the constituencies whose support was required for the 
successful implementation of policy and was, thus, electorally 
damaging. Consequently, a process was required within the SCC to 
mitigate the damage caused by the alienation of education sector 
groups from the political arena. Anderson's goal, therefore, was to 
encourage a process whereby a 'broadly-based consensus could be 
reached on most issues' (Bunker, interview 6.10.94) in order to recreate 
the stake of interest groups in the reform process. 
While not all members of the SCC explicitly used the word consensus 
when interviewed, the process by which decisions were made was 
clearly not just a reflection of majority opinion - nor could it be, given 
the diversity of views represented on the group as well as its conflict-
containing role. And while just about all members interviewed 
acknowledged the difficulty of a consensual approach to decision-
making given the conflicting views within the group, by the time the 
SCC began considering its work programme in April 1993, sufficient 
goodwill had been generated by Anderson's chairmanship and the 
commitment of members to open and frank discussion of their 
positions (and, no doubt, the apparent willingness of the government 
to once again consider the views of sector groups), that a genuine 
attempt appears to have been made to adhere to the philosophy of 
negotiating an outcome to all issues acceptable to all members. 
While the SCC had been clearly focused, in its initial stages, on the 
resolution of the industrial conflict of 1992, once a settlement had been 
reached the emphasis clearly shifted. The SCC began to look like a 
genuine 'consultative' group, with the referral by ministers of other 
quite contentious issues, and thus appearing a somewhat contradictory 
development, given the neo-Liberal position on interest group 
involvement in policy formulation that had prevailed throughout the 
reform process during the 1980s. For a short time, at least, it appeared 
that a corporatist-type approach was working for the state. However, 
underpinning this apparent 'success' was the on-going issue of the 
21 It appears to have been common knowledge in the Wellington education community, 
however, that Anderson was opposed to bulk funding. 
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funding mechanism for teacher salaries. By December 1993, although a 
report had been presented to the Minister, its recommendations were 
interim measures only. Further work, according to the SCG, needed to 
be done on related issues before the bulk funding question could be 
laid to rest. It is somewhat ironic, perhaps, that the decision-making 
processes within the SCG established in order to find a resolution to 
this most contentious of issues, and utilised successfully in the 
resolution of others, was ultimately compromised by the revisiting of 
the bulk funding issue in early 1994. Chapter VIII outlines the role 
played by bulk funding in the decline and eventual collapse of the SCG. 
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CHAPTER VIn - THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SCG 
Recommendation 10: A Solution to the Crisis? 
By early 1994 much of the work of the SCG was in varying stages of 
completion. Final reports were in the process of being prepared for the 
review of school property and entry/exit and retirement provisions, 
and progress on a Ministry of Education review of schools' operations 
grants was being monitored. Two important items on the SCG work 
programme, though, remained outstanding: further consideration of 
the mechanism for financing teachers' salaries and the review of the 
teacher staffing formula1. Both issues were part of the substantive 
recommendations made to the Minister of Education in the December 
1993 report, The Principles and Mechanisms for the Financing and 
Payment of Teachers' Salaries. In this report, further consideration of 
the funding mechanism for salaries was contingent upon the outcome 
of a review of the staffing formula - according to the SCG, the question 
of what to fund needed to be settled before consideration could be 
given to how the funding was to be provided. 
The SCG did, however, provide some interim advice concerning an 
appropriate mechanism for the delivery of teachers' salaries. In the 
December report to the Minister, the SCC recommended that: 
(8) the TSG trial formula not be applied nationally. 
(9) existing contractual obligations to TSG schools be 
honoured. 
(10) subject to th,e completion and outcome of the staffing 
review, the mechanism for the financing of teachers 
(sic) salaries be the payment of the applicable staffing 
formulae combined with the actual salaries of teachers 
employed into school bank accounts, with teachers paid 
by boards according to applicable contractual 
arrangements. 
1 The formula by which the staffing entitlement for each school is determined, 'and 
delivered as a quantum of hours or full-time teacher equivalents' (SCG Staffing Sub-
group contextual paper, February 1994). 
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In other words, the same mechanism as the Salaries Grant for 
Management that had been introduced the previous year. 
Recommendation 8 appeared to have the support of the group as a 
whole, even of TSG school representatives. While they were recorded 
in the minutes as not wishing to return 'to what they perceived as a 
more restrictive mechanism', they agreed that it was the collective 
responsibility of the SCG to 'find a mechanism appropriate to national 
needs' (SCG minutes 3.9.93). The most interesting aspect of 
recommendation 10, however, was that while it did not have the 
support of all members, it had their qualified endorsement. According 
to the minutes of the meeting in December 1993 prior to the 
submission of the Principles and Mechanisms report to the Minister, 
this recommendation, 'as expected, had generated most interest and 
debate' (SCG minutes 2.12.93). In spite of this, though: 
While there were reservations expressed about 
recommendation 10 all group members were comfortable 
with the full report and recommendations going forward as 
part of the interim report of the Group in order for work to 
proceed on the review of teacher staffing and other matters 
referred to the SCG (ibid). 
While this hardly constitutes a consensual position on the issue of the 
salary funding mechanism, the inclusion of recommendation 10 
appeared to be an indication of the extent to which a certain amount of 
'goodwill' had, thus far, been generated by the SCG process - to the 
point where a collective position could be taken that was clearly 
contrary to the views of those SCG representatives of schools in the 
bulk funding trial, in order to advance discussion in other areas2 . 
Indeed, in the minutes of an earlier meeting in which a draft of the 
recommendations was considered, both the TSG school's 
representatives and the teacher unions expressed concern that the 
proposal to extend the Salaries Grant for Management mechanism 
2 While the report containing recommendation 10 was not released until December 1993, 
in a column in the 'PPTA News' of April 1995, Kevin Bunker makes the statement that 
recommendation 10 was part of the reason why PPTA joined the SCG in 1992. From this 
it might be adduced that recommendation 10 was the initiative of the PPTA. It might 
also be suggested that agreement to a modified form of bulk funding was the price the 
PPTA was prepared to pay in order to secure participation at the political level. 
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compromised their respective positions on bulk funding. The TSG 
schools were reported as being 'very happy' with their experience of 
bulk funding. Conversely, the PPTA and the NZEI reported that 
reaction to the recommendation at their annual meetings was 
negative, with members seeing the proposed extension of the SGM as 
providing a mechanism for the later imposition of per capita cash 
funding (SCG minutes 3.9.93). Yet in spite of these concerns, union 
members believed it was 'important to put this issue to rest and 
encourage an environment of goodwill as a basis for establishing a 
better framework for contract negotiations' (ibid). 
Regardless of the apparent goodwill toward the process of negotiating 
an agreement on the issue of bulk funding, the recommendations of 
the Principles and Mechanisms report merely delayed what many 
believed was an inevitable conflict. Bulk funding was, after all, the 
essential raison d' etre for the existence, as well as the constitution, of 
the SCG; the quiescence of opposition over Recommendation 10 
notwithstanding, the bulk funding question had still to be confronted. 
Having shaped the nature of the SCG in such a fundamental way, bulk 
funding was, in many respects, an intrinsic structural weakness. 
While considerable goodwill was being generated within the group 
around educational and 'professional' issues, on the industrial 
relations problem it was established to solve the membership 
remained hopelessly divided. It was no surprise, therefore, that the 
revisiting of the issue early in 1994 was identified by a number of SCG 
members as being central to the disintegration of the group later in the 
year. 
In addition to the still unresolved bulk funding question, the expanded 
scope of the SCG's function as perceived by most of its members finally 
collided with the much narrower view of the government over the 
outcome of the review of the teacher staffing formula. A secondary 
factor in the demise of the group, the SCG crucially changed the focus 
of the staffing review working party from considering the technical 
issues of how to pay salaries to the political question of how much to 
pay, that is, questions regarding the adequacy or otherwise of 
Vote:Education. The role of both these factors will be examined. 
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Bulk Funding Revisited 
In a letter to John Anderson dated 26 January 1994, the Minister of 
Education acknowledged receipt in December of the interim Principles 
and Mechanisms report. The recommendations made to the Minister 
in this report, mentioned earlier, detailed the need for a review of the 
teacher staffing formula to be conducted before the question of delivery 
mechanism could be revisited. To this end, at the SCG meeting held 
on March 1 1994, a staffing subgroup was established with its first 
meeting date set down for 29 March. However, while the question of 
bulk funding was effectively side-lined by the staffing review3, pressure 
was mounting in other quarters to ensure bulk funding stayed on the 
agenda - most notably from the Minister of Education via his Ministry. 
As mentioned in Chapter VI, the Ministry of Education was perceived 
by a number of SCG members as being antagonistic towards the group. 
Both occupied the same territory as providers of policy advice to the 
Minister, with the work of the Ministry frequently duplicating the 
work programme of the SCG. For example, running parallel with the 
SCG consideration of salary funding mechanisms was a Ministry of 
Education work project, The Provision for Resourcing of Teacher 
Salaries in Schools, a project it expected to have concluded by May 1993 
- well ahead of the timetable for SCG policy recommendations. Not 
only was the SCG a policy competitor, but it was also calling into 
question a policy direction that both the Minister and the Ministry 
were clearly in support of and wished to see implemented. 
During the six months from the submission of the Principles and 
Mechanisms report in December 1993 to the final full Group meeting 
held in July 1994, it was becoming increasingly apparent that SCG 
recommendations on bulk funding were not the only ones being 
solicited. A company called Dialogue Consultants Ltd had been 
contracted by the Ministry of Education to review teacher resourcing in 
schools, with its final report, authored by Murray Ellis, submitted in 
September 19944. In addition, during the six months to July, the 
3 According to the PPT A, the pressure on the SCG by the NZEI for a review of primary 
staffing, an issue that had been outstanding for some time, was instrumental in 
allowing the supporters of bulk funding, both within and outside the SCG, time to 're-
~roup' and organise their campaign to get SCG support for it more effectively. 
The unified staffing system recommended in this report reputedly formed the basis of 
the staffing model recommended by the later Ministerial Reference Group. 
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Ministry of Education was preparing documents outlining possible 
future options for the TSG trials. With the submission of the SCG's 
report, both the Minister and the Ministry would have been fully 
aware that the SCG recommendation to implement what was 
essentially a universalised SGM mechanism was incompatible with 
the system of funding operating in the TSG trial. In a letter to the 
Minister from the Ministry of Education Group Manager 
Implementation (Gibson 22.4.94), concern was expressed that 
... the work currently [being] undertaken by the Schools 
Consultative Group is constrained by the agreement reached 
at SCG to a different path to the bulk funding of salaries. 
(emphasis added). 
At the beginning of 1994, the Ministry of Education revisited the issue 
of the TSG trial with the Minister of Education. The trial had been 
initially approved for a three year operating period, from mid-1992 to 
mid-19946 . Beyond that, no provision had been made to fund its 
continuation. As noted in Chapter VII, confirmation of the closure of 
the TSG trial to new participants was provided by the Minister of 
Education as part of the settlement of hostilities in early 1993. And, 
according to a comment made by John Anderson at the time the 
confirmation was received, there appeared to be an expectation that the 
trial would not continue beyond 1994 with, presumably, the 
recommendations made by the SCG perhaps being implemented for 
the 1995 school year. Anderson noted that: 'It now seems appropriate 
that the Trial runs its course without disruption while SCG examine 
other alternatives and models as requested by the Minister' (Anderson 
to SCG members 28.2.93, emphasis added). 
In a letter to Smith and Birch dated 14 February 1994, however, the 
Ministry of Education proposed that the TSG trial continue beyond 
Interestingly, the report also alludes to a 'scoping exercise' being undertaken by another 
contractor concerning a future EFTS (equivalent full-time student) system for the school 
sector. 
S These documents were obtained by the PPTA under the Official Information Act. 
6 While the school year in New Zealand corresponds to the calendar year, financial 
years for the government run from July to June the following year. Thus the TSG scheme 
was to operate for the financial years 1992/93, 1993/94 and 1994/95, and would have 
ceased in the middle of a school year. 
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1995. In the letter the Ministry sought his approval for an additional $8 
million required to fund an extension to the scheme for the 1995/96 
and 1996/97 financial years (Gill to Smith and Birch 14.2.94). At the 
same time, one of the policy options being explored by the Ministry in 
its own evaluation of salary resourcing mechanisms was a scheme 
similar to the TSG trial model - policy advice diametrically opposed to 
the recommendation of the SCG that the TSG formula not be applied 
nationally. Because of this: 
... it is desirable to allow those schools currently in the trial to 
remain under these arrangements until decisions on future 
policy have been made and the arrangements for 1996 and 
beyond are known (ibid). 
In other words, the TSG trial model might be the model eventually 
implemented, and therefore schools in the trial may as well be funded 
in anticipation of its possible national implementation. That bulk 
funding, in one form or another, would indeed eventuate was 
reinforced by the Minister in a speech (The Press 18.4.94), in which he 
expressed his desire to see secondary schools bulk funded under much 
the same system as tertiary education7. 
In a second letter to the Minister of 22 April, the Ministry again 
suggested the TSG trial continue beyond 1994. In addition, however, it 
also proposed that the Minister should consider re-opening the trial to 
new schools on the grounds that 'further implementation experience 
could be gained within a controlled environment' (Gibson to Smith 
22.4.94). In addition, the Ministry informed the Minister that 
increasing numbers of schools had indicated they wished to participate 
in the TSG trial. Also noted was the 'difficulty' this course of action 
may cause, given the position of the SCG on the matter. 
The case the Ministry presented to the Minister was overwhelmingly 
in favour not only of the extension of the TSG trial beyond 1994 for 
existing schools, but also for the inclusion of new schools - policy 
advice completely at odds with the Ministerial guarantee given to the 
7 The tertiary sector in New Zealand is funded on an Equivalent Full-Time Student 
(EFTS) basis. 
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SCG. A background paper was prepared detailing the funding 
necessary for the transition of new participants to the scheme. 
Interestingly, also included in this paper were co stings for the national 
implementation of a full bulk funding regime based on the TSG trial 
formula. Furthermore, it appeared that funding had been applied for 
in the current year's policy round for transitional costs for its 
implementation 'in anticipation of a phased arrangement [of] about 
one hundred schools a year' (ibid). Not surprisingly, a 'risk factor' 
identified by the Ministry to this proposal was the SCG. 
By 5 May, however, the Minister of Education had informed various 
'gate-keeping' ministers, notably the Prime Minister and Deputy and 
the Minister and Deputy Minister of Finance, of his intention to 
extend the three year term of the bulk funding trial and to permit the 
entry of new schools into the scheme. There was, he reassured them, 
increasing support for the TSG trial as well as a lessening in opposition 
to bulk funding from the school sector. He also informed them that it 
was unclear whether the SCG would be able to reach a decision on the 
issue of funding mechanism. Thus, in order to provide some choice 
for schools, the trial was to be extended and expanded. Not only had 
the Minister broken his word to the SCG regarding the future of the 
TSG trial, but was seriously pre-empting the group's decision8 - the 
report of the staffing review subgroup, who were considering the issue 
of funding mechanisms, did not table its report to the full SCG until 
the meeting held on 4 July (SCG minutes 4.7.94) and the Minister of 
Education not officially advised of the impasse until 12 July. It is 
interesting to note, too, that the Minister made particular mention of 
the support received for the proposal to extend the trial from the NZ 
Principals' Federation, SPANZ, the ISPA, the STA, as well as the 
Association of TSG schools - groups, moreover, whose representatives 
were still putatively considering various proposals for the funding of 
teachers' salaries inside the SCG. 
'Jumping the Gun' - the Review of the Teacher Staffing Formula 
While the Minister and the Ministry were planning for the extension 
and expansion of the TSG trial, the SCG was proceeding with the 
8 In a letter to Anderson dated 10 June 1994, Smith wrote saying he was looking forward 
to getting the SCG's recommendations on bulk funding and how pleased he was to 
support their work. 
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review of the teacher staffing formula, as it had recommended in the 
Principles and Mechanisms report. As already mentioned, the 
subgroup to consider the staffing formula - chaired by Bruce Adin of 
the NZEI - was set up at the SCG meeting held on 1 March 1994, 
although not convened for its first meeting until 29 March. Contained 
in the minutes of the 1 March meeting were the terms of reference for 
the subgroup: 
To review the teacher staffing formulae, taking into account 
the learning and development needs of students by 
examining and making recommendations on the options: 
(i) for determining the amount of teacher staffing for 
curriculum delivery and particular tasks required of 
schools; 
and 
(ii) for delivering resources for school and individual 
student equity. 
To review the teacher staffing formulae taking into account 
where appropriate: 
(i) the New Zealand curriculum framework; 
(ii) the emerging qualifications framework; 
(iii) community and societal expectations of schools, and 
(iv) implications of a seamless education system. 
To comment on the appropriateness of the mechanism for 
the delivery of teacher staffing resources contained in 
recommendation 10 of the interim report of the Schools 
Consultative Group December 1993 (SCG minutes 1.3.94). 
While no timetable was indicated for the completion of the work of 
the subgroup, a final report was submitted to the SCG at its meeting on 
4 July 1994. This was, in fact, to be its last meeting. 
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The constitution of the subgroup was, as might be discerned from the 
issue it was assigned to consider, very finely balanced with equal 
numbers of members representing both sides of the bulk funding 
debate9 . Between 29 March and 20 June, the group met on eight 
occasions (Teacher Staffing Formulae Review Subgroup Report, July). 
However, as with other subgroup minutes, no record of these meetings 
was available. By 27 April, in a progress report tabled by Bruce Adin to 
the SCG, the subgroup had agreed to the principles and conceptual 
framework that would guide the review. By this stage, the only 
subgroup tasks remaining were discussion of the crucial delivery 
mechanism, recommendation 10 of the December 1993 report, as well 
as consideration of, according to the minutes, 'levels of resourcing'. 
According to the subgroup report tabled in July, the staffing review was 
divided into four parts: resource generation, resource level, allocation 
and usage, and delivery mechanism. From the report it is clear that 
the work of this subgroup was framed within the expanded role of the 
SCG. From simply addressing technical aspects of how to provide 
schools with teachers, the focus had become the amount of resourcing 
it would take to achieve a particular staffing level - staffing that would 
produce desired outputs in terms of curriculum delivery, management 
of resources and equity for students. 
The issues of resource generation and resource level are the most 
interesting points here. The subgroup developed a set of principles to 
underpin the generation of teaching resources which explicitly 
articulated many of the criticisms that had been levelled at the 
government in terms of cost-cutting, increases in staff-student ratios 
and teacher workload: 
(ii) Any system should seek to provide sufficient staffing to 
enable a fair chance of quality educational outcomes for 
each student in each school; 
9 The members of the subgroup were: Bruce Adin, NZEI (chairperson); John Fleming, 
NZPF; John Sutcliffe, ISPA; Derek Chapman, SPANZ; Phil RaffiUs, principal, bulk-
funding trial school; Lena Orum and Kevin Bunker, PPTA; Donna Hickey, STA; Pat 
Lynch, APIS; Cathie Penitito, NZEI. It is interesting to note that, unlike other 
subgroups, no government officials are recorded as members. 
204 
(iii) Any system should seek to provide sufficient staffing to 
enable national and local curriculum requirements to 
be met; 
(iv) Any system should seek to provide sufficient teachers 
so that students can have individual needs met within 
a classroom environment; ... 
(vii) Any system should seek to provide sufficient teachers 
so that each teacher has a manageable workload 
(Teacher Staffing Formulae Review Subgroup Report, 
July 1994). 
The Subgroup's comments on resourcing levels were even more 
critical: 
23. The subgroup questioned the assumption that the 
overall level of resourcing in the sector is adequate. This 
assumption leads to an approach of fiscal neutrality. The 
subgroup rejected this approach in favour of one of fiscal 
respons ibili ty. 
24. The subgroup felt that it was unable to reach any 
conclusive view on the level of resourcing because of the 
lack of any agreed objective data or analysis on the amount 
of resollrcing required to meet current or future need (ibid). 
Its recommendations on resource levels demonstrate unmistakably 
the subgroup's encroachment into questions of overall government 
policy, in clear contravention of protocol two10: 
27. It is recommended that evaluative research IS 
undertaken to determine: 
(i) the teaching resource required to deliver the 
curriculum in todays (sic) schools; 
10 'The group's sphere of advice is that covered by the agreed Terms of Reference. The 
group does not have the power to veto any decisions or implementation processes agreed 
by the Government.' 
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(ii) the teaching resource required to manage and 
support curriculum delivery; and 
(iii) the quantum of resource required to support 
equity in curriculum delivery. 
This straying into the perceived inadequacies of education funding 
was not universally agreed to by the SCG. In the minutes of the full 
SCG meeting held on 27 April, an abbreviated discussion was recorded 
on 'whether the work of the subgroup on levels of resourcing should 
be constrained by current resourcing levels'. It concluded, though, that 
'fiscal issues should be addressed as one of the final considerations' of 
the group. According to two SCG members interviewed, however, 
evaluating the adequacy of funding was clearly implicated in what was 
seen as the 'premature' ending of the group. Both saw resourcing 
levels as being, in the end, 'a political decision' - a decision not only 
outside the purview of the SCG's terms of reference for providing 
policy advice, but also in terms of their skill to undertake and evaluate 
co stings of various options. According David Jackson, the SCG could 
(and should): 
only give advice; officials then have to go away and work out 
whether the advice can be used. 
Damage Control: the Final Meeting 
The majority of the SCG, however, was in favour of the 
recommendations made by the subgroup. At the meeting of 4 July, 
when the staffing review report was debated clause by clause, none of 
the fina.! recommendations created any debate or amendment. In fact, 
few of the changes suggested at the meeting could be described as 
substantive; they related mainly to organisational aspects of the report, 
such as the replacement of diagrams or the reordering of paragraphs 
(SCG minutes 4.7.94). All members endorsed the conceptual 
framework recommended in the report and agreed that technical work 
to model and test the proposals it contained was needed. 
The one factor, yet again, that the subgroup could not agree on was the 
delivery mechanism for salaries. The subgroup advised in their report 
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that 'they were unable to reach a consensus positionll on point three 
of its terms of reference' and that consideration of recommendation 10 
was referred back to the full SCG 'on the direction of the Chairperson' 
(Teacher Staffing Formulae Review Subgroup Report July 1994). 
Although the minutes documenting the debate over bulk funding in 
the sub group meetings were not available, several members referred 
to events that took place - the most notable of which was the vote on 
the issue called for by Phil Raffills. As discussed in an earlier chapter, 
the processes by which the SCG reached decisions were based very 
firmly on negotiation and consensus - successful, albeit in relation to 
much less contentious issues. Throughout the full term of the SCG 
and its various subgroups, no formal voting procedure had ever been 
instituted for any issue under consideration. Yet at the final subgroup 
meeting on the staffing review, members were compelled to 
participate in a somewhat crude version of 'majority rules'. 
According to John Sutcliffe, President of the Intermediate Principals' 
Association and member of the staffing review subgroup, a 'sensitive 
situation' occurred at its final June meeting: 
Now 'where it all came to pieces was when, one fateful 
afternoon, a vote was called for. You don't vote on those 
things, you discuss and talk and reach positions. People felt 
they had to retreat to their trenches. I can remember that so 
vividly, I thought 'this is wrong, so absolutely wrong'. It was 
in that dangerous time of 2-3 o'clock when people are tired, 
irritable and need a break.. .. That's what seemed to torpedo it. 
According to Phil Raffills, however, a clear consensus was emerging 
within the subgroup in support of bulk funding. But the minutes, he 
claimed, persisted in recording that no agreement could be reached. At 
the meeting in which the vote took place, he says: 
... I was ropable. I spoke to STA and said 'this is crazy, you're 
saying that this group operates on consensus and we have to 
11 Debate over bulk funding in the subgroup had centred around two options: either to 
allow boards a choice of delivery mechanisms or to apply a single mechanism to all 
schools (Subgroup Report 1994). 
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have a consensus. What I'm saying is already it appears to 
me there is a majority of six, or whatever, in favour of 
having a choice - which includes bulk funding. Now I want 
every sector group to go around the table and state their 
view'. No way were they going to have that. John 
Anderson wasn't there but it was chaired by an NZEI person, 
and with Patricia McNeill having a very strong influence on 
the group, there was no way - they were not going to allow it. 
I insisted and pushed it, and we all went round and stated 
our views. It was clearly seven to two in favour of choice. 
While precipitated by Raffills, his action was viewed by others on the 
group as evidence of a concerted push by members and officials, both 
inside and outside the Group, to get bulk funding (or something close 
to it) through with the endorsement of the SCG. For both the PPTA 
and the NZEI, the alignment between the Minister, the Ministry and 
some members· of the SCG over bulk funding was clear and long-
standing. Other members, too, saw the hand of the Ministry12 in the 
proceedings: 
It became clear as the Group continued, as it went into [1994J, 
that the Ministry officials were meeting separately and 
certainly planning some strategy.I3 
The vote destroyed the goodwill generated within the group and 
polarised the SCG. Its effect, at the full group meeting in July, was for 
members to retreat to their 'fixed positions'. 
John Anderson's role at the final full SCG meeting seems to have been 
one of damage control. While dissension over bulk funding was ever-
present in the SCG, it had been effectively controlled and constrained 
to a considerable degree by the group's willingness to comply with its 
internal procedures and processes for negotiated outcomes, as well as 
by simply delaying the debate. The vote over bulk funding, though, 
12 A group known as the TSG Referral Group, of which Phil Raffills was a member, 
were meeting with Ministry of Education officials from at least the beginning of 1994. 
As well as this formal channel of contact with Ministry officials, it seems that he also 
had considerable informal contact with them as well. 
13 Member of the SCG interviewed for this project. The quotation cannot be attributed 
directly. 
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appears to have taken most members by surprise. Indeed, according to 
John Sutcliffe, the contrast between the previous meeting on 27 April 
and the 4 July meeting in terms of 'the spirit of consensus and 
goodwill' was stark14. 
In the face of this withdrawal to fixed positions, Anderson suggested 
that a technical group be established to test not only the feasibility of 
the staffing formula but also to 'provide a description and cost analysis 
of the delivery mechanisms discussed by the subgroup' (SCG minutes 
4.7.94) - a suggestion to which members agreed. While this work was 
being undertaken, over approximately three or four months, the SCG 
agreed that the delivery mechanisms for salaries that were already in 
place should apply for 1995. On 12 July, Anderson advised the 
Minister of Education, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance 
of the substantive recommendations of the 4 July meeting and 
forwarded to them the minutes and the staffing review subgroup 
report, along with details of the proposed technical working group to 
investigate delivery mechanisms 'in terms of cost and 
implementation' (Anderson to Smith 12.7.94). Suggested terms of 
reference for the group were also appended which included making 
recommendations on: 
• a methodology for determining the level(s) and quantum 
of teaching resource required by schools to deliver the 
curriculum, to manage and support curriculum delivery 
and to support equity in curriculum delivery; 
• to describe, provide a cost analysis and investigate 
transition and implementation of the options for 
delivery of teaching resources discussed by the SCG. That 
is: 
(i) a system which would allow boards to choose one of 
the following: 
14 It is also possible, although there is no evidence to suggest this is the case, that in 
the intervening weeks the proposal of the Minister to implement bulk funding trial 
formula may have 'come to light'. 
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delivery in hours/FTTE;l5 
delivery in hours/FTTE with the ability to cash in up to 
100% of entitlement; 
the TSG formula; 
an EFTS system (ibid). 
November 30 was tentatively set as the date by which the technical 
group was to complete its work and report back to the full SCG. 
Anderson suggested to Smith that, after receiving responses to the 
proposed terms of reference from SCG members, they meet to 'discuss 
the process' (ibid). This was the situation with regard to the status and 
operation of the SCG as members left it on 4 July 1994. The group was 
eventually disbanded amidst some confusion around September 
without meeting again. 
The 'Final Reports' of the SCG 
For what seems to be the majority of members, the first indication the 
SCG had been disestablished came with the release of two summary 
reports, apparently authored by John Anderson, on 5 September 1994. 
In a covering letter to members, Anderson informed them a meeting 
had been held, on 23 August, between himself and the Ministers of 
Education and Finance to discuss SCG recommendations concerning 
the staffing review and proposals for the technical working group 
(Anderson to SCG Members 5.9.94). This meeting had, in fact, been 
delayed until the outcome of a crucial by-election in the Selwyn 
electorate was known16. 
15 Full-time teacher equivalents - a staffing driven funding formula. 
16 Selwyn was the electorate of the former Minister of Finance, Ruth Richardson. 
Richardson, who had been even more unpopular than her predecessor, Roger Douglas, 
had lost crucial support from within the business sector (Kelsey 1995). After the 
National party barely scraped home in the 1993 election with a one seat majority, 
political pragmatism took over. Richardson was replaced by former Minister of Labour 
and State Services Bill Birch. Dissatisfied with the powerlessness of being a back-
bencher, she resigned in 1994. Given National's precarious parliamentary majority, 
the outcome of the by-election was critical. As it was, the newly-formed Alliance, a 
coalition of left-wing political parties, came within 500 votes of winning the seat 
(ibid) . 
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According to Anderson's letter, it had been agreed at that meeting that 
he should prepare a report for the Minister detailing: 
• the work of the group to date; 
• the options available to the government for delivering 
resources to schools in order for them to employ teachers; 
and 
• the relationship between the delivery mechanism issue 
and reform programmes particularly the Curriculum and 
Qualifications Frameworks, and issues arising from 
these. 
Two reports covering these issues were forwarded to members, 
Education Priorities in the School Sector, and Teacher Staffing and 
Resource Delivery Mechanisms: Options (see Appendix III). They 
were, in fact, appendices to a separate letter forwarded by Anderson to 
the Ministers of Education and Finance and the Prime Minister which 
outlined, in general terms, the work of the SCG over the two yean; of 
its existence. In this letter Anderson summarised the position reached 
by the SCG at its last meeting and outlined the alternative funding 
mechanisms the technical working group was intended to investigate: 
partial bulk funding and board choice17. Anderson included two 
further options that he believed were open to the government: the 
maintenance of the status quo, that is, centralised funding, or full bulk 
funding. 
The final reports contained a clear rebuke from Anderson to the 
Minister in terms of the emphasis that had been placed on the issue of 
the funding mechanism for teachers' salaries throughout the life of 
the SCG. His comments were also critical of the nature of the 
educational reform process carried out and the 'inertia and 
uncertainty' that it had created in schools (Education Priorities p5). In 
Education Priorities in the School Sector, Anderson outlined, in 
general terms, what he considered were the key areas arising out the 
17 Under this option, school boards could elect to receive their funding for teacher 
salaries in any combination of cash or teacher hours. 
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reform process, areas that required 'clarification and improvement' 
(some of which were central components of National education 
policy), for example: the viability of school boards of trustees as a 
management structure; the risks to schools of bad financial 
management as well as increasing inequalities between schools in 
terms of the wealth of their community; and the educational viability 
of schools as stand-alone competitive units, and the consequences of 
such an organisational structure for equality of opportunity. 
In his identification of the issues that required immediate attention, 
bulk funding was not apriority. Indeed, the issue of mechanisms for 
the resourcing of schools were what he considered to be of a 'third 
order' priority. The most pressing, or 'first order', issue was the 
curriculum and qualifications frameworks. The lack of understanding 
and support for the frameworks, the absence of policy integration 
between the two and inadequate levels of resourcing all required the 
attention of government. Second order issues revolved around four 
key policy areas that underpinned curriculum and qualification 
reforms: the implications of parental and school choice; the effects of 
choice on equality of opportunity; the tension between national 
standards versus local decision-making; and the effects of cost cutting 
in the school sector. 
The 'third order' issue of funding mechanism was the subject of the 
second report, Teacher Staffing and Resource Delivery Mechanisms -
Options. In this, the four options outlined above were considered in 
detail. Full bulk funding, as in the TSG trial model, had the virtue of 
being consistent with government policy for increasing the level of 
school self-management, yet would face considerable opposition, he 
believed, from both opponents of bulk funding and supporters of 
school choice alike. Board choice, an option suggested by the School 
Trustees Association, was difficult to evaluate without the costings 
that were to be carried out by the seG's technical working group. The 
status quo, the delivery of the majority of teachers' salaries in hours or 
full time teacher equivalents, was also considered 'not strictly viable' 
(Options p2) - on the grounds that: 
... a number of initiatives in place (SCM) or due to be 
implemented over the next two years (outcome of the 
212 
review of supplementary resourcing) already redefine the 
status quo (ibid). 
The final option, partial bulk funding, where core curriculum 
functions would be delivered through teaching hours with equity and 
management functions delivered in cash, was clearly the option most 
favoured by Anderson. The most important aspect of this option was: 
It could receive the support of the unions as well as the 
majority of boards and principals, thus retaining the 
goodwill in the sector essential for the effective 
implementation of the wider reform programme (ibid:5). 
In addition, it would allow flexibility, give schools the experience of 
bulk funding in a manageable way, would provide a stable 
environment within the school sector, and would 'create the 
opportunity' to reform teacher employment contracts. Its drawback, 
however, was that it was not 'the full bulk funding model' (ibid). 
In a final comment on the level of resourcing, Anderson was 
forthright in his criticism of the amount of funding made available to 
implement the government's initiatives in education. Reviews of 
staffing schedules and formulae were required in light of the demands 
made by the new curriculum and qualifications frameworks, the 
impact of technology on teaching and the concept of seamless 
education. Furthermore, according to Anderson: 
Attention to this element of the overall question of teacher 
staffing would do much to allay fears in the sector that policy 
is driven by a desire to cut the overall cost of the teacher 
salaries budget (ibid:6). 
Anderson ended his covering letter to members by noting that, with 
the preparation of these final two reports by him, the work of the 
Schools Consultative Group was over, and that it was now 'up to 
government to consider the options in the wider context of 
educational reform' (Anderson to SCG members 5.9.94). 
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Reaction to the Dissolution 
The response of members to the dissolution of the SCG was mixed. 
For some, its ending was anticipated; for others, it came as a complete 
surprise - 'shocked and appalled' according to one particular member. 
While most expressed disappointment and concern that the 
government was dispensing with a forum such as the SCG, a not 
unexpected sentiment given the circumstances of the previous five 
years, by far the most trenchant criticism was reserved for John 
Anderson, who many believed had initiated the termination of the 
group. Members not only objected to what they saw as his premature 
ending of the SCG, but also strongly disapproved of the content of the 
reports and the lack of consultation over them. With extraordinary 
amnesia, some members believed Anderson was guilty of breaching 
what was an already seriously compromised SCG 'process'. 
For the two teacher unions, the end of the SCG was no surprise. 
According to Joanna Beresford of the NZEI, the SCG had reached the 
end of its useful life by mid-1994. In terms of its work programme, a 
number of tasks had been completed, although for the NZEI there 
remained the key issue of primary school staffing that had yet to be 
resolved. More significant, though, was the resurfacing of the 
structural tension within the group created by its membership 
configuration. Moreover, according to Beresford, the difficulties in the 
relationship between the group and the Ministry of Education had also 
reached a critical mass: 
1'd always thought the group was top-heavy and there was a 
question of whether it would collapse under its own weight 
over a period of time. 50 I think there was a question as to 
whether the group should have been reconstituted or 
reformatted - bulk funding should have been set to one side 
and a slightly smaller, more cohesive group [formed] .... 1 
think there was beginning to be a question mark [too] as to 
whether the 5CG in its current form, with a Ministry who 
was so clearly opposed to some of the things coming out of 
the 5CG, was going to continue to be a useful forum. I guess 
what you could say is that John Anderson's letter brought 
that to a head. 
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The PPTA, too, expressed official disappointment that the SCG had 
ended without resolving all the issues it was designed to consider 
(PPTA News, September 1994). For the PPTA, however, the SCG was 
becoming a liability. The structure of the group was such that, even 
though most of the groups involved represented a very small 
constituency, a consensus decision was emerging on the side of bulk 
funding and, furthermore, this outcome had been given time to 
emerge by the NZEI's pursuit of the primary staffing review through 
the SCG. According to Martin Cooney, if the SCG had kept to the 
position on bulk funding contained in recommendation 10 of the 
Principles and Mechanisms report of December 1993 (the extension of 
the SGM to all staff), this would have had the full support of the 
PPTA. As it was, the staffing review created a breathing space for the 
pro-bulk funding lobby to reform and plan a renewed strategy. 
Overall, the PPTA accepted the termination of the SCG before it could 
come out in favour of bulk funding. 
The PPTA was not surprised, either, that Anderson had moved to 
terminate the group. According to the PPTA, Anderson was fully 
aware of the alignment between, and machinations of, the Ministry of 
Education and the supporters of bulk funding within the group, and 
saw that because of their 'close collaboration', the SCG process was 
essentially doomed. Furthermore, the deliberate imbalance in the 
group's membership engineered by the Minister of Education would 
eventually prevail. As it was, Anderson had steered the group towards 
a solution to the impasse in bulk funding that would have seen the 
extension of the SGM mechanism to all teachers, a position supported 
by the teacher unions, although the membership of both expressed 
some opposition. Thus, the issue had been resolved by the end of 1993. 
But with bulk funding revisiting in mid-1994, it was clear that the SCG 
would reach a position that would be opposed by the unions. By this 
stage Anderson had been appointed to the Employment Task Force 
and, according to Kevin Bunker, was having his views on education 
affirmed by the views being expressed to the Task Force: that the 
priorities in education were not administrative, but concerned the 
curriculum and the adequacy of funding available to do the job. Again 
according to Kevin Bunker, Anderson believed these views needed to 
be expressed to the Prime Minister - and were, via his final reports. 
215 
While both unions were happy with the position taken by Anderson 
in his reports to the Minister, many other members were not. Publicly, 
though, opposition was articulated largely in terms of a breach of SCC 
process, not a dispute over the content of the reports. While some 
members were 'dismayed' at some of the conclusions, a media 
statement was released on 20 September, with the assistance of the 
Ministry of Education, in which the representatives from the STA, the 
NZPF, SPANZ, the ISC, the APIS and the NZISP publicly dissociated 
themselves from the manner in which the final reports had been 
formulated: 
While we acknowledge the personal view of John 
Anderson ... about the work of the group dealing with school 
staffing and resourcing, we do not accept that the process of 
consultation regarding the agenda of the Group has been 
concluded. The chairman's report to government has not 
been endorsed by the Group. 
Although some participants were happy with Anderson's account of 
the work done by the SCC, for example both David Jackson and John 
Sutcliffe of the NZISP A 18 endorsed his reports as a fair summation of 
the views held by the group, most objected to his unilateral authorship 
of them. They were disappointed that no final meeting had been 
convened to debate the contents before submission to the Minister, in 
spite of Anderson's assertion that 'the nature and timing of the 
Minister's request' to produce the final reports prevented him from 
doing so (Anderson to Members 5.9.94). It is clear, however, that the 
endorsement of the reports by the SCC was unnecessary; they reflected 
Anderson's own views, not the view of the group19. If it can be argued 
there was an alignment between the Minister of Education, Ministry 
officials and the supporters of bulk funding on the SCC, the same 
could also be said of Anderson and the teacher unions. From the 
outset, Anderson had clear sympathies with the PPTA's position 
18 John Sutcliffe was the representative for the Intermediate Schools' Principals' 
Association for most of the term of the SCG. By the time of the release of the media 
statement in September 1994, he had been replaced by Brian Davison who supported 
the views contained in the release. 
19 Indeed, this was the instruction given to Anderson at the meeting with Birch and 
Smith. He was not asked to provide the SCG's outline of their own work or views; he 
was asked to prepare the report himself. 
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particularly, and, from the contents of his reports, shared many of the 
unions' concerns over the structure a,nd direction of education policy. 
Given the extent to which Anderson was presenting his own concerns 
about the education sector, it was highly unlikely that ratification by 
the full SCG would be forthcoming. 
It is questionable whether the complaints that Anderson had not 
respected the process of consensus and consultation were a genuine 
concern. In the media statement, while objections were framed in 
terms of the lack of consultation, the dissatisfaction with the process 
was, in fact, displaced opposition to the views Anderson presented. If 
the reports submitted to the Minister had endorsed the full bulk 
funding option, it is highly likely that those SCG members protesting 
the lack of consultation might have been considerably less vociferous 
in their opposition. As it was, objections over the process rather than 
the outcome (that is, no support for full bulk funding) was the only 
possible avenue for protest, in public at least; it would be difficult for 
those supportive of bulk funding to display their own agenda so 
openly without also being exposed to the accusation of compromising 
the consultation process. 
The storm over the dissolution of the SCG broke publicly in late 
September, when the press carried reports of the row generated among 
members by Anderson's final submissions to the Minister. The split 
in the SCG over the bulk funding issue, though, had been alluded to 
earlier in July. In a speech to school trustees, the Prime Minister had 
made reference to the stand-off within the SCG over the salary funding 
mechanism and asked whether or not trustees supported 'the unions' 
position that schools should be denied options for funding and self-
management' (The Press 21.7.94) - a contravention of SCG confidence 
~nd prot~col ~hat even governmel~r~ources at the time described as 
extraordmary . ) 
With the ending of the SCG, the conflict in education was once again 
in the media spotlight, the 'two years of peace' (PPTA News, April 
1995:4) seemed to be over. Throughout the term of the SCG, the 
release of information to the media had been strictly governed by 
operating protocols, with statements concerning the issues under 
consideration by the group made either by Anderson himself or with 
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his prior approval. With the disintegration of the group, however, 
conflict over education once again became headline news20. 
The SCG Becomes the MRG: Same People, Same Issues ... ? 
On October 5 1994, in the Wellington 'Evening Post', the Minister of 
Education signalled that bulk funding was once again back on the 
agenda. Citing the slow pace of change in education and the rigidity of 
the current system, Smith was determined to find some way of giving 
schools more control over their resources: 
I could do the easy thing and do nothing and keep the union 
leaders happy, or do I try to do the things that are right for 
the students? I don't feel I have any choice. I must do what 
is right for the students. 
His clear support for the implementation of bulk funding highlighted 
his rejection of both the reports submitted by John Anderson and the 
work of the SCG overall. While the newspaper report noted that 
Smith intended 'to have a careful look at the report of the SCG', he 
viewed it as 'inappropriate' to comment on how he might proceed 
with the issue. It became abundantly clear how he intended to proceed 
later in October, however, when the government announced it was 
establishing a new education group to replace the SCG - the Ministerial 
Reference Group (MRG). The MRG was established in November 
with the same participants as the SCG, although this time with a 
reduction in number of representatives from the NZEI, and was given 
the same issues to consider: to advise the Minister on both 'a rational 
system for generating the staffing resource entitlement and delivery 
mechanisms' (Report of the MRG February 1995:4). 
The speed with which the MRG was formed so soon after the demise 
of the SCG suggested that the bulk funding agenda was to be 
continued21, but this time with the Minister more firmly in: control of 
20 After a quick trawl through The Press for 1993, news items on education for the year 
numbered 11; to September 1994 there were 30, with 27 of those occurring over June, July 
and August. 
21 By this stage Smith had received the report from Dialogue Consultants. According 
to one source, the Ministry of Education were keen to pursue bulk funding via the unified 
staffing structure outlined in the Dialogue Consultants report. The similarities 
between the unified entitlement of the Dialogue report and the core resource 
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the process. With the Minister determined to see progress made 
towards bulk funding, the semblance of legitimacy lent to the SCG by 
the independence of its chairman as well as its putative 'consultative' 
role, was dispensed with for the MRG. The 1992 warning that had 
been given to Smith by his Ministry concerning the selection of an 
independent chairperson - that John Anderson may be 'less inclined to 
follow [the Minister's] direction' over the issue of bulk funding - was 
heeded this time. The Minister himself assumed the chairmanship. 
Keeping the SCG at arms length from the Minister and officials, and 
Anderson's vigilance in keeping it so, had clearly created a space 
within which some representatives on the SCG could attempt to 
articulate independent opinion. For the MRG, though, this was not to 
be an option22 . 
In spite of resorting to direct control of the group himself, Smith 
persisted with claims of independence for the MRG. In a speech at the 
annual conference of the NZ Intermediate School Principals' 
Association, he noted: 
In their work, [the MRG] were constrained by the 
government's fiscal strategy, just as I am everyday (sic). But 
within that constraint they were granted powers which are 
unprecedented in New Zealand education policy 
development. The final report was the work of the group as 
a whole. It was not my work nor that of the Ministry of 
Education .... The report did not, therefore, reflect the 
particular views of anyone person, but the collective will of 
the group. And those who accepted the unprecedented 
powers of the group - in practical terms, the delegated 
powers of the Minister of Education - have had to accept the 
responsibility for that power, and the venom which change 
always creates (Smith 7.6.95). 
entitlement of the MRG report are marked - with parts of the former reproduced 
verbatim in the latter. Further evidence, perhaps, that the MRG, like the SCG, was 
not about consultation. 
22 Interestingly, the participation of government officials within the MRG was 
limited to speaking when spoken to - they were observers who could comment only 
when specifically invited (Sunday Star Times 12.3.95). . 
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With the need for changes to the salary funding mechanism for the 
1996 school year to be in the Orders in Council by June 1995, the MRG 
met over December and January and produced their report for the 
Minister in February 199523 . And with respect to bulk funding they 
affirmed what could perhaps be considered, for the Minister, the 
second best option24: 
8. All boards choose: 
either 
to be staffed and payrolled centrally, 
or 
to recezve the resource entitlement in cash for staffing, 
with the right of review after three years. 
With the exception of the PPTA, all MRG members were heralded by 
the Minister as accepting the package as a whole (ibid). And although 
the NZEI had their opposition to bulk funding formally registered in a 
footnote to the report, Bruce Adin nevertheless signed NZEI's 
agreement to it25 . The 'monumental opposition' (The Press 29.10.94) 
threatened by NZEI to any attempts to impose bulk funding through 
the reference group never eventuated. 
23 Given that the SCG deliberated for two years on much the same issues, the short 
time-frame for the production of the MRG report might be explained by its similarity 
to the existing Dialogue Consultants Report of September 1994. 
24 It is highly likely the Minister's preference for outcome would be to have bulk 
funding universalised throughout the compulsory education sector. That schools were 
given a choice might be considered a very small victory for the opponents of bulk 
funding. 
25 It is interesting to speculate on the role of the establishment of the Government's 
Working Party on a Unified Pay System in appeasing the opposition of the NZEI to the 
bulk funding proposals. Throughout the latter half of 1994, the NZEI had become 
increasingly militant in the face of government refusals to consider pay parity. In the 
face of threatened strike action by the NZEI, the Government agreed to set up a 
working party to consider the issue. A perusal of the NZEI newsletter, 'Rourou', over 
the latter part of 1994 and the first half of 1995 indicates clearly that the focus of 
NZEI action was on achieving pay parity not opposing bulk funding. The collapse of 
the SCG in September 1994 was duly noted, yet discussion of bulk funding was curiously 
absent. 
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CHAPTER IX - CONCLUSION 
Do we really feel that we can win the bulk funding 
battle? ... Maybe we can move the problem sideways into a 
forum and continue to address the real issue of funding for 
education overall. They're excluding teachers from policy 
making and we, I guess, saw very much our role as social 
partners, as part of the process of government. The other 
side of that is that if you Ire part of the process you don't 
have the option at the end of kicking up a stink (Martin 
Cooney, PPTA President, 1992).1 
There are two quite distinct positions identifiable concerning the 
function of the Schools Consultative Group - one of which is 
embodied by the quote above. For the education sector groups who 
participated, the SCG was, potentially at least a forum within which 
issues of general concern in education could be debated by those groups 
with specialised knowledge and expertise. In short, it was the forum by 
which education sector groups could, once again, have legitimate and 
formalised input into policy by virtue of their positions as 
professionals. The second position is that of the government - or, from 
the dearth of material available from this particular source, what can 
be inferred as the position of the government. Given the context in 
which the SCG arose in 1992, the tensions surrounding its operation 
and its dissolution almost two years later, it would appear that the SCG 
was intended as nothing more than a short-term solution to the 
specific crises of 1992 and as a containment strategy for the very public 
campaign of opposition the teacher unions were conducting. 
Given these competing perspectives, it is clear the SCG was the site on 
which a two.,.dimensional contest was being waged - a contest between 
participants within the SCG, as well as a contest over the SCG as a site 
of contestation between the state and the teacher unions. Not only did 
1 From Teach the Children Well: the Secondary School Power Struggle' by Rosemary 
McLeod, North and South magazine, October 1992. This provocative article, in which 
the position of the PPTA on bulk funding was presented in a somewhat partisan 
fashion, was typical of the 'teacher-bashing' undertaken during 1992. 
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individual groups within the SCG struggle over the specific issues 
considered by the group, primarily bulk funding, but they also engaged 
collectively in a broader struggle with the state over the positioning of 
the group as a genuine consultative body. It was a contest, following 
Jessop, that arose out the neo-Liberal institutional form of the state and 
was manifested, simultaneously, as a crisis of support for the state's 
hegemonic project as well as its institutionalised modes of interest 
representation. The solution to this institutional as well as strategic 
crisis, it was suggested in Chapter III, was the reversion by the state to a 
corporatist-style strategy more typical of relationships within the 
, education state prior to its restructuring during the 1980s and was, 
thus, something of a political anomaly. The Schools Consultative 
Group must be seen, in this context, as both positioned within a 
specific terrain of struggle, but at the same time also as a strategy to 
transform the larger terrain on which educational struggles were 
carried out. 
Four questions arise from this particular hypothesis: firstly, was the 
SCG a corporatist-type body; second, if it was, to what extent was it an 
anomaly within a neo-Liberal state form?; third, why was a corporatist 
strategy pursued as a solution to the education crisis of 1992?; and, 
finally, was the SCG a 'success' in terms of achieving what it had been 
set up to achieve? These four issues will be dealt with in turn. 
What Was the SCG? 
There are, clearly, a number of answers to this question, depending 
upon the perspective of each of the participant groups. The most 
significant to be considered here, however, are those of the 
government and the teacher unions who, in the drama tis personae of 
the 1992 conflict, were plainly the leading characters. 
For the government, the SCG appeared to serve a number of purposes. 
Firstly, and most obviously, it was to function according to the tasks 
outlined in the initial terms of reference, as an advisory group to aid 
the resolution of the specific issues around which education conflict 
was being waged - most notably the bulk funding of teachers' salaries. 
It was to be a forum in which the various education sector groups, 
appointed by the Minister of Education, could potentially have input 
into the policy process as it related to the funding mechanism for 
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teachers' salaries. This particular function of the group was clearly not 
supported by the Minister of Education, Lockwood Smith, as suggested 
by the involvement of the Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, and the 
Minister of State Services (and later Minister of Finance) Bill Birch. 
The involvement of the most senior members of the National 
government, unusual in the setting up of consultative groups in other 
sectors, is perhaps a good indication of the politically sensitive nature 
of the conflict that was occurring during 1992 and of the extent to 
which the government as a whole, not just the Minister of Education, 
would reap the consequences were it to continue. The appointment of 
a specific configuration of participants, however, suggests that the 
Minister took the SCG as an opportunity to advance the agenda of 
school self-management. So, while he did not endorse the mechanism 
of the SCG as appropriate for the solution of the bulk funding crisis, he 
did appear to take the opportunity it offered to shape the outcome of 
the group's deliberations. 
Secondly, and less obviously, it was the forum in which the specific 
industrial conflicts between the teacher unions and the government 
were to be mediated and resolved. The third, and perhaps the most 
important, function of the SCG was that it provided the means by 
which a very public conflict between the teacher unions and the 
Minister of Education could be removed from the public arena, thus 
sparing the government as a whole the political consequences of the 
hostility. 
Clearly, these functions are not exclusive. Indeed, it could be argued 
that shades of all three are evident throughout the life of the group. In 
its initial phase, in the settlement of the issues causing immediate 
conflict - the introduction of the Salaries Grant for Management, the 
commencement of the bulk funding trial as well as issues concerning 
the negotiation of collective employment contracts - the purpose of the 
group was to resolve these issues. Its specific status was never clear, 
however, thus putting the group potentially into conflict with the 
Ministry of Education. Once the original disputes were settled, once its 
corporatist-type function had been completed, the SCG became an 
advisory group to the Minister of Education as outlined in its quite 
tightly prescribed terms of reference. And overall, in both phases of its 
operation, the SCG successfully contained the conflict over bulk 
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funding, and education issues generally, and kept it out of the public 
arena until the demise of the group in September 1994. 
The teacher unions shared with the government the view that the 
SCG represented the best means by which to achieve particular goals. 
Indeed, in an important sense for the unions, the SCG was the goal. 
For the unions, while endorsing with some scepticism the function of 
the group to resolve the bulk funding issue, the SCG presented a 
crucial opportunity to gain what they believed to be their legitimate 
right to representation and input at the political level on all 
'professional' issues, a position that appeared to be widely shared with 
the other participants in the group. The opportunity the SCG offered 
to the unions clearly outweighed the disadvantages. For both the 
PPTA and the NZEI, it meant foregoing their strategy of maintaining a 
public and hostile campaign of opposition to education policy in the 
hope of embarrassing the government and possible forcing some policy 
concessions. The question of whether to join, an issue raised by the 
unions, was quite clearly never an issue of substance, although 
mistrust of the Minister of Education and doubt over the constitution 
of the group was obviously cause for concern for both. Given that the 
SCG presented the only opportunity for political input to be offered 
since the implementation of Tomorrow's Schools in 1989, however, it 
was highly unlikely the unions would refuse to participate. 
For the unions, too, the SCG was the mechanism by which the issue of 
bulk funding might finally be disposed of. For the PPTA it seems likely 
that agreement to recommendation 102, which evidence suggests 
might have been an outcome of its deliberations prior to agreeing to 
participate in the SCG in 1992, and agreement to the implementation 
of the Salaries Grant for Management, was the price by which the rest 
of the bulk funding policy might be bought off. The NZEI, although 
also trenchantly opposed to bulk funding, saw the SCG as an 
opportunity to pursue their goal of increased primary staffing, an issue 
they were successful in getting referred to the SCG for consideration. 
2 ' ... the mechanism for the financing of teachers (sic) salaries be the payment of the 
applicable staffing formulae combined with the actual salaries of teachers employed 
into school bank accounts, with teachers paid by boards according to applicable 
contractual arrangements.' (SCG Principles and Mechanisms report, December 1993). In 
effect, recommendation 10 advocated the extension of the Salaries Grant for 
Management mechanism to all teachers. 
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Having staffing debated by the SCG effectively left the NZEI leadership 
free to concentrate on pay parity, an issue of increasing importance to 
its wider membership. As Jesson (1995) notes, albeit in relation to the 
PPTA, both unions can be seen to have engaged in behaviour best 
described as 'rational opportunism' with regard to the opportunities 
presented by the SCG. 
Was the SCG a Corporatist Body? 
The life of the SCG fell into two distinct phases; the settlement phase, 
from October 1992 to April 1993, during which time the immediate 
issues which had created the conflict during 1992 were dealt with, and 
its advisory phase, from April 1993 until its demise around September 
1994, during which the substantive issues contained in its terms· of 
reference, as well as the other issues subsequently referred, were 
attended to. If the SCG could be regarded as being corporatist in 
character at all, it was only weakly so, and was characteristic of its 
settlement phase only. Once this first phase was over, the corporatist 
tendency collapsed and the SCG became simply another 'competitive' 
policy advisory group to the Minister of Education. 
As outlined in Chapter III, particular conditions need to be present for 
the SCG to represent a corporatist relationship between the state and 
the interest groups represented: concentration of political interests, a 
particular configuration of the state and state power as well as some 
evidence of political exchange in the relationship. These will be dealt 
with in order. 
The Concentration of Political Interests 
Quite clearly, the teacher unions, as with the other education sector 
groups represented on the SCG, could be considered as monopoly non-
competitive representatives of the interests of both state primary and 
secondary teachers; there are no other groups, in terms of either 
teachers' professional or industrial concerns, competing to represent 
these interests at the political level. While not compulsory, teachers 
are historically a highly unionised workforce3, which is the functional 
equivalent of compulsory membership. Although the difficulties of 
3 According to the Christchurch office of the PPTA, membership covers approximately 
80% of secondary teachers; for the NZEI, the membership figure is between 96-97%. 
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applying corporatist theory to professional associations within the state 
have been discussed, a convincing case can be made, as Walsh (1987) 
notes, for viewing associations of professional state employees as 
internal interests organised around issues concerning professional 
autonomy. The challenge to the professional autonomy of teachers 
evident in the entire neo-Liberal agenda for the restructuring of 
education is a compelling 'divergence' of interests between the state 
and teachers. 
It might be assumed that the School Trustees' Association would be an 
ideal corporatist interest group. As the association of trustees who, 
under the ideal of devolved self-management of schools, would 
represent the employers of teachers, the STA would be a crucial group 
to be involved in a tripartite corporatist arrangement involving the 
state, employers' and employees' associations. However, apart from 
some difficulties regarding the adequacy of their representation of 
members' interests, in the current industrial environment in which 
both primary and secondary teachers are employed under collective 
employment contracts, the State Services Commission represents the 
employer - the state - in contract negotiations. As such, the 
participation of the STA in the SCC, while important for political 
legitimacy, was not vital for a corporatist arrangement between 
education sector employers and employees to exist. The only necessary 
participants would be the state, as employer, and the teacher unions. 
Thus, for the first phase of its existence, the SCC could be considered, 
following Cawson (1986, in Chapter III) and in spite of the presence of 
the STA, an example of weak bipartite sectoral meso-corporatism 
between the teacher unions and the education state, that is, those 
agencies functionally involved in the delivery or monitoring of state 
education. 
If this is the case, however, the presence of representatives from other 
interest groups needs to be examined. As with the participation of the 
STA, the other groups represented on the SCC served two purposes: 
first, and most importantly, they lent legitimacy to the appearance of 
the group as a 'genuine' and inclusive forum for consultation with the 
wider education sector. Secondly, and less obviously, they were the 
means by which the Minister of Education shaped the configuration of 
the group in order to influence the outcomes of its decision-making 
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processes. In relation to this latter purpose, what these other groups 
illustrate, as Bull (1992) notes in relation to political exchange (Chapter 
III), is the creation of 'insider' groups for overtly political purposes, by 
attributing to some of them a representational status entirely 
disproportionate to the 'constituency' or interest they putatively 
represented. This was demonstrated most clearly in the appointment 
of the members from the bulk funding trial schools. While almost all 
representatives on the SCG were there by virtue of their representation 
of a genuine constituency of interest, their presence was also· 
determined by the need of the Minister, as outlined in Chapter VI, to 
provide 'countervailing' voices to those of the teacher unions. So, 
while the presence of other groups is not vital to the positioning of the 
SCG as weakly corporatist, they are significant insofar as they were part 
of the strategy of the Minister to shape the membership and, thus, the 
operation, of the SCG. 
The Nature of the State and State Power 
According to Bull (1992, in Chapter III), the emergence of corporatist 
relationships is only likely where a high concentration of political 
interests within civil society, as well as a 'strong' state, exist. In the 
presence of the former and absence of the latter, the strength of the 
interests within civil society would be sufficient to 'colonise' the state, 
resulting in what Bull, in his typology of state-group relations has 
labelled as rule by private interests. Conversely, in the absence of 
concentrated political interests and the presence of a strong state, state 
rule over weak interests would prevail. Under both these particular 
sets of conditions, a corporatist form of articulation between interests 
and the state is rendered unnecessary. Corporatism, thus, walks a 
theoretical knife-edge by requiring both a strong state and strong 
interests; each strong enough to resist the other, but not sufficiently 
strong to act autonomously to pursue their particular interests at a 
given political and/ or historical conjuncture. 
According to Jessop (1990), state strength or weakness, that is the power 
of the state, is the outcome of the strength or weakness of particular 
forces pursuing specific strategies within and through the state or its 
agencies, and may be influenced by the articulation of particular 
agencies that form a 'state within the state' - a constellation of agencies 
identifiable by function such as the education state. Thus it is 
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particular strategies that can be characterised as either strong or weak. 
In the context of the New Zealand state, the strategy from which state 
strength is derived, a strategy which ultimately became the hegemonic 
project of the state, is clearly the economic and political strategy of neo-
Liberalism. As noted by Gamble (1988) in Chapter IV, part of this 
strategy is the creation of a 'strong' state, achieved, as was also outlined 
in relation to New Zealand, by the contraction of the boundaries of the 
state and the concentration of the forces therein, coupled with new 
forms of control and accountability. Within the public sector new 
forms of agency control, the contracting out of functions previously 
carried out by the state, contestability and, most significantly for the 
existence of the SCG, the removal of vested interests from the state 
bureaucracy, have resulted in a state more limited in function, but 
strengthened in its capacities to protect both the policies of the state and 
the free-market order they promote. As Gamble (1994:39) points out: 
Once all illegitimate functions and responsibilities are 
stripped from it the state is no longer the weak state of social 
democracy, overburdened by ever-widening responsibilities 
and infested by special interests, which seek to use the 
political process to portray their sectional interest as the 
public interest. It can concentrate on defending what is the 
true public interest - upholding impartially the rules of the 
market order. 
As was also noted in Chapter IV, this process of stripping away 
'illegitimate functions and responsibilities' was clearly evident in the 
institutional restructuring of the education state during the late 1980s 
under the provisions of Tomorrow's Schools and subsequent 
amendments to the Education Act 1989. As such it can be argued that 
the nature of the education state met the conditions required for the 
emergence of corporatist relations, even though the specific neo-
Liberal form of the state made the pursuit of such relations unlikely. 
And, in relation to the strength of the interest groups the education 
state confronted during 1992, there was clearly some risk involved in 
acting authoritatively to complete the agenda for the self-management 
of schools and to impose the bulk funding of teachers' salaries. In 
short, although the state was 'strong', it was constrained by the 
strength of the opposition of a significant portion of the education 
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sector as well as by the need to be seen to be acting legitimately. The 
capacity of the state to act autonomously, or the limitations on this 
capacity, is a key feature of the third prerequisite of corporatist 
relations, political exchange. 
Political Exchange 
It is clear from the operation of the SCG that political exchange was a 
characteristic of its 'settlement' phase only, that is, when negotiating 
the truce between the teacher unions and the Minister of Education, 
and even then was only partially evident. As noted by Bull (1992) in 
Chapter III, political exchange occurs where the state gives up part of its 
decision-making authority in exchange for the adherence of the 
membership of participant interest groups to the decisions made. 
During its first six months of operation, negotiation between the SCG 
and the Minister centred around consultation over implementation of 
the Salaries Grant for Management, the entry of schools into the bulk 
funding trial and the salary levels of senior teachers who would be 
subject to the SGM. In exchange for the cessation of union pressure on 
schools in the TSG trial, the lifting of the moratoria on the 
Achievement Initiative and the implementation of the SGM without 
disruption, the Minister guaranteed closure to the TSG trial, confirmed 
that consultation over the implementation of the SGM was to be a 
function of the SCG, and partially guaranteed the salaries of senior 
teachers - albeit with the proviso that government expenditure was 
subject to change over time. 
During its advisory phase, however, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the Minister ever considered giving up decision-making authority 
over the question of salaries bulk funding to the SCG, or on any of the 
other issues subsequently referred to it. Indeed, what evidence there is 
suggests a quite contrary view. For instance, the operating protocols 
specifically prevented the SCG from challenging government policy 
decisions or implementation processes and self-management, 
including bulk funding, was already a stated policy goal of the National 
government. Furthermore, the action of the Minister of Education 
early in 1994, in revisiting the issue of the TSG trial and preparing to 
re-open it for new participants, would indicate that his own views on 
the question of salary funding mechanisms had not been altered by the 
suggested solution of the SCG, recommendation 10, reported to him in 
229 
the December 1993 report. If he was supportive of recommendation 10, 
the extension of the trial would be somewhat redundant. 
Conversely, with particular reference to the bulk funding debate, it was 
not clear that the wider membership of either the PPTA or the NZEI 
would adhere to recommendation 10. As noted in Chapter VIII, when 
reported at the annual meeting of both unions, members greeted the 
proposal negatively, viewing the extension of the SGM to all teachers 
as simply another form of bulk funding. On both sides then, the 
Minister and the unions, there was little evidence of political exchange 
over the issue of salary funding mechanism. Indeed, the reception of 
recommendation 10 by the Minister confirms the view of SCG 
operation at this time as that of an advisory group, with the Minister 
free to choose whether or not to accept the advice being offered. 
Within the settlement phase of the SCG, the losses and gains of both 
the unions and the Minister can be postulated. Both lost in terms of 
autonomy of operation, but this was not particularly significant for 
either. For example, according to one source the PPTA were very 
concerned about their capacity to sustain a campaign of opposition. 
And although the decision to participate was debated 'long and hard', 
the creation of a forum such as the SCC was the goal of the PPT A and, 
as such, relinquishing an increasingly fragile autonomy of action in 
return for participation was not a loss of any consequence. For the 
Minister, loss of autonomy was no loss at all, as he had never been in 
the position to act autonomously. If he had, it is highly likely he 
would have acted to impose bulk funding. At the time the SCG was 
formed, it was clear the government were constrained by the potential 
political impact of a very ideologically-committed Minister of 
Education maintaining a very bloody conflict with the teacher unions, 
and which looked like remaining unresolved through until the next 
election. 
By participating in the SCG, however, the unions lost more than 
autonomy of action. By agreeing to the formation of the SCG, and 
their involvement in it, they both essentially lost their 'bargaining 
chips'. While the capacity of the PPTA to sustain their campaign of 
opposition was questionable, once the threat of public conflict had been 
removed both unions lost what leverage they initially had. Once 
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inside the SCC, with the threat of hostility effectively contained within 
its boundaries, the government were, theoretically at least, at liberty to 
ignore the unions' demands. In addition to this, both unions, by 
letting the government 'off the hook' so publicly in the conflict over 
bulk funding, could be exposed to the accusation that the goal of 
regaining representation at the political level challenged the primacy 
of the goal of defeating bulk funding as government policy, bearing in 
mind that they both effectively agreed to a modified form of bulk 
funding in the form of recommendation 10. 
Union gains, however, were two-fold. Firstly, they were able to wring 
concessions from the Minister of Education during the settlement 
phase of the SCG over the bulk funding trial and the introduction of 
the SGM, while they still had the leverage of industrial action. 
Secondly, and most importantly, they regained political involvement -
the long-term goal of both unions, and an attempt to reproduce the 
close relations with the state that, historically, they had benefited from. 
Attempts to reposition the SCG as a genuine consultative group 
ultimately failed, however, and its recommendations to the 
government ignored. Effectively, the gains for the unions from the 
SCG were industrial but they lost significantly in terms of advancing 
their professional concerns. 
The gains for the state were also two-fold. Most importantly for the 
government as a whole, not just the Minister, the widespread hostility 
in the education sector to the government agenda for self-management 
was removed from the public arena, and, in effect, gave them 'two 
years of peace'. Secondly, the exercise in 'consultation' had the effect of 
legitimating the input into major decision-making forums of an 
assortment of groups who had previously been 'bit-players' in the 
education debate - an involvement which has considerable 
implications for the future of 'consultation'. 
The SCG and the Neo-Liberal State 
As an apparent exercise in interest group consultation, the SCG was a 
significant anomaly in the context of a neo-Liberal state, given that one 
of the primary purposes of education restructuring, as elsewhere, had 
been the removal of self-interested teachers and bureaucrats from 
policy decisions and their implementation. The SCC, in its initial 
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weakly corporatist form, could be considered something of a 
contradiction. However, as discussed in Chapter III, corporatism, as a 
form of socio-political articulation, can theoretically co-exist with 
several different state forms. While most frequently associated with 
the Keynesian forms of state intervention, corporatism is not 
specifically proscribed by neo-Liberal forms of state. 
In the context of a neo-Liberal state, however, corporatist arrangements 
may only appear less likely to arise, given the ideological position 
taken on interest groups in general and provider capture in particular. 
For example, the structural rearrangement of state agencies, such as 
occurred in the transformation of the old Department of Education 
into a policy-only Ministry, effectively removed the entry-points into 
the state previously utilised by education sector interest groups. 
Conversely, though, it could be argued that just such a state form could 
make corporatist arrangements more likely. The political vacuum 
created by the withdrawal of the 'strong' neo-Liberal state, as noted by 
Gordon (1992), might in fact encourage the creation of mechanisms 
through which the state may attempt to govern 'indirectly and at a 
distance'. 
Specifically in relation to the SCG, however, it was only weakly 
corporatist in relation to the settlement of the industrial conflicts 
'which arose during 1992. For most of its existence, the SCG was 
eminently compatible, and operated entirely consistently, with the 
neo-Liberal model of contestable policy-advice bodies - a view which 
explains the hostile stance of the Ministry of Education towards the 
SCG. However, despite the best attempts of its parttcipants to position 
the SCG as the only legitimate representative forum, it was ultimately 
unsuccessful as they effectively had no means by which to compel 
either the Minister or the government to take specific regard of their 
recommendations. The strategy which had resulted in the formation 
of the SCG, that is a public campaign of opposition to the government, 
was explicitly precluded by the operating protocol of the group. When 
viewed in this way, the fact that all SCG advice was disregarded 
becomes immaterial. Within the neo-Liberal context, the SCG would 
be accorded no greater legitimacy than any other forum for advice 
merely because they represented education sector groups. Indeed, their 
recommendations were probably to be distrusted for this reason alone. 
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Although SCG members viewed the group as the legitimate forum for 
the resolution of wider educational and professional issues, this was 
not a view shared by the Minister. 
A further point can be made concerning the existence of corporatist 
bodies within a neo-Liberal political framework. In relation to the 
SCG, a distinction can be made between neo-Liberal ends and means. 
As Bull (1992) points out, corporatist strategies do not necessarily imply 
a change of goals by participants, simply a change in the means by 
which they may be achieved. That the Minister was committed to the 
self-management agenda, of which bulk funding was a significant part, 
remained unchanged. If the view is taken that the Minister saw an 
opportunity to advance bulk funding through the SCG, it could be 
argued that the SCG was simply an uncharacteristic means to achieve a 
decidedly neo-liberal end. If the teacher unions used the forum of the 
SCG opportunistically, so too did the Minister of Education. 
Why Pursue a Corporatist Strategy? 
Some answers to this question have already been alluded to. One, a 
simple rational choice explanation, would be that the SCG represented 
the best means available to both the state and the teacher unions to 
achieve the most gains for the fewest losses. Such a response, though, 
is a little simplistic. For the government, there was, effectively, no 
choice. During the conflict of 1992, the government could not afford, 
politically, to either ignore the conflict or to impose solutions -
although this is arguably the solution the Minister of Education would 
have taken. An escalation of the conflict, under such circumstances, 
was a distinct possibility. 
Although the potential political consequences were a constraint on 
government action, the most significant constraint was structural. The 
education crisis that culminated in 1992 had its origin in the 
institutional restructuring of the 1980s. The wider neo-Liberal 
restructuring created a vacuum in both the education sector as well as 
in the industrial relations arena. In both, mechanisms by which 
conflict had historically been mediated, had been removed. Industrial 
conflict was conducted in the public arena as the arbitration 
mechanisms of the old 1. C. and A. Act had been replaced by the 
provisions of the Employment Contracts Act of 1991. Within the 
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education state itself, the new institutional form specifically excluded 
oppositional education sector groups from .input at the political level. 
According to Jessop (1990), the changes in the mode of interest 
representation into the education state, as well as changes to the mode 
of state intervention, created a political crisis in terms of support for 
the restructuring agenda. That the crisis was generated by issues 
concerning the representation of interests rather than simply 
opposition to the reform programme can be demonstrated by the 
actions of the PPTA. In order to gain representation at the political 
level, the PPTA pursued a compromise solution to the issue of bulk 
funding that they may have even been responsible for suggesting -
recommendation 10. This was bulk funding in another guise, a point 
brought home to the PPTA executive by the opposition of their 
members to it. 
In essence, the neo-Liberallabour market restructuring had dismantled 
industrial relations mediation mechanisms and education 
restructuring had expelled the unions. Thus, any solution that 
involved the education state representatives and the teacher unions to 
communicate with each other was, in effect, likely to be corporatist-
looking for the simple reason that mediated solutions cannot be 
achieved with groups who no longer have a stake in the game. The 
adoption of something like a corporatist consultative group was one of 
the means by which to bring previously excluded groups back into the 
picture. As Martin Cooney notes in the introductory quote, 'if you're 
part of the process you don't have the option at the end of kicking up a 
stink.' 
Was the SCG 'Successful'? 
Given that the formation of the SCG was the result of the actions of 
different forces operating to achieve a diversity of goals, there are 
several answers to this question. As a means of reaching a settlement 
to the specific issues that arose during 1992, issues set against a 
backdrop of antagonistic collective contract negotiations under the 
auspices of the Employment Contracts Act, the SCG could be 
considered a success. Although 'negotiating the truce' took almost six 
months, the SCG, as a forum for mediation, achieved a settlement to 
the immediate conflicts in 1992 to the point where the substantive 
234 
work of the group could proceed, and which effectively ended the 
unions' public opposition to the government. 
As a strategy to contain the conflict between the Minister of Education 
and the teacher unions during 1992, then, for the duration of the SCG, 
this was also a success. Over the two years it was in operation the SCG, 
and the issues considered by it, had a very low public profile, a 
deliberate constraint imposed by the group's operating protocols as 
well as by John Anderson's chairmanship. In this regard, the SCG did 
provide 'two years of peace'. For the unions, too, the SCG was a 
success of sorts. It was the first political forum they had participated in 
since Tomorrow's Schools. And as both had continually pressed for 
inclusion at the political level as part of their professional role, the 
SCG successfully, although temporarily, achieved this goal. 
As a consultative group, however, the SCG did not succeed. Although 
none of the recommendations made by the group on the issues it 
considered were heeded by the government, this was not the basis of its 
failure. As the providers of 'contestable' policy advice within a neo-
Liberal environment, the government was free to take the advice of 
the SCG or to ignore it. That the advice was largely ignored was 
immaterial. The source of its failure as a consultative body lay in the 
core issue that the SCG was established to consider - bulk funding. It 
was an issue that shaped the both the form and the function of the 
group. The appointment by the Minister of Education of supporters of 
bulk funding created a specific and unbalanced configuration of 
participants, out of which a negotiated settlement, satisfactory to all 
involved, would be impossible to achieve. Thus, bulk funding 
constituted a significant structural as well as operational weakness. In 
the end, dispute over the funding mechanism for teachers' salaries was 
the issue that both started and finished the SCG, with the group's 
termination by John Anderson before an endorsement of bulk funding 
could be articulated by it. From the unions' point of view as well, the 
SCG failed as a consultative body because it did not succeed in 
recreating the form of consultation they required. The SCG was not 
the old-style 'corporatist' relationship they had previously enjoyed 
with the Department of Education as the terrain on which the SCG was 
formed had been fundamentally altered. 
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However, while the SCG was successful in solving the conflicts of 1992, 
and in controlling the potential for conflict over bulk funding between 
the Minister and the unions, its function was essentially palliative. 
The SCG, as a forum for mediating the struggle between teachers and 
the government that culminated in 1992, merely attended to the 
symptoms of a severely dysfunctional relationship between the two, 
not their most significant underlying cause. The neo-Liberal 
institutional structure remained intact. 
Postscript 1996 
As a weak, and, with hindsight, unstable corporatist arrangement 
between education sector groups and the government, the SCG did not 
represent a reprise of the previous relationships in the education state 
of old. Although the strategic contraction of the boundaries of the neo-
Liberal state created the need for such mediating forums as the SCG, it 
is clear such arrangements are not to be institutionalised, although the 
potential for political crises to arise in education, or, indeed, in any 
other sector of state activity, has not diminished. 
Although the Ministerial Reference Group was established 
immediately following the dissolution of the SCG, this, too, has 
completed its work, under the close direction of the Minister, and now 
no longer exists. The recommendations of the MRG effectively ended 
the bulk funding debate, making bulk funding (now euphemistically 
renamed 'Direct-Resourced Salaries' or DRS) a question of individual 
school choice. Few schools have chosen this form of funding in spite 
of the ability to opt-out of the scheme after three years. However, the 
extent to which the education sector is still characterised by conflict and 
opposition is indicated by the renewed struggles between the teacher 
unions and the state over rates of pay, performance appraisal, merit 
pay and, for primary teachers, pay parity. And, in response to 
government inaction over these issues, the teacher unions are, once 
more, engaged in strike action, rolling stoppages and have threatened 
to reimpose the moratorium on the implementation of the new 
curriculum. It would appear that 1996 is a repeat of the policy 
stalemate that occurred in 1992 - complete with general election, only 
this time in the uncertain political environment created by the new 
system of proportional representation. 
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That the current relationship between the government and teachers is 
ineffective is incontrovertible. Indeed, it is the primary source of the 
conflict that arises between the two. The SCG did nothing to change 
this, therefore conflict will continue. There is one significant 
difference between 1992 and 1996, however. Early this year a new 
Minister of Education was appointed. And, although the new Minister 
has demonstrated a much less confrontational approach than the 
previous Minister, the question that remains to be asked for 1996 is, in 
the context of the prevailing neo-Liberal institutional arrangement in 
education, does the change in Minister represent a change of substance 
or merely a change of style? 
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ApPENDIX I - RESEARCH ETHICS 
There are a number of ethical issues to be considered before 
undertaking this research. These issues include: 
• Confidentiality 
Access to documentation, minutes of meetings or any other records 
will be negotiated. Where the functioning of the Group could be 
compromised by access to records, the need to maintain confidentiality 
will be respected. However, while this research would be most 
productively carried out with the co-operation of the SCG, gaining 
information under the Official Information Act remains an option. 
• Interview Procedure 
All participants will be given transcripts of their interviews. They will 
be free to make additional comments, points of clarification or factual 
amendments. All interviews will be voluntary, with participants 
acting in their public capacities as representatives of the various 
member groups of the SCG, not as private individuals. Private 
opinions on any matter will not be sought. 
• Future use of information 
Interview transcripts, with the agreement of the interviewees, may be 
included as an appendix to the thesis to allow future readers to draw 
their own conclusions about the validity of the use of the material. 
Should this be agreed to, the interviewee will determine whether they 
wish to be identified. 
• Withdrawing from research 
Hopefully, this will not be necessary. The purpose of this research is to 
gain as full an account as possible of the formation and operation of 
the Schools Consultative Group with the co-operation of the members. 
Accordingly, ground-rules will be negotiated for the research process. 
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ApPENDIX II 
Representatives attending the first meeting of the Schools 
Consultative Group on 22 October were: 
Independent chairperson 
Independent deputy chairperson 
NZ School Trustees Association 
Secondary Principals' Association 
NZ Principals' Federation 
NZEI 
PPTA 
Proprietors of Integrated Schools 
Bulk-funded trial Schools - board chair 
principal 
Maori community representative 
Later Additions: 
Independent Schools' Council 
NZ Intermediate School Principals' Assn. 
Later Changes 
John Anderson 
Dean Halford 
Les Maxwell 
Ruma Karaitiana 
Br. Pat Lynch* 
Jean Packman 
Neville Lambert 
Kevin Bunker* 
Fr. John O'Neill 
David Jackson* 
Phil Raffills* 
Iri Tawhiwhirangi 
1 Jan Kerr 
1 John Sutcliffe* 
Ian Simpson subsequently replaced Pat Lynch as SPANZ 
representative when he became president, although Pat Lynch 
continued his participation as the representative for the Association of 
Proprietors of Integrated Schools instead of John O'Neill; Joanna 
Beresford* and Bruce Adin were representatives for NZEI after the 
death of Neville Lambert; Mark Farnsworth* replaced Ruma 
Karaitiana for STA; and John Fleming* replaced Jean Packman for 
NZPF. 
* Members interviewed. 
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APPENDIX III 
EDUCATION PRIORITIES IN THE SCHOOLS SECfOR 
Introduction 
1. Two parallel sets of reforms have been carried out in the education sector over the last 
ten years. The administrative reforms contained in "Tomorrow's Schools", and the 
cUrriculum and assessment reform on which the New Zealand Curriculum and 
Qualification Frameworks are based. 
2. During his term as Prime Minister and Minister of Education David Lange referred to 
these as the "two legs of the double". In one way this is an apt analogy since unless 
success is achieved in both "legs" the dividend is not paid out. 
3. It is also apt in that it describes the approach taken to the reforms. They have been 
carried out largely independent of each other. This on many occasions has led to conflict 
and confusion in schools which are ultimately responsible for their implementation. It 
has also resulted in one component of the reforms becoming the focus of this confusion 
and conflict. 
. 4. This paper attempts to trace the historical relationship between curriculum and 
assessment and administrative structures, identify the competing objectives and policy 
conflicts which must be balanced in the sector and suggest some ways in which these may 
be resolved. 
Role of Education in New Zealand 
5. The Ministry of Education Consultative document spells out the "National Aims for the 
21st Century". The second aim is that of a "high level of achievement in the essential 
learning areas and essential skills throughout the compulsory schools years." 
6. Since the Education Act of 1877 which established "free, secular and compulsory" 
education the role of schools has primarily been to impart the body of knowledge and 
skills that the society of the day considers "essential". Essential in terms of both its 
economic and social goals. 
7. What has changed over the years since the 1877 Act is the breadth and depth of what is 
considered to be essential knowledge and skills. 
8. In 1877 primary education was considered capable of imparting these. Secondary 
education was only available to those who could afford to pay fees or won scholarships to 
the few secondary schools. 
9. Various social pressures arising in part from the depression, which lasted from the 1880's 
into the 1890's, the emergence of a modem economy and the increasing role of the state, 
rather than the provinces, in the regulation of social and economic life in New Zealand 
led to increasing criticism of secondary schools as elitist and inappropriately reflecting the 
english class system many colonists had sought to escape. ' 
10. The Secondary Schools Act of 1903 marked a turning point in the accessibility of 
secondary education. The essential nature of secondary schools did not change however, 
despite repeated attempts to broaden the curriculum. Although by 1915 there were three 
distinct categories of secondary school: the 'secondary' school, the district high school, 
and newly developing technical high schools, the domination of the University Entrance 
Examination on the curriculum was a feature common to them all. 
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11. Between 1910 and 1920 there were a series of reforms in the areas of curriculum, teacher 
training and salaries, determination of staffing levels and school administration. All of 
these were part of a gradual centralisation of the system, which culminated in the 1920 
Education Act which authorised the establishment of national staffing and salary scales. 
12 Prior to this district education boards received grants under a capitation system. 
Secondary schools received capitation grants for free pupils on a sliding scale set against 
net income from endowment lands. Neither system distinguished between a salaries 
and operational component, or took into account school size, location or regional 
differences in operational costs. The result was substantial differences in the average 
salary of teachers and in class sizes. It was the perceived effect of these differences on the 
quality of teaching that led to the 1920 Act. 
13. Following the depression and the election of the Labour Government in 1935 there was 
an increased emphasis on education. The school leaving age was raised from 14 to 15, 
free post primary education was made available to age 19 and five years olds were once 
again admitted to schools. The proficiency examination sat at the end of primary 
schooling was abolished and effectively replaced by 5th form examinations. 
14. These measures reflected the expectation that learning the essential skills and knowledge 
required schooling up to the age of 15. However, there were still concerns about the 
'academic' nature of courses offered by secondary schools. In the 1940's half of secondary 
school students left before they had completed two years. There was concern that this 
meant they were not receiving a "sound basic education". 
15. These concerns led to the Thomas Report in 1942 recommending the separation of the 
University Entrance and School Certificate examinations, and the establishment of a 
compulsory curriculum for the lower secondary school. These recommendations were 
incorporated in the 1945 Education Act. 
16. In the prosperous years of the 1950's and 1960's the essentials continued to be taught to 
students in the lower secondary school. The School Certificate examination became both 
a credential for the job market and a means of determining a students appropriate place 
in the job market. Senior secondary schools offered preparation for the 'academic' 
vocations, and those who 'failed' School Certificate went on to obtain skilled and semi 
skilled work with, in some cases, additional training on the job. 
17. It was during this period that educational debate began to focus more and more on issues 
of equality of opportunity as social expectations, particularly with regard to the role of 
women, went through fundamental changes. 
18. Primary schools continued to develop excellence and expertise that became increasingly 
recognised internationally. 
19. Pressure to broaden the curriculum, this time in the senior secondary school mounted in 
the 1970's. Schools saw that they would reqUire greater flexibility in order to offer an 
increasing range of options to their students. The Secondary Staffing Report of 1983 based 
its recommendations on staffing levels in the senior school on this premise. 
Unemployment increased the pressure on schools as, repeating the pattern of the 1880's 
and 1890's, students who could not obtain work returned to school. 
20. It became clearer that the academic focus of the senior school could not cater for the needs 
of the students staying on to the sixth and seventh form. 
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21. Reviews of the curriculum and assessment practices led to the New Zealand Curriculum 
Framework and the New Zealand Qualifications Framework. The essential skills and 
knowledge now effectively require students to attend school till year 13, the seventh 
form. The compulsory school leaving age was raised to 16 in 1993 and at the same time 
the Government signalled its intention to extend it to age 17. 
22 Implementation of the curriculum and qualification frameworks are far from complete. 
Difficulties in implementation have frustrated many who support their basic thrust. 
They have also come under attack from teachers, academics and other sectors of the 
community. 
23. It would seem critical that, if they are to stand any chance of success, the completion of 
the curriculum and assessment reforms becomes the priority in education over the next 
two to three years. 
24. This is the context within which policies on the quality of teaching, resource allocation, 
institutional structures and any further administrative reform should be made. 
"Tom arrows Sch ools" Adm in istratjye Reform s 
·25. The need for reform of the administrative structures in education was generally accepted 
at the time the Picot Taskforce to Review Education Administration, was established. 
The degree of control exercised by the Department of Education over school decisions was 
viewed as inflexible and inappropriate. A consensus existed about the need to redefine 
the relationship between the central authority and the individual school in a way which 
would devolve greater decision making ability to the schooL 
26. The concensus broke down on analysis of the objectives of the devolved structure. On 
the one hand the devolved system was seen as an extension of the state sector reform 
model to schools, on the other it was seen as a vehicle which would enhance the 
involvement of parents in education . 
. Zl. While at a superficial level the structures recommended by the Picot Taskforce appeared 
to be able to deliver on both objectives, in practice it has created confusion over the roles 
of the various groups involved. 
28. The thinking behind the objective of greater parental involvement is that of democratic 
schooling and empowerment to produce the best local school community response 
within the policy and resource parameters set by the central agencies. The partnership 
between parents, teachers and the government as representative of wider societal 
interests is stressed as are democratic processes for resolving the conflicts which would 
invariably arise. 
··29. This concept of partnership was one key aspect of "Tomorrows Schools". The running of 
the institution was described as a partnership between the professionals and the 
community within which it was located, the Board of Trustees being the mechanism 
serving the partnership. The charter was to be the covenant, or contract between the 
community and the school and the school and the state. 
30. The extension of wider state sector reform to education devolution applies a model 
which uses devolution as a mechanism to enhance individual freedom of choice by 
competition between education providers. The trustees become the managers of a 
business competing for custom with other providers. The interests of the state as owner 
and funder are dealt with by an emphasis on outcomes and accountability. 
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31. The focus of a democratic system is the school community, the focus of the second model 
is the individual. 
32 The interaction between objectives resulted in the unique nature of administration 
reform in the education sector. For example, unlike the health sector where a 
distinction was made by the National Interim Provider Board between purchase and 
provider interests, both interests are devolved to the school in the education sector. 
33. Where all other state agencies have a management structure which is headed by a 
professional appointed Board of Directors, Boards of Trustees are elected by the school 
community and offer their services on a voluntary basis. 
34. Another key aspect of 'Tomorrows Schools' was the unification of the separate primary 
and secondary sectors in a number of important ways. Boards of Trustees replaced the 
secondary school Board of Governors and primary school control by Education Boards. 
Teacher registration replaced the separate classification and certification procedures. The 
operational component of school funding was unified as was property management. 
35. Major areas were not unified. These were teacher training, staffing and remuneration 
structures. These continue to form major barriers to realising the concept of a seamless 
education system in the schools sector. Boards of Trustees have also become barriers in 
this respect as they focus inwards on the needs of their school and attracting students in 
.competition with neighbouring schools. There is no agency or forum with responsibility 
for considering the educational needs of the wider community. 
36. Administering for Excellence recognised in part the need for some form of district 
structure which would give "valuable feed back on the efficient running of the education 
system" on matters such as funding levels, curriculum, opening and closing of 
institutions, administrative support, discussion and initiation of policy, resolution of 
local conflicts of interest and sharing of professional and consumer views. Picot stressed 
that the district level structures, should cut across sectoral boundaries. 
-37. Other factors contributed to the confusion created at the school level by the competing 
objectives of the reforms. 
38. The restructuring was carried out during a period of tight fiscal control leading to 
decisions often being made in order to accede to the simple pragmatic desire to control 
and sometimes reduce education costs. 
39. The Employment Contracts Act changed the nature of employment relationships in 
schools, particularly those of teachers, over the same period. Narrow industrial 
objectives became enmeshed with aspects of the reforms, giving contract negotiations the 
unwarranted status of driving reform rather than supporting it. It also ensured a large 
measure of support from parents for the teacher unions as they opposed parts of the 
reform. 
40. Whenever a programme of decentralisation has overcome its teething problems few 
advocate a return to the past. This is the case with the implementation of Tomorrows 
Schools. One would be hard placed to find advocates of the old education boards or 
central control over the operations component of school funding. Equally parents, and 
teachers, are strongly supportive of boards of trustees as a way parents can have a greater 
sa y in their school. 
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41. Many do wish to move on, adapt, and improve the system. The key areas in which 
clarification and improvement are required are: 
(i) The role of the Board of Trustees. It needs to be acknowledged that structures 
which are viable in enhancing parental involvement are not necessarily the same 
as those which are viable in management terms. The voluntary nature of boards, 
the number of schools (2,700), the variation in size (from one teacher primary 
schools to secondary schools with over 80 teachers), and the intense interpersonal 
dynamics created by board members being both parents, and involved in decisions 
which affect the teachers of their children, are all factors which need to be taken 
into account. 
(ii) The financial viability of focussing on the school as the base unit for all aspects of 
management. The risks to the school of bad management decisions can result in 
financial liabilities that they are unable to sustain. Recent examples of successful 
legal action taken against schools are one example. The isolation and size of many 
primary schools are other factors as is the increasing inequality between schools 
related to the relative wealth of school communities. 
(iii) The educational viability of schools as stand alone competitive units. If the 
objective of equality of educational opportunity is to be achieved some 
ratjonalisation of institutional structures will need to occur over time. Currently 
such rationalisation requires boards of trustees to contemplate their own demise 
while at the same time competitively marketing their school. 
(iv) Removal of barriers to seamlessness. The form and location of institutions will 
necessarily need to be responsive over time. Recent attempts to change the form 
of schools (e.g. the creation of middle schools) have failed or only occurred with 
political intervention. Existing separate staffing, teacher training and 
remuneration structures need to be addressed to minimise barriers to change. 
Structures also need to exist which emphasise the commonality of interest 
between schools and are able to address the need to rationalise institutional 
structures in the interests of providing the best education for the wider 
community. 
(v) Central policy direction. The existence of over five central bureaucracies with no 
overall effective co-ordination of the various policy strands has created confusion 
and chaos in schools. Implementation of the curriculum and qualification 
reforms must be professionally managed by a dedicated unit which is able to place 
other proposed changes within this context. 
(vi) Junction points between the centre and the school. New Zealand is unique 
amongst OECD countries in having only two effective loci for decision making, 
the centre or the school. Many functions such as property management, equity 
funding, sharing of best practice, risk management and dispute resolution could 
well be managed in regional support units. 
Unresolved Issues 
42 The first section of this paper has briefly described the development of the two parallel 
sets of reforms undertaken in the education sector in the last decade. A number of issues, 
both ongoing and arising specifically out of the reforms, remain unresolved. This has 
created a degree of inertia and uncertainty in schools. For the sector to move forward a 
clear direction needs to be re-established . 
. 4.'3. The issues need to be addressed sequentially, firstly clarifying the role of schools, then 
how that is best achieved and fina liv how it is to be resourced. 
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First Order Issues: Curriculum and Qualification Frameworks 
44. Without commenting in any detail on the reforms inherent in the implementation of 
the Frameworks themselves there appears to be a number of problems with the 
programme of implementation. These fall into four main areas. 
Presentational 
45. While there has been considerable effort put into promotion of the Frameworks it would 
be difficult to find an ordinary parent, or for that matter teacher, with a comprehensive 
understanding of what they are and what the impact of them will be on their child's 
education. In the absence of a common community understanding of the change there 
will be a strong desire to fall back on the familiarity of traditional subject areas and 
examina tions. 
46. It may be that a more explicit enunciation of the broad pathways available to students 
through the units of the Qualifications Framework would assist in establishing this 
cornmon understanding. 
Policy Integration 
47. Integration of curriculum and qualifications policy and their operational implications is 
required in order to provide a framework within which schools can plan. For example 
schools need to have an understanding of where the emphasis should lie between the 
Curriculum Framework and the potential range of units on the Qualifications 
Framework as a student progresses through secondary schooling. 
48. Also, integration of courses and programmes offered by schools, and tertiary institutions 
in response to ITO and academic requirements is needed to ensure that the paths 
embarked on by students at a secondary school are viable post school and throughout 
their working lives. 
Support for Refonn 
49. In order to support the reform initiatives the implications for teacher training (pre-
service and ongoing), careers advice to students, and mechanisms and structures to 
support and encourage consistency of standards and sharing of best practice need to be 
analysed and consequential policy developed and initiated. 
Resourcing 
SO. The current resources provided to schools support the now outdated systems. A re-
evaluation of the provision of property, equipment, technology, teacher staffing and 
teacher support staffing is required in the new context. 
51. Some of the answers to the questions raised will not elicit immediate solutions. Many 
will need to be worked through as schools gain confidence and experience. However, the 
process of identifying such questions and providing forums for debating and finding 
solutions needs to be built into any implementation plan. 
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Change Management 
52 The primacy of the curriculum and qualifications reform needs to be established and the 
relationship between the two clarified. Management of the reform requires a clear 
implementation plan which takes account of the implications for workforce planning 
(including pre-service and ongoing teacher training), property and equipment. Teachers 
and boards need to be able to clearly see the implications for themselves and their schools 
as part of a realistic implementation programme. 
Second Order Issues: Four Policy Areas 
53. Four key policy issues underlie much of the debate that surrounds the curriculum, 
qualification and administrative reforms of the last decade. They are issues which are the 
subject of ongoing debate and raise numerous questions to which there are no "correct" 
answers. Resolution of these require a sophisticated balancing of competing demands. 
In order to introduce sustainable policy reform the solution for the time also requires the 
support of parents, teachers and principals to make it work. 
Parental Choice 
·54. The primacy given to parental (and student) choice has a significant impact on the 
allocation and management of resources as it raises questions about the basic unit of 
devolution - the individual student/parent or the community. Where parental choice is 
given primacy, parents and students are viewed as customers deciding where to .allocate 
their education dollar (or voucher). 
55. The New Zealand debate has tended to focus on choice of educational institution. The 
validity of state mandated curricula and compulsory attendance is also open to question 
if the concept is consistently applied. 
56. If as argued in the first part of the paper, as a community New Zealand has determined 
that school attendance and the curriculum is compulsory, student and parental choice 
must operate within those constraints. 
57. The practical implementation of parental choice must take into account other factors 
such as: 
(i) The age of the student. As illustrated by concerns expressed recently by parents in 
Auckland, access to the local primary school is important. The practicality of five 
year olds travelling long distances to school stretches the resources of even 
moderately affluent parents and exclusion from the local primary school is foreign 
to the expectations of New Zealand parents. 
(ii) Location. For the majority of students the possibility of choice between a range of 
schools is highly unlikely due to the size of communities and geographical 
location. Distance learning, home schooling, and boarding school have limited 
appeal and are beyond the resources of most parents. They are also options which 
question the role of schools in enhancing social cohesion. 
(iii) Property management. The Property Taskforce drew attention to the fact that 
parental choice is limited by controls over capital works. The comment by the 
sec goes on to point out that schools which are popular would need the flexibility 
to purchase additional land and buildings to accommodate demand. This would 
leave surplus property in other neighbouring schools and of course as the 
'popularity' of schools change over time, difficulties in efficient property 
management. 
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(iv) School choice. Where a school is popular with parents inevitability leads to the 
school rather than the parent having the choice of which students it will accept for 
enrolment. 
(v) Commonality of Interest between Schools. The concept of the school as a 'one 
stop shop' is increasingly outmoded. The potential for schools to work together 
and be resourced in recognition of this is important. For example the sole teacher 
in an isolated primary school should be able to access the resources of the 
Correspondence School. Schools should be encouraged to work together for 
mutual benefit. There should be positive incentives for such behaviour which is 
difficult when schools are in competition for students. 
58. Despite the difficulties outlined above there would not be widespread support for a 
return to zoning. What is clear however is that access both to the local school, the school 
of choice, and for rural students, quality education at their local school are key concerns. 
59. New Zealand parents have a strong collective sense of the nature of schools, and 
recognise that schools must mediate across a wide variety of views and the consequence 
of this is that they will not always get what they personally want. The focus of New 
Zealand parents especially in the primary years is on the school as representing its local 
community needs. As students get older and parents look to the school in terms of 
increasing their child's employment chances, choice of type of school becomes more 
important. 
Equality of Opportunity 
60. As economic and social pressures increase, concerns about the ability of the system to 
encourage all students to achieve their full potential also increase. Examples of system 
failure become more apparent as students who 'fail' at school go on to fail to obtain 
employment with associated social costs. 
61. An inclusive curriculum and targeting of resources is required to address the inequities 
that arise. Management of the system is also required to ensure that the quality of 
teaching and management decisions made by boards of trustees does not vary in a way 
which penalises students. 
62 Parental choice creates difficulties in ensuring that all students receive the highest quality 
schooling. As one school is perceived as popular it attracts a status which is 
communicated to the students staff and community. Teachers will be attracted to high 
status schools along with students, taking with them both professional expertise and 
resources. While this may benefit the popular school it can have substantial detrimental 
effects on the surrounding schools as resources diminish, jobs become insecure, and 
students would rather be elsewhere. The students in these schools may be disadvantaged 
by the choice of others. 
63. Of course these situations can be turned around and occur mainly in urban centres where 
there are viable options. However, the damage that occurs to the education of students 
in the lower status school during the process is often unable to be remedied and 
represents wasted potential. 
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National Standards and Local Decision Making 
64. The desirable degree of local versus central control varies depending on the task. It has 
been the right of secondary schools to hire and fire teachers since their inception, 
however the determining of teacher remuneration structures moved from local control 
to national control in order to address inequities in the ability of schools to pay staff and 
the resulting inequity in quality of teaching. A high degree of standardisation in 
curriculum and assessment has occurred alongside devolution of resource management. 
65. It would seem sensible to adopt a pragmatic approach when determining where decisions 
should be made rather than applying the same model to all decisions. One difficulty with 
the current system is the lack of any effective intermediate structure between the centre 
and the school. It assumes that a decision 'lbout appropriate levels of funding for each 
school can be made at the centre. 
Cost Containment and Effectiveness 
66. The drive to reduce costs across the state sector has led to a reduction in real terms in the 
resourcing of schools. Productivity gains have been made as a result but services have 
also been cut back. 
~ 67. The schools sector is currently resourced on the basis of precedent and historical costs. 
There is a real need for a comprehensive assessment of whether this is still valid 
following the curriculum and assessment changes. 
68. Schools and communities will always plead for an increase in resources. A sound 
information base is required to match what is required of schools, spelt out in charter and 
curriculum statements, with the costs of the system. Such information must underpin 
systems of accountability, inform judgement about appropriate devolvement of decision 
making and be the basis of debate about resource levels. 
Third Order Issues 
69. The issue of third order is the resourcing of the system in order to deliver the curriculum 
in the way determined most sUltabie for the time. 
70. Other than at times of curriculum and assessment reform the focus of public debate in 
the schools sector is most often on the level and form of resources delivered to each 
school. 
71. During a time of reform it is important to re-examine resourcing levels and form to 
ensure that they support the change. 
72. An examination of these issues is the subject of another paper. 
Summary 
73. This paper makes the case for consideration of specific school sector issues in the context 
of the priority in education over the next two to three years. 
74. It is proposed that this priority is the full implementation of the N.Z. Curriculum 
Framework and the N.Z. Qualifications Framework. 
248 
75. If this proposition is accepted the issues in the sector that are required to be addressed, 
naturally fall into three categories: 
(i) General Approach: 
The education sector is always the focus of intense debate as it reflects how we 
view ourselves as a society, what skills and knowledge we wish to pass on to 
future generations and what values and belief systems we consider important. 
Those who work in schools balance the demands of students, parents, 
communities, employers, government and personal needs on a day to day basis. 
Their good will is essential to any true implementation of refonn. Refonn is put 
at risk if this is not recognised as a feature of the sector that must be managed 
positively. 
(ii) Change Management: 
Recognition needs to be given to the complexity of the refonns. They require 
careful management and a sophisticated knowledge of the interactions and 
tensions inherent in the sector. Experience in the education sector itself, as well 
as elsewhere in the state, indicate that a dedicated change management team is the 
best way to integrate policy, implementation and ongoing operational decisions in 
a time of refonn. 
(iii) Administration: 
The Picot reforms need to be adapted and improved to clarify the role of boards of 
trustees, reassess the financial and educational viability of the school as the base 
unit for all aspects of management, address the absence of meaningful co-
ordination of policy at the centre, remove the remaining barriers to a seamless 
education system and create effective junction points between the centre and the 
school. 
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TEACHER STAFFING RESOURCE DELIVERY MECHANISMS 
OPTIONS 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 The Schools Consultative Group identified and commented on a number of delivery 
mechanisms in its interim report published in December 1993. 
12 Having completed the staffing review in the first half of 1994 the Group returned to the 
question of delivery mechanism. Discussion centred around two proposals; 
(0 partially bulk funding all schools based on the divisions of the teaching role 
contained in the conceptual staffing framework, and 
(ii) allowing schools to choose the kind of delivery mechanism considered most 
appropriate to their school. In very general terms the choice would be between 
delivery in teaching hours, delivery in cash or a mix of the two in a proportion to 
be determined by each board . 
. 13 It was recognised by the Group, at its meeting on the fourth of July, that further work of 
a technical nature needed to be carried out in order to describe the options in detail, 
investigate their effect on schools, and cost the proposals. 
1.4 The Group was consulted on the wording of the terms of reference of a technical group 
to undertake this work and the agreement reached was communicated to the Minister of 
Education in mid August. 
1.5 This paper describes and comments on the four options now available to the 
Government in determining the mechanism for delivering resources to schools in 
order for them to employ teachers. These are: 
(i) Retain the status quo, 
(ii) Apply a type of bulk funding to all schools, 
(iii) Offer boards a choice of delivery mechanism, 
(iv) Apply partial bulk funding to all schools. 
1.6 Two closely related issues are also discussed, the amount of resource delivered to each 
school, and the approach to employment contracts. 
1.7 The paper is divided into the following sections: 
1.0 Introduction 
20 Status Quo 
3.0 Full Bulk Funding 
4.0 Board Choice of mechanism 
5.0 Partial Bulk Funding 
6.0 Level of Resourcing 
7.0 Approach to Employment Contracts 
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2.0 Status Quo 
2.1 Removing the Teacher Salaries Grant (TSG) and Salaries Grant for Management (SGM) 
from the picture, the status quo could best be described as the delivery of up to 90% of 
teacher salaries in hours or full time teacher equivalents and the smaller proportion in 
cash. 
Key Considerations 
• Delivery in teacher time ensures that schools are able to appoint the best teacher 
for the position irrespective of the costs of employment. In order to control these 
costs a national collective employment contract is required to set at least 
maximum and minimum rates of pay within a framework of employment 
conditions. 
• It also draws a direct link between an assessment, made nationally, of the 
teaching time required to deliver the curriculum and the resources received by a 
school. 
• Certain aspects of the current formulae have invested it with rigidity that is not 
necessarily intrinsic to the delivery of resource in time. An example is the 
specification of certain management positions in the staffing Orders in Council. 
• Given that a number of initiatives in place (SGM) or due to be implemented over 
the next two years (outcome of the review of supplementary resourcing) already 
redefine the status quo its maintenance is not strictly viable. 
• Under such a scenario a number of key issues would remain unresolved and be 
vulnerable to adhoc decisions. These would include the future of the TSG trial 
schools, the desire for greater flexibility in management structures particularly at 
the secondary level and the interface between the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
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3.0 Full Bulk Funding 
3.1 This option delivers all resources to schools in cash. This is the TSG scheme trial model 
although changes to the formula determining the nominal national pay rate could 
reduce the number of schools whose existing staffing bill falls above or below the 
formula entitlement. 
Key Considerations 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
This option would face strong opposition from opponents of bulk funding and 
proponents of school choice alike resulting in loss of board and teacher goodwill. 
However if implementation in face of such strong opposition was achieved it 
would have the advantage of administrative completeness. 
Ongoing opposition would be related to problems of the new system rather than 
the change itself. Research indicates that these problems may not be 
inconsequential. It is clear that not all boards of trustees would be capable of 
managing such a system without considerable support. This was the reason for 
the SCG recommending in its interim report that full bulkfunding not be applied 
to all schools. 
While initially some schools with disadvantaged students may benefi't, in cash 
terms in transition to the new system, once established it creates a stronger 
relationship between the total income of a board and the type and number of 
teachers it is able to employ. If devolution of responsibility for employment 
contract negotiations followed this link would be stronger. Questions are then 
raised about the ability of the Government to provide resources to less 
advantaged schools to offset those that well off schools could use to supplement 
teacher salaries. 
The ability to manage the sector over time becomes more complex under full 
bulk funding than at present. Changing institutional structures is difficult in the 
current context. In an environment when the educational and financial viability 
of existing structures to deliver the requirements of the curriculum are being 
questioned, this is an important factor. 
Bulk funding of all schools has the potential to increase the predictability of the 
teacher salaries budget although the degree to which this would be realised in an 
environment which encourages choice of school and thus the potential for a high 
degree of student mobility and movement of resources is debatable. Certainly it 
would make the variable effect of the current incremental steps for "basic scale" 
teachers a school level issue rather than one dealt with on a national basis. 
In order to reduce the number of schools whose actual budget would be below the 
notional average in transition, the bulk funding formulae would have to be set at 
the top of the current basic scale. An analysiS of the cost of this was incorporated 
in the terms of reference of the technical group proposed by the SCG. As the 
demographics of the teaching workforce changes and older more expensive 
teachers leave the system, the potential for overall savings is lost under this 
proposal. 
This model is consistent with the move towards self managing schools. It allows 
boards to have full control over all their resources and the flexibility to make 
decisions on the type and mix of resources that best meet their needs. 
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4.0 Board Choice of Mechanism 
4.1 This option was proposed initially to the SCC by the School Trustees Association. It is 
proposed that boards are given the choice between delivery of resources in cash, in 
hours/full time teacher equivalents or any proportional mix of the two. 
42 Because of the difficulty of analysis of this option without the detail of the options 
before it the SCC recommended that a technical group carry out such work. 
43 The Ministry of Education considers that only a small number of schools would choose 
a bulk funding option, at least initially. 
Key Considerations 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Offering boards a choice of mechanism acknowledges that bulk funding is not 
appropriate for all schools. It is not a real option for a large number of schools 
due to factors such as the opportunity for flexibility being related to the size of 
school, the nature of existing contractual arrangements and the expertise 
available to the school on its board of trustees. This could create a degree of 
resentment between schools based on a sense that some were benefiting at the 
expense of others. 
Schools which picked up bulk funding under this option could be expe<;:ted to 
have a high level of commitment to making it work, a characteristic of schools in 
the TSG triaL This would be especially so as they would make such a choice in an 
environment similar to that prior to the setting up of the SCC. That is, a school 
based union campaign of opposition. This opposition would threaten the 
viability of implementing wider reform in the sector at both a school and 
national level. 
The option would allow schools to benefit from bulk funding when they were 
ready to do so, however as relatively few schools could be expected to opt in few 
would benefit. 
Boards could be expected to make the decision based on optimising the resources 
available to the school. This would have the effect of maximising the costs to the 
system but no more so than a total bulk funding formula set at a level to cover 
the most expensive salary structure. 
Questions of management of the system over time are raised under this option 
with respect to viability of changing board membership, rationalisation of schools 
and implementation of change. Details such as whether boards could change 
their decision and the scope for varying the choice of mix of cash and hours are 
critical and as yet undefined. If a new board were unable to review a previous 
boards decision the conclusion would be that this option was less about choice 
than about bulk funding by evolution. 
The relationship of the SCM to this option would need to be determined but TSG 
schools could obviously continue with little or no change should they wish. 
Management of such a system per se would have high ongoing risks and 
transaction costs as schools constantly reviewed their decision on the most 
appropriate delivery mechanisms. The practicality of managing a large number 
of different delivery mechanisms for over 2,700 schools is also questionable. 
Under this option the issues would remain at large and the debate around the 
best could be expected to continue and be vulnerable to political change. At best a 
small number of schools would gain some benefit from, in the main, optimising 
the level of resourcing achievable. 
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5.0 Partial Bulk Funding 
5.1 This option would consist of an increase in the proportion of all schools funding 
delivered in cash. The way in which the cash proportion was decided would be aimed at 
addressing the main areas requiring increased flexibility. There are a number of ways of 
determining the proportion to be bulk funded. The potential of changing the 
proportions in the future is not ruled out. 
52 One way that has been discussed by the sec is the delivery of the equity and 
management components of teacher staffing in cash. Depending on the formula, size 
and type of school, this could cover up to 45% of teaching staff. The consistency of 
delivery of the core curriculum would be maintained by delivery of this component in 
teaching hours. 
Key Considerations 
• It could receive the support of the unions as well as the majority of boards and 
principals, thus retaining the goodwill in the sector essential for the effective 
implementation of the wider reform programme. 
• It allows all schools to benefit from the experience of bulk funding in a 
manageable way. 
• Implementation of the option would enable the SCM system and TSC schools to 
be accommodated. 
• This option would represent a considerable step forward from the status quo and 
provide both the basis for further reform and a relatively settled environment in 
the schools sector. 
• It is not however the full bulk funding model and as such would require the 
maintenance of some form of centralized contract negotiating. 
• This would create the opportunity for reform of the teacher employment 
contracts particularly in the creation of greater flexibility in management 
structures. 
• The implementation of such a model would require careful planning to ensure 
that boards of trustees would be able to cope with the new demands the system 
will place on them. 
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6.0 Level of Resourcing 
6.1 The current levels of resourcing for the employment of teachers have been developed 
over time in response to the increasing demands of the curriculum. Substantial reviews 
of staffing levels in primary, secondary and area schools were carried out in the early 
1980's. 
6.2 Since these reviews and their partial implementation, a number of new initiatives and 
imperatives have corne into play. These include the curriculum and qualification 
frameworks, the impact of new technology on teaching methods, and the concept of a 
seamless education system. 
6 .3 The current staffing schedules and formulae need to be reviewed in light of these 
factors. The Conceptual Framework for teacher staffing recommended by the Schools 
Consultative Group (SCG) provides the basis for such a review. 
6 .4 Attention to this element of the overall question of teacher staffing would do much to 
allay fears in the sector that policy is driven by a desire to cut the overall cost of the 
teacher salaries budget. 
6..5 The description and comment on the delivery mechanism contained herein assumes 
that work will proceed and result in agreement on new staffing formulae. 
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7.0 Approach to Employment Contracts 
7.1 The form and content of the teacher employment contracts are a critical part of the 
debate over the advantages and disadvantages of the various funding options. 
72 Much of the flexibility sought in managing teaching staff in schools is related to the 
substance of teacher employment contracts rather than the funding mechanism. For 
example the call for greater flexibility in management structures, especially in secondary 
schools, can not be responded to without fundamental change to remuneration 
structures. 
73 Some definitions of a self managing school also include localised contractual 
arrangements with the responsibility for negotiation of teacher contracts devolved to the 
board of trustees. 
7.4 In the absence of the financial controls of a fully bulk funded system, it is sensible to 
maintain a large measure of control over the costs of employment at the centre. The 
degree to which it is appropriate to devolve this responsibility in a bulk funded 
environment was an issue only touched on briefly by the SCC. It raises another set of 
inter related and complex questions. 
7.s A number of factors argue for little change to this area until other matters are 
determined and implementation problems resolved. The Employment Contracts Act 
requires the agreement of each individual teacher to changes in their contract. As 
fundamental changes are being sought in the way teachers as a group are remunerated 
the process most likely to achieve the change is a collective one. There are strong signals 
from the unions that given a positive environment substantial change to existing 
contracts would be possible. Devolving another area of responsibility to boards when 
many are indicating difficulties with current work loads and responsibilities would be 
questionable. 
76 Robust regional structures to advise and support boards on contract and personnel 
matters would be critical in ensuring the success of further devolution of employment 
matters. From a purely pragmatic point of view it may not be possible to make what are 
perceived to be unpalatable changes in too many areas at one time. 
7.7 As mentioned the SCC did not discuss the issues of the employment contract in any 
depth. The above points are observations which require further analysis. 
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